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FOREWORD
In the spring of 1985, the Third Bi-Annual Institute for Natural Resources Law Teachers was held at the University of Denver College of
Law. At this gathering of prominent scholars, a wide array of legal topics in natural resources law were discussed. Among the most valuable
products of this convocation was the airing of fresh approaches to litigating natural resources disputes and the presentation of careful critiques of several controversial theories, such as the public trust and classic
property clause, that are having a profound influence upon natural resources law. This issue was conceived as a vehicle for disseminating a
sampling of the ideas presented at the Institute beyond the province of
Academia.
On behalf of the Board of Editors, I would like to thank David P.
Phillips, Executive Director of the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation, for his invaluable guidance and support in the conception of this
issue. The financial assistance provided by the Foundation, through its
Scholarship and Grants Committee, is also deeply appreciated by the
Review. Finally, I would be remiss if I did not extend thanks to the Eastern Mineral Law Foundation and the Southwestern Legal Foundation
who, in conjunction with the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation,
sponsored a truly memorable Institute.
Peter A. Fahmy
Symposium Editor

THE MYTH OF THE CLASSIC PROPERTY
CLAUSE DOCTRINE
DALE

D.

GOBLE*

INTRODUCTION

As befits its name, the "classic property clause doctrine" Iis a variation on the ubiquitous Golden Age myth: during some remote age, heroes lived among us and the truth was understood. But the truth has
been lost and the scourge we face is punishment for our sin, for failing
to be heroes ourselves. The truth from the Golden Age is the "classic
property clause doctrine," the thesis that the federal government as a
landowner has only limited powers; the sin is slothfulness, the unwillingness "to expend the intellectual effort necessary to comprehend [the]
intricacies" of the truth;2 the scourge is the waning of state authority
3
over the federal lands as highlighted by the Kleppe decision.
The classic theory has assumed two different forms. The first concludes that in managing federal lands Congress lacks the power to preempt state laws because its proper constitutional role is that of a mere
proprietor. As with other landowners, federal interests as a proprietor
* B.A., Columbia College; J.D., University of Oregon. Special thanks to Carol
Bradford, Art Smith, and Charles Wilkinson for reading an earlier draft of this article. The
research for this article was partially funded by a grant from the University of Idaho Research Council.
i. The term was applied by Professor David Engdahl. See Engdahl, State and Federal
Power over Federal Property, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. 283, 288 (1976). The basic tenets of the argument are, however, considerably older. The first detailed statement of the position I have
found is an address of Ninian Edward, Governor of Illinois, to the Illinois General Assembly. See Address by Governor Edwards, Illinois General Assembly (Dec. 2, 1828), reprinted
in HouseJournal, 6th Assembly, 1st Sess. 10-39 (Kaskaskia, 11. 1829).
A historical basis for the position is set out in two articles prompted by the decision in
United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947), that the federal government had the paramount right to sea floor within three miles of shore. Hardwicke, Illig & Patterson, The
Constitution and the ContinentalShelf, 26 TEX. L. REV. 398 (1948); Patterson, The Relation of the
Federal Government to the Territoriesand the States in Landholding, 28 TEX. L. REV. 43 (1949); cf.
Clark, National Sovereignty and Dominion over Lands Underlying the Ocean, 27 TEX. L. REv. 140
(1948) (defending the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. California).
More recently, the "Sagebrush Rebellion" prompted a reexamination of the respective authority of federal and state governments over the public lands. E.g., Brodie, A Question of Enumerated Powers: ConstitutionalIssues SurroundingFederal Ownership of the Public Lands,
12 PAC. L.J. 693 (1981); Leshy, Unraveling the Sagebrush Rebellion: Law, Politics, and Federal
Lands, 14 U.C.D.L. REV. 317 (1980); Note, The Property Power, Federalism, and the Equal Footing Doctrine, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 817 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, PropertyPower]; Note,
The Sagebrush Rebellion: Who Should Control the Public Lands?, 1980 UTAH L. REV. 505 [hereinafter cited as Note, Sagebrush Rebellion].
Finally, after the initial draft of this article was completed, another article covering
some of the same ground came to hand. See Gaetke, Refuting the "Classic" Property Clause
Theory, 63 N.C.L. REV. 201 (1985).
2. Engdahl, supra note 1,at 384.
3. Id. at 349 (referring to Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976)).
495
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can be overridden by state law. 4 The second and more extreme variation has most recently been associated with the "Sagebrush Rebellion."
Proponents of this variation assert that Congress lacks the constitutional
authority to hold lands even as a proprietor and, therefore, is required
5
to transfer title into state or private hands.
Despite their dissimilar conclusions, advocates of both variations of
the classic doctrine share a common analysis. Beginning with the proposition that the federal government has only those powers delegated to
it in the Constitution, they note that the Constitution contains two separate clauses applicable to real property. The first, in article I, provides
for "exclusive legislation" over land acquired with the consent of the
state in which it is located. 6 The second, in article IV, grants Congress
the power to "make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the
Territory or other Property [of] the United States." '7 For proponents of
the classic doctrine, the presence of two clauses is decisive. Because the
article I clause preempts all state laws, the article IV clause must therefore lack preemptive effect. 8 Advocates of both variations of the classic
doctrine thus share a fundamental proposition: the article IV property
clause is not a grant of power to govern federal land once that land is
4. Engdahl, supra note 1, at 296.
5. See, e.g., Brodie, supra note 1, at 694; Hardwicke, Illig
& Patterson, supra note 1,at
408, 416-20; Patterson, supra note 1, at 58-60. Despite the difference in their conclusions,
the classic theorists share a common core of ideas and assumptions, which is the subject of
this article.
6. The article I clause grants Congress the power
to exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District . . . as
may . . . become the Seat of the Government . . .and to exercise like authority
over all places purchased by Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the
Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-yards, and
other needful Buildings.
U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl.17.
7. Article IV grants Congress the "Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules
and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United
States." U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 3, cl.2. Although the grant of "exclusive legislation" over
article I property has created few difficulties, the grant of power in article IV has been a
source of conflict. Professor Engdahl argues that this discord results from the fact that the
clause is the source of federal authority over two distinct types of federal property: territory outside of any state and non-article I property within a state. He argues that this
divergence has produced confusion because - despite their common source in article IV
- the scope of federal power over each type of land is distinctly different. When the
United States acquires title by conquest or purchase to land outside any state, it obtains
both title to and exclusive governmental jurisdiction over the land because there isno other
sovereign within the territory. Engdahl, supra note 1, at 292. Once the territory becomes a
state, however, there is another sovereign and the federal government's powers under
article IV necessarily changes as a result of the equal footing doctrine, which limits federal
power in new states to the power it had in the original thirteen states. Id. at 293-96.
8. Some proponents of the classic doctrine do recognize two situations in which federal law based on article IV preempted state law during the classical period. Engdahl,
supra note 1,at 296-97, 306-08; Note, Property Power, supra note 1, at 821. These exceptions are discussed at infra notes 55-64 and accompanying text.
In addition, the doctrine's proponents acknowledge that the United States may rely
upon an enumerated power as the basis for statutes preempting state control over federal
property. The classic theorists' thesis is simply that the article IV clause grants no additional power.
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included within a state. 9 Congressional power over property differs fundamentally from its power over commerce,' 0 coinage,' or road construction 12 because the property power ceases with statehood. The
classic doctrine thus resolves into an equal footing argument: because
the federal government had no dominium or imperium over land as land in
the original thirteen states, the presence of either in the new states vio3
lates equal footing.'
Given their rejection of the accepted construction of the article IV
clause, classic theorists have a substantial burden. They must demonstrate not only that their interpretation is permissible, but also that it is
constitutionally mandated; that is, they must prove that the constitutional text is determinate and that their interpretation is the only permissible one.
There are a host of arguments that they might employ to meet this
burden. Proponents of the doctrine might, for example, argue that the
clause's language commands their position, that land differs from other
possible objects of federal power, therefore, requiring differing interpretive procedures, or, in the alternative, that the history of the drafting
or subsequent judicial application of the clause makes their interpretation inescapable.
The proponents of the doctrine unfortunately fail to carry their burden of persuasion. Although attractive, 14 the doctrine is fundamentally
misconceived. First, while imperium and dominium are generally separate
in this country, there is no legal or logical requirement for this separa9. Brodie, supra note 1, at 694, 710-11; Engdahl, supra note 1, at 296-300, 384; Hardwicke, Illig & Patterson, supra note 1, at 408; Note, Property Power, supra note 1, at 837.
10. U.S. CONssr. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
11. Id. at cl. 5.
12. Id. at cl. 7.
13. The classic theorists do not state the dichotomy in terms of imperium and dominium,
though this seems their thrust. Engdahl, for example, distinguishes between "governmental jurisdiction" and the "limited powers of a proprietor." Engdahl, supra note 1, at 296.
See also Hardwicke, Illig & Patterson, supra note 1, at 431-32 (federal government becomes
an imperial government when it holds property for other than "governmental purposes").
"Dominium" is "perfect and complete property or ownership in a thing"; "imperium" is
"the right to command, which includes the right to employ the force of the state to enforce
the laws." I BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY 605, 990 (Rawle's ed. 1897). The terms have
acquired the general meaning of "property" and "sovereignty." See United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 43-44 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See generally United States v.
Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 712-13, 719 (1950) (discussing dominium and imperium as, respectively,
"ownership or property rights" and "governmental powers of regulation and control" and

noting that they are commonly, though not necessarily, distinct).
14. Because a state's power over land is essentially a power to prohibit instead of a
power to requires uses, a state could prohibit a federal use, other than one tied to an
"enumerated power," but could not require a specific use. In most cases, the classic doctrine would require that land be used in the least intensive of the potentially different
federal and state preferences. As an officially certified "environmental extremist," I find
the possibility of increased environmental constraints attractive. SeeJ. LASH, K. GILLMAN &
D. SHERIDAN, A SEASON OF SPOILS 235-39 (1984).

At the same time, I have a place in the demonology of the proponents of the classic
doctrine. The initial research for this article was undertaken while I was employed in the
Solicitor's Office at the Department of the Interior, as a lawyer who necessarily advocated
"the immediate interests of the federal government.., in the face of unpersuasive rhetoric about states' rights and the tenth amendment." Engdahl, supra note 1, at 284.
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tion; governments can hold land in a governmental capacity as well as in
a proprietary capacity. Second, in this country imperium is divided between state and federal governments in line with the powers granted to
the federal government by the Constitution, including the provisions of
article IV. Finally, the classic theorists' equal footing argument involves
a confusion of factual equality, which is not guaranteed by the doctrine,
with political equality, which is guaranteed. Both Congress and the
Supreme Court have consistently accorded the property clause an expansive reading that is consistent with this understanding of the clause
and the history of the public lands in the period preceding the drafting
of the Constitution.
I.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL LANGUAGE

Advocates of the classic doctrine begin with the proposition that the
article IV property clause differs from other clauses of the Constitution
because it is not an "enumerated power."' 5 In light of this argument, it
is surprising that classic theorists provide no textual analysis of the
clause.
This absence of analysis may be due to the language of the article
IV clause: "Congress shall have the Power to dispose of and make all
needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States."' 16 The language is verbally indistinguishable from other grants of power to Congress:' 7 the statements
that "Congress shall have Power . . .To regulate Commerce,' 8 "To

coin Money [and] regulate the Value thereof,"' 9 and "To make Rules
for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces" 20 are
each accepted by classic theorists as enumerated powers despite their
15. E.g., Note, Property Power,supra note 1, at 826. Although this tenet is implicit in all
proponents of the doctrine, Mr. Brodie in particular emphasizes the point. Brodie, supra
note 1,at 715-23. The principle that the government of the United States is a government
of enumerated powers assumes unusual shapes in his argument. He insists, for example,
that the power to retain lands is not expressly granted and, therefore, is unconstitutional,
while simultaneously asserting that "[t]he ability of the United States to acquire territory
by gift, conquest, purchase, annexation, or bequest is vested in it by the Constitution
.... "Id. at 718. At best, however, the drafters were remarkably indirect in expressly
granting this power. Indeed, the question of the existence of such authority was the subject of sharply divergent views when the United States purchased Louisiana from France.
J. ADAMS, THE LIVES OF JAMES MADISON AND JAMES MONROE 78-79 (Boston 1850); E.
BROWN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE, 1803-1812, at 14-35

(1920).
16. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl.2.
17. The clause does not say "Congress shall have Power to make all needful Rules and
Regulations respecting disposal of the Territory or other Property of the United States" or
"Congress shall not have Power to exercise exclusive Legislation in any case whatsoever."
Instead, the language simply empowers Congress to "dispose of and make all needful
Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property [of] the United States."
Id.
18. Id. at art. 1, § 8, cl.3.
19. Id. at cl.5.
20. Id. at c1.14.
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obvious verbal similarities to the article IV clause. 2'
Despite the similar language, classic theorists argue that the language of article IV is either a grant of authority only to dispose of federal lands or that it grants no sovereign power to manage federal lands
inconsistently with state law. The article IV clause thus is accorded a
special interpretation. The authority to make "rules" and "regulations"
respecting land differs from the authority granted when the same terms
are applied to money, commerce, or the armed forces. Furthermore,
the unique constituadvocates of the doctrine offer no explanation 2 for
2
tional status of "Territory or other Property."
The mere fact that federal ownership of land potentially limits state
authority is in itself an insufficient basis for differing constitutional results; each of the powers granted to Congress imposes a corresponding
limitation on state authority. 2 3 The question is not whether the power
21. See, e.g., Engdahl, Preemptive Capability of Federal Power, 45 U. COLO. L. REV. 51, 56
(1973).
22. Mr. Brodie attempts to meet this difficulty by arguing that the location of the
clause "in that area of the founding document that deals with the relative positions of the
state and central governments within the federalist system," instead of in article I, the
"logical" place, demonstrates that "it was felt that the federal government should own no
property for any purpose other than for the implementation of its enumerated functions."
Brodie, supra note 1, at 720-21. This argument is problematic for several reason:
First, the clause does "deal with the relative position of the state and central government" by specifying that it is to be the federal government which determines the disposition of federal lands. Similarly, the list of congressional powers in article I, section 8, the
supremacy clause in article VI, and any number of other provisions also specify the relative
positions of the federal and state governments because any delegation of power to the
federal government necessarily limits state authority over the same subject.
Second, as Professor Engdahl has noted, enumerated powers "are scattered throughout the body of the Constitution." Engdahl, supra note 21, at 56. See also Hardwicke, Illig
& Patterson, supra note 1, at 417 (noting that enumerated powers are found not only in
article I, section 8, but also in "such other provisions as Article IV, Section 3"). Article III,
for example, grants Congress the power to create inferior federal courts. U.S. CONST. art.
III, § 1. Similarly, article IV contain grants of power to Congress, most notably the authority to admit new states.
23. Mr. Brodie simply asserts that "the right to control the property within its own
geographical boundaries is implicit in the concept of a 'state' itself. Such power is an
essential component in the concept of sovereignty." Brodie, supra note 1, at 712 (emphasis
added). This argument is unpersuasive.
First, states are less than "pure" sovereigns. As King from Massachusetts noted during the debates on the Constitution, much of the discussion of state powers used the term
"Sovereignty ... inaccurately & delusively [because the states] did not possess the peculiar features of sovereignty," such as the ability to make war. 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CoNVENTION OF 1787, at 323 (M. Farrand ed. 1911) [hereinafter cited as vol. CON VE.-ION
RECORDS]. State sovereignty was further limited by the powers granted to the federal government. See License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 588 (1847); Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2
DalI.) 419, 469, 429, 453 (1793) (opinions ofJay, C.J., Iredall & Wilson, JJ., respectively);
THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 93 (A. Hamilton) (. Cooke ed. 1961); id. at No. 39 (.
Madison). One such limitation upon the states is the lack of the power to control federal
property located within their borders, a lack recognized during the earliest days of the
Constitution. E.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819). Federal
real property is simply another example of this general principle.
Second, searching for "essential" attributes of sovereignty is a "snipe" hunt. See generally Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005, 1015 (1985)
("Neither the governmental/proprietary distinction nor any other that purports to separate out important governmental functions can be faithful to the role of federalism in a
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restricts state authority, but whether Congress was granted the power. 24
In the absence of a constitutionally significant distinction between land
and other objects of federal power, there is no apparent reason not to
give the words used in the clause the same effect that they have in other
constitutional clauses, and, therefore, to read the clause as granting the
power to regulate federal real property and the activities occurring on it.
In short, the proponents of the classic doctrine fail to provide a convincing justification for their conclusion that rules respecting federal lands
25
are subject to state authority while rules regulating commerce are not.
In place of an analysis of either the language of the clauses or the
reasons for distinguishing property from other constitutional subjects,
advocates of the classic doctrine rely upon a rhetorical device: the exclusivity theorem - the presumption that the grant of complete preemptive power in one clause precludes the grant of any preemptive power in
26
another clause.
It is important to note the nature of this argument. The presence of
two clauses concerning federal power over land logically supports the
conclusion that they do not grant identical powers because otherwise
there would have been no need for both clauses. Because the grant of
"exclusive legislation" in the article I clause preempts all state law, the
article IV clause logically may not have the same effect. Classic theorists, however, take an additional step by assuming that because article I
completely preempts state law, article IV grants Congress no preemptive
power. This extension lacks any logical basis.
There is no reason why reading article I as a grant of complete preemptive power to the federal government within the territorial confines
of one type of lands compels reading article IV as granting no preemptive power over another class of property. To say that article I and article IV are different does not mean that they share nothing in common only that they are not identical. 2 7 Acknowledging that article IV does
not grant exclusive federal jurisdiction over all activities occurring on
democratic society."). This is particularly true when the searcher does not set out even a
general description of the beast being sought.
24. E.g., Hardwicke, Illig
& Patterson, supra note 1, at 416-18. The authors state that
the tenth amendment was included "[t]o foreclose any argument which might be made for
extending powers to the Federal Government by interpretation..." and argue that "the
prerogative of the Federal Government in regard to land or territory was expressly limited" by the provisions of the article I and article IV property clauses. Id. at 417. On the
tenth amendment argument, see, for example, McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
316, 406-10 (1819). On the proposition that grants of power operate negatively, see generally infra notes 158-59 and accompanying text.
25. One potentially significant difference has emerged. The Supreme Court in Kleppe
and the other property clause cases attacked as error by the classic theorists has required
congressional action before finding state laws inapplicable. E.g., Wilkinson, The Field of
Public Land Law: Some Connecting Threads and Future Directions, 1 PuB. LAND L. REV. 1, 7-15
(1980). There does not appear to be a "dormant property clause" akin to the dormant
commerce clause.
26. E.g., Engdahl, supra note i, at 296; Hardwicke, Illig & Patterson, supra note I, at
418-20.
27. The negation of complete preemptive power is incomplete preemptive power instead of no
preemptive power.
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public lands does not therefore mean that federal authority is limited to
that of a proprietor. It is at least equally logical to read the article I
clause as completely displacing state law by its own force, while the article IV clause is preemptive only to the extent that state law is inconsistent with congressional legislation. 28 That is, the article IV clause
merely authorizes Congress to preempt state law. Indeed, because the
Constitution is a document that delegates power to the federal government, the latter interpretation logically makes more sense.
Classic theorists do not explicitly state the mutual exclusivity theorem. Instead, they repeatedly contrast federal authority under the two
clauses in terms of a dichotomy between the "governmental jurisdiction" - imperium - that the federal government exercises over article I
lands, and the "limited power" of a proprietor - dominium - that it
possesses over article IV lands. 2 9 Much of the analytical confusion in
the classic doctrine as well as much of its persuasive power stems from
the use of this ambiguous dichotomy.30 By iterating the thesis as a contrast between proprietary and governmental, advocates of the doctrine
play upon a range of similar pairings and the binary nature of commonlaw analysis. 3 1 However, the dichotomy is false; the terms obscure instead of enlighten because they do not address the central question.
In this country imperium is divided between state and federal governments. That portion of the imperium allocated to the federal government
is specified in the Constitution; the residue is held by the states. The
central question thus is how the Constitution allocates the imperium over
article IV lands. Given the language of article IV, this is a question of
what limitations are imposed upon the grant of power to Congress to
make rules and regulations respecting such lands. The governmentalproprietary dichotomy is of no assistance in resolving these questions.
Federal authority over article IV lands is limited. Despite the rhetoric of
some advocates, 3 2 the states do exercise a wide range of powers over
28. See Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343, 346 (1918) ("The police power of the
State extends over the federal public domain, at least when there is no legislation by Congress on the subject."); THE FEDERALIST, supra note 23, at No. 32 (A. Hamilton).
29. E.g., Engdahl, supra note 1,at 296; Hardwicke, Illig
& Patterson, supra note 1, at

431-32 (arguing that the federal government becomes an imperial government when it
holds lands within states for nongovernmental purposes).
30. Cf Wells & Hellerstein, The Governmental-ProprietaryDistinction in ConstitutionalLaw,
66 VA. L. REV. 1073 (1980) (concluding that the dichotomy is employed to accommodate
conflicting interests in two categories of cases: (1)in deciding whether to deny a state an
immunity from suit or from federal taxation and regulation, and (2) in applying federal
constitutional limitations to state activities; in both categories, states acting as "proprietors" enjoy less protection from federal action and are, therefore, likely to be treated as
private individuals). The Supreme Court has expressed dissatisfaction with this dichotomy. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985).
31. Much of the common law proceeds by classifying something as either one thing or
the other thing. For example, governmental actions are either ministerial or discretionary.
Similarly, an individual is liable in negligence if her unreasonable conduct caused injury
but not if her reasonable conduct caused injury. These and other dichotomies are ultimately helpful in resolving the basic legal dichotomy: liable or not liable; guilty or not
guilty.
32. E.g., Brodie, supra note 1,at 711, ("It is pure sophistry to contend that the states
currently have any real ability to govern, implement legislation, or exercise jurisdiction
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federal lands within their borders. 33 The limits on federal authority,
however, are not captured within the opaque governmental-proprietary
dichotomy. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized, the limits
34
are primarily political instead of judicial.
In place of an analysis of the property clause, classic theorists contend that the doctrine has previously been adopted by the Supreme
Court. Therefore, they argue that the doctrine was the law in the
Golden Age.
II.

THE CASE LAW: STRAINING JUDICIAL DICTA

Proponents of the classic doctrine base their thesis primarily upon a
handful of nineteenth century United States Supreme Court decisions
that they contend adopted the doctrine. 3 5 They argue that the classic
theory is implicit in the rationales of the cases as the unstated major
premise of the decisions.
There are two fundamental difficulties with this argument. First,
the cases upon which the advocates rely did not adopt the doctrine even
as an unstated but necessary premise to the holdings. Rather the classic
theorists' interpretation is a substantial extension of the equal footing
doctrine. Second, the classic theorists have chosen their cases carefully,
ignoring a large number of contemporaneous decisions that are inconsistent with their arguments.
A.

The Property Clause

The most important case for the classic theorists' is Pollard v. Hagan,3 6 a case involving conflicting titles to a parcel of land. The plaintiff's claim was based upon a federal patent, while the defendant's claim
was founded upon a deed from the state. Defendant challenged plaintiff's title, contending that the land in question was not federal property
when the patent was issued because the land was below the mean high
water line and thus was state property. The United States Supreme
Court agreed that the land was state property. The Court had previover the public lands within their geographical limits."); Note, Property Power, supra note 1,
at 824 n.56.
33.

See, e.g., Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981) (upholding

the constitutionality of a state severance tax on coal mined on federal lands); Omaechevarriav. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343, 346 (1918) ("The police power of the State extends over the
federal public domain at least when there is no legislation by Congress on the subject.");
Wilkinson, Cross-JurisdictionalConflicts: An Analysis of Legitimate State Interests on Federal and
Indian Lands, 2 U.C.L.A.J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y. 145, 153-54 (1982) (noting that state laws
apply unless specifically preempted by federal statutes).
34. E.g., Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 540-41 (1976); cf. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 5-11, at 254 (1978) (the property clauses as "an area of congressional authority limited primarily by considerations of federalism").
35. See Colorado v. Toll, 268 U.S. 228 (1925); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46
(1907); Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504 (1893); Fort Leavenworth R.R. v. Lowe, 114
U.S. 525 (1885); Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845). These cases are discussed
infra note 44 and accompanying text.
36.

44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845). See Brodie, supra note 1, at 713-14; Engdahl, supra

note 1, at 293-96; Note, Property Power, supra note 1, at 833-37.
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ously decided that the original thirteen states held title to lands beneath
navigable waters within their boundaries as an incident of sovereignty3 7 and
therefore concluded that upon admission into the Union, Alabama "succeeded to all the rights of sovereignty, jurisdiction, and eminent domain
[that the original thirteen states possessed] except so far as this right was
diminished by the public lands remaining in the possession and under
the control of the United States ....

.38

Thus, Alabama as a state was

entitled to the same degree of sovereignty as the original thirteen states
and, consequently, defendant's title, which was based on state law, was
valid.
Classical theorists base their argument in large part upon dicta in

Pollard that does support a restrictive interpretation of congressional authority over article IV lands. The Court stated that "the United States

have no constitutional capacity to exercise municipal jurisdiction, sovereignty, or eminent domain, within the limits of a State ....

.,,3

Based

largely upon this phrase, the classic theorists interpret the case as establishing three constitutional propositions:

first, that states are empow-

ered to exercise "general governmental authority" over all non-article I
property within their boundaries; second, that the federal government
lacks the power of exclusive legislation within both old and new states
under article IV; and therefore, that the federal government loses any

"governmental authority" over article IV lands upon admission of a
state into the Union.

40

Although the first two propositions are supported by logic as well as
dicta, 4 ' the advocates' conclusion does not necessarily follow. First, the
Court simply did not adopt the classic doctrine even in dicta. 4 2 In contrasting the federal government's powers over article I property with its
37. Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842). The decision was predicated
upon the common law rule that the Crown as sovereign holds title to the beds of navigable
waters in trust for the nation. Thus, "when the Revolution took place, the people of each
state became themselves sovereign; and in that characterhold the absolute right to all their
navigable waters and the soils under them . . . subject only to the rights since surrendered
by the Constitution to the general government." Id. at 410 (emphasis added).
38. 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 223.
39. Id. See also id. at 221 (iterating dichotomy between "municipal sovereignty" and
"right of soil"). Despite this broad language, the Supreme Court subsequently held that
the United States did possess the right of eminent domain, either as an inherent "attribute
of sovereignty," Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 406 (1878), or as "the offspring of
political necessity." Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 371 (1875). Both decisions were
rendered during Professor Engdahl's classic period.
40. Engdahl, supra note 1, at 295-96. The argument continues to obscure the distinction between "exclusive legislation" and any "governmental authority."
41. If the first two propositions were incorrect, there would be no need for the article
I clause because the article IV clause would be sufficient to meet the presumed goals of the
article I clause. Similarly, because there is no contention that the article IV clause
preempts state law by its own force, it is undisputed that the state continues to exercise
general legislative authority over all land within its borders; such state legislation is preempted only to the extent that it is inconsistent with actual federal legislation. E.g., Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. at 346.
42. Professor Engdahl acknowledges this difficulty but nonetheless argues that "[t]he
Court's rationale in Pollard... carried definite implications for the entire public domain."
Engdahl, supra note 1, at 295. The "implications" lay in the governmental/proprietary
dichotomy:
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powers over article IV property, the Court merely stated that Congress
lacked general governmental jurisdiction over article IV lands; 4 3 that is,
the federal power under article IV is less than that under article I. The
Court did not, however, say either that the state has the same power
over article IV federal land as it has over private land or that the federal
government has only the powers of a common proprietor over article IV
land.
The proponents' conclusion follows only if one is willing to accept
the mutual exclusivity theorem in a slightly different guise: because the
state has "general governmental authority," the federal government can
only be a proprietor. The classic theorists thus argue that general governmental authority necessarily excludes any other governmental jurisdiction. However, the fact that states exercise general jurisdiction does
not in of itself preclude federal jurisdiction over a more limited subject.
For example, states have general authority to define criminal conduct,
but this fact does not preclude the federal government from also defining some conduct as federal crimes. Similarly, the fact that the state
possesses general authority over all of the land within the state is not
inconsistent with paramount federal authority over federal property located within that state. To reach the opposite conclusion, it is necessary
to read Pollard for its contrary.
Even granting the classic theorists their interpretation of the ration44
ale in Pollarddoes not necessarily lead to the conclusion they advocate.
As to [the public domain] land . . .title had to be distinguished from governmental jurisdiction. To hold that the governmental jurisdiction which the
United States had enjoyed over a territory could be retained over vast expanses of
the public domain when that territory was organized into a state would be to
place such a state on a different footing from the original, nonpublic domain
states, much more clearly than would the retention of federal jurisdiction over
[submerged lands].
Id. Professor Engdahl's argument thus bottoms on the equal footing theory: federal governmental power over article IV lands violates the equal footing doctrine. See infra notes
45-53 and accompanying text.
43. The Court's actual language is instructive because it is far less expansive than
implied by proponents of the classic doctrine. After quoting the article I property clause,
the Court stated that
these are the only cases, within the United States, in which all the powers of government are united in a single government, except in the cases already mentioned
of the temporary territorial governments, and there a local government exists.
The right of Alabama and every other new state to exercise all the powers of
government, which belong to and may be exercised by the original states of the
union, must be admitted, and remain unquestioned, except so far as they are,
temporarily, deprived of control over the public lands.
Pollard v. Hagen, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 223-24 (emphasis added). The Court thus distinguished between exclusive and nonexclusive federal jurisdiction, instead of between governmental and proprietary functions.
44. The other cases cited by advocates are similarly inapplicable. Engdahl, for example, states that "[tihe basic proposition ... that article IV property not being utilized for
an enumerated federal governmental purpose was by constitutional reservation subject to
the general governmental jurisdiction of the state wherein it lay, was reaffirmed in llWard
v.
Race Horse, [163 U.S. 504] in 1896." Engdahl, supra note 1, at 303.
Contrary to Professor Engdahl's reading of the case, Ward does not enunciate a "constitutional rule that a state cannot be precluded from exercising and enforcing its general
governmental jurisdiction over federal lands within its borders." Id. at 357 n.322. ll'ard
involved a habeas corpus proceeding on behalf of an Indian who had killed an elk in viola-
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The Pollard Court may well have assumed that states had complete governmental authority over the public lands within their borders and that
the federal government occupied the role of a mere proprietor. At best,
however, the Court presumed; it did not decide or clearly state that conclusion. Because the constitutional text provides no explicit support for
their conclusion, the assumptions of the Pollard Court and the arguments of the classic theorists demonstrate only that the constitutional
text is contingent: a dichotomy not stated in the text was read into it in
the mid-nineteenth century. In of itself, this provides no reason for preferring the assumptions of the PollardCourt to those of the Kleppe Court.
B.

Equal Footing

Ultimately, the classic theorists' case analysis and arguments resolve
into claims based upon the equal footing doctrine. Because the federal
government had neither dominium nor imperium over lands within the
original states, the classic theorists argue that new states are less than
equal if the government retains either imperium or dominium over lands
within their borders: "if either title to or jurisdiction over common lands
in the new states could be retained by the United States, those new
states would be received into the Union on less than an equal footing
45
with the original states."
tion of state game laws. The Indian relied upon a treaty that antedated the admission of
Wyoming into the Union and "the sole question ...
is whether the treaty ... gave [the
Indians] the right to exercise the hunting privilege . .. within the limits of the State of
Wyoming in violation of its laws." 163 U.S. at 507. The Court held that the treaty was
impliedly repealed by the admission act. The decision thus is inapposite because it turns
upon the treaty clause, instead of the article IV property clause. Cf Hunt v. United States,
278 U.S. 96 (1928) (the United States has a right to protect federal property by killing deer
in violation of state game laws). In addition, despite Ward's broad equal footing language,
it does not state the classic doctrine. Instead, the Court was careful to hold, not that Congress could not have achieved the result urged by the Indians, but instead that it did not
purport to do so:
Nor need we stop to consider the argument advanced at bar, that as the United
States, under the authority delegated to it by the Constitution in relation to Indian tribes, has a right to deal with that subject, therefore it has the power to
exempt from the operation of state game laws each particular piece of land,
owned by it in private ownership within a State,for nothing in this case shows that this
power has been exerted by Congress.
163 U.S. at 514 (emphasis added). Similarly, the Court noted the "silence of the act admitting Wyoming into the Union, as to the reservation of rights in favor of the Indians"
and concluded that "the enabling act not only contains no expression of the intention of
Congress to continue the burdens in question . . . but, on the contrary, its intention not
to do so is conveyed by the express terms of the act of admission." Id. at 515. In fact, the
Court noted that equal footing would not be infringed by exempting from state control
"rights created by Congress, during the existence of a Territory, which are of such a nature as to imply their perpetuity," despite the silence of the new state's enabling act. Id.at
515-16. For an example of such a right, see United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 382-84
(1905) (upholding against an equal footing challenge the creation of federal fishing rights
akin to easements which prevented the state from licensing a fishing machine, to the exclusion of treaty fishers).
Reliance upon similar dictum in Colorado v. Toll, 268 U.S. 228 (1925), Kansas v.
Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 91-92 (1907), and Fort Leavenworth R.R. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525,
531 (1885) is equally unavailing without assuming what the advocates seek to prove.
45. Brodie, supra note I, at 712. See also Engdahl, supra note 1,at 294; Note, Sagebrush
Rebellion, supra note I, at 520-21 & n.104.
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This interpretation requires an extension of the equal footing doctrine far beyond both its traditional scope and the holding of Pollard.
Traditionally, the equal footing doctrine has been applied to political
rights, to sovereignty: Congress may not impose conditions upon a state
in its admission act that render the state less than politically equal to the
other states.

46

The classic theorists' argument confuses factual equality (the presence or absence of federal lands) with political equality (the authority of
the states over article IV lands). 4 7 So long as all states have the same
authority over article IV lands within their borders, the equal footing
doctrine is not offended. 48 Just as Texas is no more sovereign than
Rhode Island despite their differences in size, so Connecticut is no more
sovereign than Idaho despite the fact that Connecticut has only ten acres
46. Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911). See Hanna, Equal Footing in the Admission of
States, 3 BAYLOR L. REV. 519 (1951); Monnet, Violations by a State of the Conditions of Its Enabling Act, 10 COLUM. L. REV. 591, 593-94 (1910).
Only Professor Patterson appears to challenge this proposition by arguing that the
doctrine "forbids either economic or political limitations on statehood." Patterson, supra
note 1, at 56. In support of this novel theory, he argues that this result is historically
mandated because
at the time this doctrine was established (1787) the Confederacy had no power
whatsoever over the states and, therefore, could not have placed limitations on
the admission of new states. . . and that when the Congress of the United States
readopted the Ordinance of 1787 in 1789, it pledged itself to the same doctrine,
thereby superseding the old Congress as the party to the compact.
Id. at 56.
There are at least three insurmountable difficulties with this argument. First, because
the Confederation lacked the power to admit new states other then by amendment to the
Articles of Confederation, the statement that the Confederacy could not have placed limitations on the admission of new states is meaningless. Second, the language of the Ordinance - "to provide . . . for [the] admission [of new states] to a share in the federal
councils on an equal footing with the original States" - seems limited to political, instead
of economic equality. This view is supported by other provisions of the clause that forbid
new states from interfering with the disposition of federal land. See An Ordinance for the
Government of the Territory of the United States north-west of the river Ohio (July 13,
1787), reprinted in 1 Stat. 51 n.(a) (1789). Finally, the "readoption" of the Ordinance was
by statute and thus lacks constitutional stature. Id.
47. Patterson argues that the equal footing doctrine is not a constitutional matter.
States do not have equal representation in Congress because of the unequal representation in the House and because Senators are individuals who do not vote as states. Patterson, supra note 1, at 63-64. Furthermore, Patterson argues that Congress has imposed
conditions on the admission of new states that have violated their political equality vis-avis the equal footing doctrine. Id. at 64-66. Therefore, he argues, it is only in the area of
reserved rights that states are equal. He then appears to conclude that state landholding is
a reserved right, though the analysis slips into the cant of an unreconstructed Southerner.
Id. at 66-71.
Patterson's argument embodies the confusion of factual and political equality. States
do not have numerically equal representation in Congress, but they have proportionally
equal representation, which is consistent with the fact that the federal government was
composed of "We the People of the United States" instead of the earlier and rejected
formulation "We the People of the States of.
...2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note
23, at 163; 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, at 336, 354-58. Cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 403-05 (1819) (The people rather than the states formed the federal
government.).
48. See, e.g., The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737, 755-57 (1866) ("There can be
no question of State sovereignty" where the state is prohibited from taxing Indians because of a stipulation in its admission act.).
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of National Forest land and Idaho has more than twenty million acres. 4 9
The equal footing doctrine does not require such factual equality. If, on
the other hand, Congress were to admit Idaho upon the condition that
Idaho not tax or zone federal lands, while simultaneously allowing Connecticut to do so, the equal footing doctrine would be violated. As the
Supreme Court has repeatedly stated, "[tihe requirement of equal footing was designed not to wipe out [factual] diversities but to create parity
50
as respects political standing and sovereignty."
The advocates' interpretation of the equal footing doctrine is also
more expansive than that adopted in Pollard. In Pollard, the Court held
that Alabama held title to the beds of navigable waters because the original thirteen states possessed such lands as an attribute of their sovereignty. 5 1 The decision thus was predicated upon the special status of

submerged lands as incidents of sovereignty. There is no similar doctrine holding that ownership of fast lands (that land which is above mean
high water) is an incident of sovereignty. Pollard, therefore, did not establish a general right to title that a state might assert against the federal
52
government as a matter of equal footing.
In Pollard, the Court neither adopted nor depended upon the classic
theorists' doctrine. Regardless of what the Court may have tacitly as49. 1980 U.S. DEPT. INTERIOR PUB. LAND STATISTICS 13 (1981).
50. United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 716 (1950). The Court explained that:
The "equal footing" clause has long been held to refer to political rights and to
sovereignty . . . . It does not, of course, include economic stature or standing.
There has never been equality among the States in that sense. Some States when
they entered the Union had within their boundaries tracts of land belonging to
the Federal Government; others were sovereigns of their soil. Some had special
agreements with the Federal Government governing property within their borders. See Stearns v. Minnesota, [179 U.S. 223], 243-45 [(1900)]. Area, location,
geology, and latitude have created great diversity in the economic aspects of the
several States.
Id.
In Stearns, which was decided during Professor Engdahl's classic period, the Court
specifically noted that Congress had the power not to sell the public lands within the state.
179 U.S. at 243. This did not violate the equal footing doctrine because that doctrine
forbids "any agreement or compact limiting or qualifying political rights and obligations,"
but does not apply to agreements "inreference to property." Id at 245. The classic theorists' world is like that Kurt Vonnegut has described where ballerinas wear ankle weights
so that they cannot outdance anyone else. K. VONNEGUT, WELCOME TO THE MONKEY
HOUSE 8 (Dell ed. 1970).

51. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. At the common law, "all navigable rivers and havens were computed among the regalia, and were subject to the sovereign." I W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *264. See Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410-11

(1842).
52. Title to nonsubmerged lands was not an incident of sovereignty and thus did not
pass to the new states upon admission. Similarly, the old states lacked absolute jurisdiction over federal property, McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 428-30 (1819),
and the new states thus cannot claim greater authority as an instance of equal footing.
United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 717-18 (1950).
Finally, the holding in Pollard has been sharply limited in the Tidelands Cases: United
States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950); United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950);
United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947). See also United States v. Maine, 420 U.S.
515 (1975). In these cases, the Supreme Court held that the littoral states did not hold
title to the sea bed adjacent to their shores even if they had held title to the lands prior to
their admission into the Union. Any equal footing claim to nonsubmerged lands stands on
an even weaker basis and finds little support even in the dicta of Pollard.
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sumed, the issue pressed by the classic theorists was not presented to
the Court. Similarly, the expansive interpretation of the equal footing
53
The prodoctrine is neither stated in, nor necessary to the decision.
justifia
persuasive
ponents' analysis of the case law thus fails to provide
cation for accepting the classic doctrine.
C.

The Actual Pattern

The classic theorists' difficulties are compounded by the fact that
the theory is inconsistent with a number of cases decided by the Court
during the classic period. 54 Under the classic theory, the federal government has at best only the same rights of any other proprietor and its
decisions regarding the land may be overridden by state law. The federal government, therefore, would have the right to control the disposition of its land only to the extent that it was not inconsistent with state law. In
other words, a state has the power to establish general, nondiscriminatory regulatory requirements applicable to all land within its borders.
Under the classic theory, such rules would be applicable to federal as
well as private land. This state power includes the right to specify the
formal requirements for transfers and to determine what, for example, is
to be sufficient evidence of title for an ejectment action brought in state
court. It thus is significant that the courts during the classical period
consistently held that the states lacked such power: federal land was different from private land because federal rules and not state rules deter55
mined when title passed and what was sufficient evidence of vesting.
53. The equal footing argument is also undercut by the fact that the drafters of the
Constitution considered and specifically rejected constitutionally mandating the admission
of new states on an equal footing. See generally infra notes 127-35 and accompanying text.
54. In addition to cases decided under the property clause, e.g., United States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 526 (1840); Wilcox v. M'Connel, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 498 (1839); Bagnell v. Broderick, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 436 (1839), cases construing other constitutional
provisions produced results inconsistent with the classic theory. For example, in Green v.
Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823), the Court was faced with a challenge to the compact
between Virginia and Kentucky under which the latter state was admitted into the Union.
One of the articles of the compact provided that the then-existing Virginia property laws
were to apply to all property interests derived from Virginia. Henry Clay for Kentucky
argued that this was unconstitutional because "there are some attributes of sovereignty, of
which a State cannot be deprived, even with the concurrence of Congress and the State
itself." Id. at 42. The most "indisputable" of these attributes, Clay argued, was the power
to act within its own territory: "The sovereignty of a State cannot exist without a territorial
domain upon which it is to act." Id. Thus, the restriction upon the state's power to pass
laws controlling property rights was necessarily unconstitutional as an invasion of the
state's inherent sovereignty and the equal footing doctrine. The Court rejected this argument, noting that it was a "trite maxim [that] man gives up a part of his natural liberty
when he enters into civil society, as the price of the blessings of that state." Id. at 63. It
concluded that "[tihere can be no doubt that sovereign States may make pacts with each
other, limiting and restraining their rights of sovereignty as to proprietary interests in the
soil," citing the agreements by the new states not to tax federal lands as an example. Id. at
63-64. The Court's analysis in Green is inconsistent with the proposition that the right to
regulate all property within its boundaries is an inherent and inalienable attribute of
sovereignty.
55. This issue was initially decided in Bagnell v. Broderick, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 436, 450
(1839). In the same term, the Court also decided Wilcox v. M'Connel, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.)
498 (1839), where one claimant's case was based in part upon an Illinois statute:
It has been said, that the state of Illinois has a right to declare by law that a title
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Although some classic theorists treat such cases as an exception to
the classic doctrine, 56 the "exception" ultimately consumes the theory.
During the period when the classic doctrine was ostensibly being enunciated, Congress was almost exclusively engaged in disposing of the
public lands. 5 7 The cases viewed as establishing the classic doctrine
thus generally involved situations where title was being transferred.
The cases do not establish explicit limitations on congressional conduct.
Instead of limiting congressional power, they reflect judicial support for
congressional actions by affirming the existing congressional policy of
disposing of federal lands. The cases contain no suggestion that Congress was constitutionally limited to the policy it was then following. In
fact, when arguments seeking such limits were advanced, the Court rejected them. In United States v. Gratiot,5 8 for example, the defendant ar-

gued that Congress did not have the power to lease lead mines on the
public lands because "[n]o authority in the cession of the public lands to
the United States is given, but to dispose of them, and to make rules and
regulations respecting the preparation of them for sale.' '59 The Court
rejected this argument, upholding congressional authority to lease:
derived from the United States, which by [federal] laws is only inchoate and imperfect, shall be deemed as perfect a title as if a patent had issued from the United
States; and the construction of her own Courts seems to give that effect to her
statute. That state has an undoubted right to legislate as she may please in regard
to the remedies to be prosecuted in her Courts, and to regulate the disposition of
the property of her citizens by descent, devise, or alienation. But the property in
question was a part of the public domain of the United States: Congress is invested by the Constitution with the power of disposing of, and making needful
rules and regulations respecting it. Congress has declared . . . by its legislation,
that in such a case as this a patent is necessary to complete the title. But in this
case no patent has issued; and therefore by the laws of the United States the legal
title has not passed, but remains in the United States. Now if it were competent
for a state legislature to say, that notwithstanding this, the title shall be deemed to
have passed; the effect of this would be, not that Congress had the power of disposing of the public lands, and prescribing the rules and regulations concerning
that disposition, but that Illinois possessed it. That would be to make the laws of
Illinois paramount to those of Congress, in relation to a subject confided by the
Constitution to Congress only. . . . We hold the true principle to be this, that
whenever the question in any Court, state or federal, is, whether a title to land
which had once been the property of the United States has passed, that question
must be resolved by the laws of the United States; but that whenever, according
to those laws, the title shall have passed, then that property, like all other property in the state, is subject to state legislation.
Id. at 516-17. The Court's "true principle" sets up a dichotomy between federal lands and
other lands that is inconsistent with the classic property clause theory.
56. Professor Engdahl offers inconsistency as a justification for the exception: "As a
practical matter ... a rule [subjecting federal conveyances to state law] would have introduced far more intricacy and confusion into public land affairs than was already present
under the federal laws alone." Engdahl, supra note 1, at 296. The increased intricacy,
however, exists only from the federal perspective because it, like any other proprietor with
land in more than one jurisdiction, would be potentially subject to differing requirements
in different states. Within any state, the rule which would follow logically if the classic
doctrine had actually been the theory relied upon by the Court would have produced less
intricacy and confusion because all land would be subject to the same state law instead of
two potentially divergent laws. Professor Engdahl's rationalization of the "exception"
thus seems particularly weak.
57. E.g., P. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAw DEVELOPMENT 121-463 (1968 &
photo. reprint 1979).
58. 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 526 (1840).
59. Id. at 532.
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"Congress has the same power over [territory] as over any other property belonging to the United States; and this power is vested in Congress without limitation." 60 As if to demonstrate the absurdity of the
defendant's claim, the Court noted that Illinois "surely cannot claim a
right to the public lands within her limits."' It is difficult to read such
unqualified acceptance of congressional action as limiting Congress to
its then-current policy of disposal.
This judicial deference to congressional authority is also demonstrated by a second "exception." If the federal government were a mere
proprietor subject as all other proprietors to state law, federal management decisions would be restricted by general state laws. Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court held during the classical period that federal laws
protecting the public lands preempted state laws. This decision was
reached initially in a case 62 that arose during a period when Congress
had begun to retain federal resources. 63 Disposal was no longer the
sole federal policy; retention and management had their place. The
Court responded to the shifting policy by upholding congressional authority to protect the federal public lands in the face of inconsistent state
law:
we do not think that the admission of a Territory as a State
deprives [Congress] of the power of legislating for the protection of the public lands, though it may thereby involve the exercise of
what is ordinarily known as the police power, so long as such power is
directed solely to its own protection."
The emphasized language is significant because it distinguishes between
land ownership rights of private landowners on one hand, and the rights
of the federal government as a landowner on the other hand. All landowners may protect their lands, but a private proprietor can neither employ sovereign power, nor override state law.
60. Id. at 537.
61. Id. at 538.
62. Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518 (1897).
63. For example, Congress in 1872 set aside Yellowstone Park as a "pleasuringground for the benefit and enjoyment of the people." Act of Mar. 1, 1872, ch. 24, 17 Stat.
32. This was followed by the more important General Revision Act of 1891 which repealed the Preemption and Timber Culture Acts and authorized the President to "set
apart and reserve. . . any part of the public lands wholly or in part covered with timber or
undergrowth, whether of commercial value or not, as public reservations." Act of Mar. 3,
1891, ch. 561, § 24, 26 Stat. 1095, 1103 (formerly codified at 16 U.S.C. § 471). The constitutionality of this provision was upheld in Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523 (1911),
against the claims that (1) the federal government "holds title to public lands, not as a
sovereign, but as a proprietor merely" and thus the laws of the state preempted inconsistent federal actions, id. at 527-28; and (2) the federal government held title to the public
lands "in trust for the people, to be disposed of so as to promote the settlement and
ultimate prosperity of the States in which they are situated." Id. at 530. The Court rejected both arguments as inconsistent with the "rights incident to proprietorship, to say
nothing of the power of the United States as a sovereign over the property belonging to
it." Id. at 537.
64. Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 525-26 (1896) (emphasis added).
Although noting that this power is less expansive within a state than it is within a Territory,
id. at 525, the Court justifies the holding by stating that "[a] different rule would place the
public domain of the United States completely at the mercy of state legislation." Id. at
526.
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Thus, during the height of the classic period, the Court consistently
upheld congressional actions regarding federal public lands under the
article IV clause, disregarding any potentially inconsistent state law. The
Court's exceptions to upholding congressional actions cited by proponents of the classic doctrine swallow up the doctrine because the exceptions reflect the basic proposition that it is for Congress, instead of the
Court, to decide how the federal public lands are to be administered.
The actual pattern was a reflection ofjudicial deference to congressional
policy instead of a recognition of constitutional limitations on congressional authority.
III.

HISTORICAL ARGUMENTS: MYTH

As

HISTORY

Perhaps recognizing the problems inherent in the case law, some
classic theorists have attempted to buttress their argument with a review
of the history leading to the drafting of the Constitution's property
clauses. 65 Their history, however, is mythology.
The central thrust of the classic theorists' argument is continuity:
"[t]he history of the American people since the establishment of the
original thirteen colonies to the present date [supports] the conclusion
that the colonies during the colonial period, and the states thereafter,
have been the land-owning units."' 66 The doctrine's proponents thus
contend that the basic relationship of the colonial or state governments
to the central government remained unchanged through the three constitutionally significant periods: the colonies, the Confederation, and the
Constitution.
The classic theorists view the first British Empire as a federation:
the colonies were "quasi-sovereign states within the British Empire"
sharing a common executive, but with separate legislative bodies. 6 7
They argue that the constitutional basis of this federation was the fact
that "landholding was the exclusive function of the colonial governments .... ."68 Given the importance of landholding to the colonies
within the Empire, the colonies retained control of the vacant lands
when they formed the Confederation. The limited role of the Confeder65. Engdahl states the point concisely: "It was not contemplated . . . that by acquiring territory the United States should accumulate and permanently hold a vast national
domain. . . .[Instead] both federal title and the federal exercise of governmental jurisdic-

tion in these lands were regarded as temporary - a transitional phase." Engdahl, supra
note 1, at 292-93. The use of "It" as the subject of the sentence nicely ignores the question of who was "It." His analysis similarly largely ignores the historical background of the
clauses. See id.at 288 n.10, 289 n.12, 291 n.24. The most detailed historical arguments
are presented by Brodie, supra note 1, at 695-96, 723-24; Hardwicke, Illig & Patterson,
supra note 1, at 408-26; Patterson, supra note 1, at 43-53.
66. Hardwicke, Illig & Patterson, supra note 1,at 408.
67. Patterson, supra note 1, at 44. Professors Hardwicke, Illig and Patterson go even
further, asserting that "the thirteen American colonies existed under the principle of federalism - as equal partners of Great Britain in a commonwealth of states." Hardwicke,
Illig & Patterson, supra note 1,at 408.
68. Patterson, supra note 1,at 45. See also Hardwicke, Illig & Patterson, supra note 1,at
408-09 (arguing that the colonies were the land-holding units under the principles of
federalism).
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ation Congress over the back lands was not expanded by the creation of
a federal constitutional government. With their emphasis on continuity, 69 the Revolution and the drafting of the Constitution play almost no role in the classic theorists' analysis.
Structuring their argument in this manner allows the proponents of
the classic doctrine to argue from silence. The fact that the Constitution

apparently denies the primacy of the states as landholders becomes explicable; apparently inconsistent constitutional provisions can be viewed
in a different light and given new meanings. Because the uniform experience had been that the colonies and states were the primary landowners, the drafters of the Constitution simply assumed that the states,
instead of the federal government, would continue to play the leading
role. The constitution of the Empire thus was affirmed in the constitutional compromise of the Confederation and reaffirmed by the drafters
of the Constitution.

Although the classic theorists largely ignore the fact, there was indeed a revolution that separated the colonies from the British Empire

and changed the relationship between local and central governments.
There was an additional discontinuity when the initial constitutional

structure was replaced because it was insufficiently "energetic." Thus,
the relationship between state and federal government changed again.
Even though the theorists are correct in arguing that much of the United

States' history prior to the adoption of the Constitution was shaped by
7
the struggle for political and economic control over the land,

0

the pe-

riod was one of discontinuity.
Resolving the struggle for control over land and adjusting other
governmental relationships across these discontinuities produced the
fundamental

constitutional compromise

of the Confederation.

It

is

largely this compromise which was reaffirmed in article IV, section 3 of
7
the Constitution. '

Although the classic theorists are correct in their

69. The classic doctrine advocates' arguments emphasize the continuity of the colonies/states from empire through confederation to present constitutional system. For example: "[T]he principle of federalism and the absolute right of the colonies to ownership
of land within their boundaries continued undisturbed through the period of confederation." Hardwicke, Illig & Patterson, supra note 1, at 416. They later argue that this was
unchanged by the adoption of the Constitution: "In establishing the 'more perfect union'
provided by the Constitution . . . the states made no concessions therein as to lands or
property rights." Id. at 416-17.
70. See, e.g., Brodie, supra note 1, at 695; Hardwicke, Illig & Patterson, supra note 1, at
409. See generally P. GATES, supra note 57, at 409; P. ONUF, THE ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC (1983) (recounting the struggle for control of lands during the colonial and
Confederation periods).
71.
New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new State
shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State
be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or parts of States, without the
Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress.
The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and
Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United
States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any
Claims of the United States, or of any particular State.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
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assessment of the constitutional importance of land issues, the history of
these issues in the period preceding the adoption of the Constitution is
far more complex and ambiguous than they wish to acknowledge.
A.

The Colonial Background

The classic theorists begin their history with the assertion that
"landholding was the exclusive function of the colonial governments
under the Crown." 7 2 In support of this assertion, they cite the
"[t]ypical" Plymouth Charter of 1620 that granted
both land and gov73
ernmental powers to the colony's incorporators.
Instead of being typical, however, the Plymouth charter was actually
quite exceptional in two crucial ways. First, it contained grants of both
land ownership and governmental powers to the same entity; these two
rights could be and often were separated. 74 Second, the charter was
75
granted to a group of incorporators, thus creating a corporate colony.
It was only in such colonies that stockholders controlled both the acquisition of individual rights to land and the laws regulating the tenures
under which the land was subsequently held. Because only Connecticut,
Massachusetts, and Rhode Island were corporate colonies at the time of
the Revolution, 7 6 the discussion of colonial rights presented by the advocates of the classic doctrine - even if accurate - is of limited
77
applicability.
The choice of a "typical" colonial charter was hardly happenstance.
In contrast to the popular control that developed in the corporate colonies, the two other generic forms of colonies were far more autocratic. 7 8
72. Hardwicke, Illig
& Patterson, supra note 1, at 408; Patterson, supra note 1, at 45.
73. Hardwicke, Illig
& Patterson, supra note 1, at 409.
74. For example, the Duke of York sold the territory that became New Jersey to John
Lord Berkely and Sir George Carteret in 1664. The indenture conveyed no governmental
rights. 6 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 375 (1976). See gen-

erally M. HARRIS, ORIGIN OF THE LAND TENURE SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES 129-32
(1953) (discussing NewJersey's various charters and the resulting land tenure system). In
addition, some colonies that began as corporate colonies ended up with a royal government and proprietary or corporate land ownership. See infra note 78.
75. Such colonies were political and economic corporations created by the Crown
with full rights to the soil and frequently with extensive governmental powers. Blackstone
classed such corporations as "[c]harter governments, in the nature of civil corporations,
with the power of making bye-laws for their own interior regulations. . . and with such
rights and authorities as are specially given them in their several charters of incorporation." I W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 51. at * 108. See S. LIVERMORE. EARLY AMERICAN LAND
COMPANIES 19-30 (1939).

76. See generally M. HARRIS, supra note 74, at 98-116 (discussing the charters and land
tenure systems of the corporate colonies).
77. For example, it was only in the three corporate colonies that people did not hold
land under feudal tenures with quit rents due either to the King or the proprietor. "[T]he
absence of quit-rents [in the New England corporate colonies] is a unique feature of the
colonial land systems, and had an influence upon the radical political theories held in
[those] colonies." B. BOND, THE QUIT-RENT SYSTEM IN THE AMERICAN COLONIES 35
(1919).
78. In addition to these generic types in which both the original ownership of land
and control over the government were in the same body or person, in five colonies landholding and government were in different hands. Although their histories differ in details,
the general pattern was similar. The colony began with a royal grant of territory either to
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Royal colonies, for example, were under the direct administrative control of the Crown: "the constitutions of [royal colonies] depend on the
respective commissions issued by the crown to the governors, and the
instructions which usually accompany those commissions; under the authority of which provincial assemblies are constituted, with the power of
making local ordinances." 79 The governmental authority that controlled both the granting of land and the local land tenure system depended entirely upon royal instructions and commissions; the Crown
approved both the granting of rights in land and all statutes adopted by
the local assemblies. 8 0 At the time of the Revolution, New York and
Virginia were royal colonies. 8 1
The third generic type of colony was the proprietary colony. These
were governments "granted out by the crown to individuals, in the nature of feudatory principalities, with all the inferior regalities, and
subordinate powers of legislation. ' 8 2 The proprietors occupied the position of king in the colony except that they "had more right in the establishment of tenures in their colonies than the King had regarding the
land of England."'8 3 The proprietor, thus, granted land and reviewed
colonial statutes. At the time of the Revolution, Delaware, Maryland,
84
and Pennsylvania were proprietary colonies.
Thus, the "typical" corporate charter relied upon by the classic theorists was markedly different from the more autocratic charters held by
most colonies. The New England corporate charters are also less prominent in the constitutional compromise of the Confederation than the
royal charter of Virginia. 8 5 Indeed, if one charter ought to be examined,
Virginia's charter is the logical choice.
Given its prominence in the land issue, Virginia's colonial experience is instructive. Although the colony began as a speculative jointstock company under a charter issued in 1612 byJames 1,86 the company
was stripped of its charter in 1625.87 Virginia became a royal colony
a proprietor or to a group of incorporators; generally the grant included governmental
powers. At some later point, the Crown resumed governmental authority over the colony,
but ownership of the land remained in the royal grantee. In these five colonies - Georgia,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, North and South Carolina - the proprietors continued to
sell land after the government passed under royal control. See M. HARRIS, supra note 74, at
127-40.
79. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 51, at *108. Blackstone terms such colonies "provincial establishments."
80. M. HARRIS, supra note 74, at 75.

81. See generally id. at 82-97 (discussing New York and Virginia charters and the resulting land tenure systems).
82. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 51, at * 108. See S. LIVERMORE, supra note 75, at 3036; Molovinski, Maryland and the American West at Independence, 72 MD. HIST. MAG. 353, 355

(1977); Zimmerman, James Logan, Proprietary Agent, 78 PA. MAG. HIST. & Bio. 143 (1954).
83. M. HARRIS, supra note 74, at 76.

84. See generally id. at 117-26 (discussing the Delaware, Maryland, and Pennsylvania
charters and the resulting land tenure systems).
85. It was Virginia's claim that the other states sought to discredit or buttress since it
was viewed as the paradigm. See P. ONUF, supra note 70, at 75-102.
86. 10 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 37 (1979).
87. Virginia Company, 2 Rolle 455, 81 Eng. Rep. 913 (K.B. 1624).
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ruled by royal governors under a series of imperial orders. 8 8 These orders were often concerned with land and with securing the Crown's income from it. 89 The Crown, however, was an absentee landowner and
was forced to rely upon its local representatives. 9 0 The authority to
make grants of land was, therefore necessarily delegated to the King's
representative, the governor, in conjunction with a body of local "gentlemen," the Council, which was appointed by the Crown. 9 1 Although
governor-in-council acted as agent for the Crown, they frequently violated their principal's instructions, often accumulating baronial holdings. 9 2 As one commentator has noted, "English authority, even though
the crown right was clear, did not prevail." 9 3 The fact that the Crown
often tolerated such fraud on the part of the local royal officials 9 4 hardly
supports the claim of an independent colonial right to parcel out land.
Furthermore, the colony never disputed the Crown's right to control
the disposition of land. 9 5 It was not until the Revolution that the
88. The colony's basic political structure evolved from an "Ordinance and Constitution" adopted in 1621 by the Virginia Company. 10 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTIONS 46 (1979). The King continued the basic governmental structure
following the recall of the Company's charter. See generally R. BEVERLY, THE HISTORY AND
PRESENT STATE OF VIRGINIA

237-42 (London 1705).

89.

See, e.g., 2 ROYAL INSTRUCTIONS TO BRITISH COLONIAL GOVERNORS, 1670-1776, at
533-55, 588-91 (L. Labaree ed. 1935) [hereinafter cited as ROYAL INSTRUCTIONS].

90. Compare the situation in the proprietary colony of Pennsylvania. Zimmerman,
supra note 82.
91. R. BEVERLY, supra note 88, at 239, 241; Voorhis, Crown Versus Council inthe Virginia
Land Policy, 3 WM. & MARY Q (3d Ser.) 499, 500-01 (1946).
92. Governor Spotswood, for example, ended his service to the Crown and retired to
his estate of some 86,650 acres. See Report from Committee Staff to Lords of the Committee of the Privy Council (June 20, 1729), in Public Records Office, Colonial Office, Class 5,
vol. 1366, at 26 [hereinafter cited as vol. Colonial Records]; Voorhis, supra note 91, at 511.
Council members often did at least as well. P. GATES, supra note 57, at 36-37.
93. Voorhis, supra note 91, at 513. Initially, land was not sold, but instead was
granted under a "headrights" system intended to encourage importation of people by
allowing the importer 50 acres for each person he brought into the colony at his expense.
Headrights applied to all persons, free, bonded, or slave. R. BEVERLY, supra note 88, at
277; M. HARRIS, supra note 74, at 194-209. "Extensive grants of land thus went to those
rich and influential men who stood at the center of large clusters of dependents bound to
work at their bidding."

R. ISAAC, THE TRANSFORMATION OF VIRGINIA, 1740-1790, at 20

(1982). The society thus created was a feudalistic patriarchy.
The headrights system also encouraged fraud, often with the active assistance of the
imperial officials. P. GATES, supra note 57, at 35-36; M. HARRIS, supra note 74, at 207-08;
Kammen, Virginia at the Close of the Seventeenth Century: An Appraisal by James Blair and John
Locke, 74 VA. MAG. HIST. & Bio. 141, 143-44, 154-55 (1966); Voorhis, supra note 91, at

500-02. The widespread abuses of the headright system led to the adoption of a procedure under which the governor-in-council sold headright certificates for 5 shillings per 50
acres, approximately 1 penny per acre. 3 W. HENING, THE STATUTES AT LARGE 305 (Richmond, Va. 1812). Although this act was disapproved by the Crown, the practice of selling
certificates continued and gradually replaced the headright system. M. HARRIS, supra note
74, at 245; Voorhis, supra note 91, at 505-07.
94. The Crown tended to be forgiving of the transgressions, approving many questionable transactions after the fact. See Report from the Board of Trade to the Lords Committee for Plantation Affairs of the Privy Council (June 20, 1729), in 1366 COLONIAL
RECORDS, supra note 92, at 26, 31 (noting that the King in Council had ordered "that no
advantage should be taken of the Invalidity of [Spotswood's] Grants, and that for the better confirmation of such of them as were defective, the [new] Governor . . .should pass
new & Authentick Patents to the said Col. Spotswood or his Assigns").
95. There was no protest, for example, of the subsequent grants that created Mary-
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Crown's complete discretion over land was challenged. Even then the
Declaration of Independence's challenge goes not to the Crown's right,
but to the effect of its policy: one of the "repeated injuries and usurpations" of which the Crown was accused was endeavoring "to prevent the
population of these states [by] raising the conditions of new appropria96
tions of lands."
land, Pennsylvania, and North Carolina and that abrogated the colony's charter boundaries. Virginia similarly did not dispute the right of the Crown to create new colonies within
its trans-Appalachian claims. For example, in 1770 when the Colonial Secretary, Lord
Hillsborough, wrote asking the colony's response to the request for a grant of 2.4 million
acres, the President of the Virginia Council responded that the colony did "not presume to
say to whom our gracious sovereign shall grant the vacant lands." Letter from William
Nelson to Lord Hillsborough (Oct. 18, 1770), reprinted in 1348 COLONIAL RECORDS, supra
note 92, at 321, 328. Although he obviously was not happy with the proposal and raised
numerous logistical problems, President Nelson did not question the Crown's right to
make the grant. Indeed, the major portion of the letter was taken up with a detailed justification of earlier colonial grants that was intended to demonstrate that they had complied
with the then-existing royal instructions.
Furthermore, Virginians sought specific grants directly from the Crown when the
grant seemed nonroutine. Thus, when the symbolic barrier of the Appalachian Mountains
was to be crossed, the lieutenant-governor advised the Board of Trade. Noting that he
had received requests for grants of land "lying on the Western Side of the Great Mountains," he informed the Board that "he did not think proper to comply therewith untill he
had receiv'd His Majesty's Orders thereupon." Letter from Gooch to Board of Trade
(Nov. 6, 1747), reprintedin 1326 COLONIAL RECORDS, supra note 92, at 277. At the same
time, a group organized as the "Ohio Company" petitioned the King for a grant of
500,000 acres "on the Waters of the Mississippi." Petition of John Hanbury to King in
Council, reprinted in 1327 COLONIAL RECORDS, supra note 92, at 31. The King assented and
the Governor was instructed to issue the desired grant. Report of King in Council (Mar.
16, 1748), reprinted in 1937 COLONIAL RECORDS, supra note 92, at 57; also in 2 ROYAL INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 89, at 645. See also Additional Instruction to the Lieutenant Governor of Virginia (Dec. 13, 1748), in 1327 COLONIAL RECORDS, supra note 92, at 39
(authorizing Gooch to make the grant to the Ohio Company). See generally T. ABERNETHY,
WESTERN LANDS AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 7-9 (1937); K. BAILEY, THE OHIO COMPANY OF VIRGINIA AND THE WESTWARD MOVEMENT, 1748-1792, at 15-82 (1939); 2 L. GIPSON, THE BRITISH EMPIRE BEFORE THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 5-8 (rev. ed. 1960); 4 id. at
225-68; (rev. ed. 1967); A. HENDERSON, DR. THOMAS WALKER AND THE LOYAL COMPANY OF
VIRGINIA (1931); P. JOHNSON, JAMES PATRON AND THE APPALACHIAN COLONISTS (1973); S.
LIVERMORE, supra note 75, at 75-82 (discussing various aspects of the pre-Revolutionary
history of the lands west of the Appalachian Mountains and the effects of the struggle to
control those lands on the politics of the period).
96. The Declaration of Independence para. 12 (U.S. 1776). Some revolutionaries did

challenge the authority of the Crown. Initially the claim was that the Crown could not
change "the Law and Constitution of this Country ... by any proclamation, Instruction,
or other Act of Government" because "the King [is] as much bound by the Act of his Royal
Predecessors, as any Private Subject." T. JEFFERSON, Petition of George Mason (June,
1774), in I THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 112, 115 (1950) [hereinafter cited as vol.
JEFFERSON PAPERS]. The petition apparently was never delivered. Id. at 115-16. See Letter
from George Mason to Martin Cockburn (May 26, 1774), in K. ROWLAND, THE LIFE OF

GEORGE MASON, 1725-1792, at 168 (1892); Sioussat, The Breakdown of the Royal Management
of Lands in the Southern Provinces, 1773-1775, 3 AGRIC. HIST. 67 (1929).
The next step came quickly. InA Summary View of the Rights of British America,Jefferson
argued that land in America was allodial instead of feudal and thus the king "has no right
to grant lands of himself;" only society as a collective has that right. A Summary View of the
Rights of British America (July, 1774), in JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra, at 121, 133. Jefferson
sought to explain the previous failure to protest this usurpation on the ground that "[o]ur
ancestors . . . were laborers, not lawyers . . . . And while the crown continued to grant

for small sums and on reasonable rents, there was no inducement to arrest the error and
lay it open to public view." Id. These more radical views were not expressed in the Declaration of Independence.
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Thus, the simple picture of the colonies as the "exclusive" landholding unit is myth. It refuses to acknowledge that in all but three colonies the authority to create any rights in land was held by the local
imperial or proprietary officials instead of the popularly controlled unit
of government. Such centralized control over land is hardly surprising
because land was the dominant source of private wealth and governmental revenue: fees were required for a grant and the Crown or proprietor
retained annual quit rents.9 7 Thus, the argument from silence actually
undercuts advocates of the classic doctrine because the most common
experience was with centralized control over the acquisition of rights to
land, a system that would not seem alien to those creating a new
government.
The fact that it was generally the central government that held the
ultimate right to grant private rights to land does not resolve the central
question. Instead, the fact that the Crown or proprietor was the source
of rights in land and that this authority passed from the Crown at the
time of the Revolution simply shifts the question: to whom did authority
pass? Resolution of this dispute was the fundamental constitutional issue of the Confederation.
B.

The Confederation. Creation of the Public Domain

The existence of large tracts of unsettled lands presented the newly
independent states with a major political and constitutional problem:
what was to be done with the back lands? There was a general consensus, though not unanimity, that the lands would eventually be carved
into states; 98 the revolutionary ideology would permit no less. 9 9 The
97. E.g.,

ROYAL INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 89, at 553-55, 588-91.
98. For example, the Virginia constitution of 1776 provided for the establishment of
one or more governments westward of the Alleghany mountains." VA. CONST. (1776),
reprinted in 10 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 51, 56 (1979).

The first draft of the Articles of Confederation similarly provided for the formation of new
western states. 5 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 551 (1776)
[hereinafter cited as vol. JOURNALS (date)]. In the same year, Silas Deane proposed that

some of the back lands be sold to finance the war and that the portion sold be formed into
a "distinct state." Letter from Silas Deane to Secret Committee (Dec. 1, 1776), in 3 AMERICAN ARCHIVES (5th Ser.) 1021 (P. Force ed. Washington, D.C. 1853). In opposing Virginia's land claims, Maryland argued that the back lands should be laid out "into separate
and independent states." 9 JOURNALS, supra at 807 (1777). The Finance Committee suggested in 1778 that "it be covenanted with the States that the Lands set offshall be erected
into separate independent States ....

" 12JOURNALS, supra, at 931 (1778). Richard Lee

also advocated settling the lands north of the Ohio River "for the common good and made
a new State." Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Patrick Henry (Nov. 15, 1778), in 1 THE
LETrERS OF RICHARD HENRY LEE 451, 452-53 (1911)

[hereinafter cited as LEE LETTERS].

99. In addition to the obvious inconsistency of claiming independence while subjecting others to colonial control, the prevailing political theory held that a republic had to be
small. As Richard Henry Lee noted in a letter to Patrick Henry, Virginia's western claims
were too large given "the difficulty of republican laws and government piercing so far
from the seat of governmen[t]." Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Patrick Henry (Nov.
15, 1778), in LEE LETTERS, supra note 98, at 453. See Letter of Joseph Jones to Thomas
JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 96, at 472; G. WOOD, THE
CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 499-506 (1969). But see infra note

Jefferson (June 30, 1780), in 3
156.
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dispute thus centered on who was to control and thus profit from the
state-making process.
During the Confederation, these problems were debated in terms of
three questions. The first was the question of who was to control development of the lands; this was generally stated as a question of property:
who owned the back lands? The second and third questions focused on
constitutional structures. The consensus that the land would eventually
be carved into states left unresolved the internal structure of the governments and their relationship to Congress. Would such lands be independent self-governing political units or would they be held at least
transitionally as colonies? Finally, if the back lands were to become selfgoverning political units, would they be admitted into the Union; and if
so, would they be the equals of the original thirteen states?
The final two questions were largely dependent upon the first.
Thus, the major political issue that initially confronted the members of
the proposed Confederation was who was to control the disposition of
the back lands: to whom did title pass? Virginia and the other states
with sea-to-sea charters argued that it passed to the states severally; that
is, to the state within whose charter boundaries the land was located.10 0
These claims were opposed by the six landless states led by Maryland' 0 '
and by a number of speculative land companies formed near the end of
the colonial period. 10 2 The landless states argued that title passed to
the states collectively, either legally or equitably.
100. At the time of the Revolution, seven colonies asserted some claim to the lands
west of the Appalachians: Connecticut, Georgia, Massachusetts, New York, North and
South Carolina, and Virginia. Connecticut based its claims upon its 1662 corporate charter from Charles II that had granted the incorporators all lands "to the South Sea on the
West." 2 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 131, 136 (1973).
Georgia's claim was predicated upon its sea-to-sea charter issued by George II in 1732. See
id. at 433. The Massachusetts claim was predicated upon the charter it received following
the Glorious Revolution of 1689. The charter was issued by William and Mary in 1691 and
reaffirmed the 1620 charter ofJames I. The new charter restated the bounds of the 1620
charter, granting all the territory between the fortieth and the forty-eighth latitude
"throughout all the Main Lands from Sea to Sea." 5 id. at 75 (1975). The North and
South Carolina title was founded upon the same charter, a sea-to-sea grant by the restored
Charles II in 1663 to eight of his most loyal followers. See 7 id. at 357 (1978). The Virginia
claim was predicated upon the sea-to-sea limits in its third charter (1612) from James I to
"The Treasurer and Company of Adventurers and Planters of the City of London for the
first Colony in Virginia." 10 id. 37 (1979). New York's claim differed from the other claimants because it was based upon its feudal status as suzerain for the Iroquois Confederacy
dating from a 1701 treaty with the Confederacy which included a deed to the King of the
Confederacy's beaver hunting ground. The Treaty Utrecht (1713) between France and
Great Britain terminating the War of Spanish Succession/Queen Anne's War recognized
this relationship. Conference of Lieutenant Governor Nansan with the Indians (1701), in
4 DOCUMENTS RELATIVE TO THE COLONIAL HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 896, 908
(Albany 1854); Report of Governor William Tyron on the State of the Province of New
York (1774), in I DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 737, 741-43 (Albany

1849).
101. In addition to Maryland, the colonies with fixed western boundaries were New
Hampshire, Rhode Island, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Delaware.
102. These land companies generally predicated their claims upon grants secured from
Indian tribes. Most members of the land companies were drawn from the landless states
and it is often difficult to determine whether a particular position was a result of principle
or interest. See generally infra note 109.
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The Confederation presents classic theorists with a major problem
because the dispute was resolved when the Confederation Congress accepted quit claim cessions from the landed states while it carefully
avoided acknowledging the validity of any of the ceded rights. Thus, the
landed states achieved formal confederation, while the landless states
achieved their stated goal of ensuring that the back lands would be used
in the national interest. In this manner, the Confederation received the
first public domain. The classic theorists attempt to avoid this difficulty
by emphasizing continuity, arguing that the compromise was not intended to change the status of the states as the primary landholding
units. 10 3 In their analysis, the Confederation resolved the three questions by transferring title to Congress, but so limited that body's authority through answers to the second and third questions that the states'
position remained fundamentally unaltered. 10 4 Thus, the fact that the
members of the Confederation decided that it was the central government that was to control the uses of the back lands is comparatively unimportant. 10 5 The classic theorists base their contentions on the
language of the congressional resolution of October 10, 1780, calling
upon the landed states to cede their unappropriated lands t 06 and the
103. See Brodie, supra note 1, at 695-96; Hardwicke, Illig & Patterson, supra note 1, at
414-16; Patterson, supra note 1, at 46-53.
104. There is only one conclusion that can be drawn from both the resolutions of
the Congress and the deeds of cession of the seven landed states: these lands
were to be disposed of by the Congress for the benefit of the states and this trust
was so specifically conditioned that Congress could not convert it into an ownership without changing the entire character of the proposed scheme of the distribution of these lands and hence the process of the further development of the
Union of States.
Patterson, supra note 1, at 50. Cf Hardwicke, Illig & Patterson, supra note 1, at 416 ("the
principle of federalism and the absolute right of the colonies to ownership of land within
their boundaries continued undisturbed thought the period of confederation").
105. Patterson, supra note 1, at 50. There is an inherent contradiction in Professor
Patterson's analysis. He begins by recognizing that "the Congress of the Confederation
was only the agent of the states." Id. at 46. Nevertheless, it is "axiomatic" that if ownership were transferred to the Confederation, "Congress could do as it pleased with its own
lands." Id. Thus, a compact was necessary: by accepting the Virginia cession with its conditions, "Congress was estopped from denying or violating its terms or conditions." Id. at
49.
But Congress as an agent could do only what the states that constituted it wanted it to
do - a fact that remained unchanged by any extra-constitutional compact that the Congress might have made - so unless the terms of the cession had been embodied in the
Articles of Confederation, Congress was no more bound by its provisions than by any
other statute.
106. Patterson points in particular to the resolution adopted on October 10, 1780, by
the Congress. The resolution stated in part
[t]hat the unappropriatedlands that may be ceded or relinquished to the United
States, by any particular states, pursuant to the recommendation of Congress the
6 day of September last, shall be disposed offor the common benefit of the United States,
and be settled and formed into distinct republican States, which shall become members of the
federal union, and shall have the same rightsof sovereignty, freedom and independence, as the
other states ....
i8JOURNALS, supra note 98, at 915 (1780), as quoted in Patterson, supra note I, at 47 (emphasis added by Patterson). Professor Patterson then states that this quote embodies "the
essence of the writer's contention that here is found the basis for only a trusteeship of
territory by Congress, [that is] for the exclusive purpose of statehood." Id.
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"typical" Virginia deed of cession. 10 7
Congress requested "a liberal surrender of a portion of their territorial claims"' 0 8 and resolved that any ceded lands "shall be disposed of
for the common benefit of the United States, and be settled and formed
into distinct republican states, which shall become members of the federal union, and have the same rights of sovereignty, freedom and inde107. Professor Patterson points to the Virginia cession, concluding that it specified
four conditions and arguing that
[t]he same conditions. . . were placed in the deeds of cession of the other states:
(1) "that the territory so ceded shall be laid out and formed into states"; (2) "that
the states so formed shall be distinct republican states, and admitted members of
the Federal Union, having the same rights of sovereignty, freedom, and independence as the other states"; (3) "that all lands within the territory so ceded . . .
shall be considered as a common fund for the use and benefit . . . of the United
States . . ."; and (4) that they "shall be faithfully and bona fide disposed of for
that purpose, and for no other use or purpose whatsoever."
Patterson, supra note 1, at 48-49 (quoting 2 THORPE, FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS
955-56 (1909)).
Contrary to Patterson's assertion, the conditions "typical" of the Virginia cession
were not typical of those employed in the other cession acts. For example, the New York
cession that covered the same area as the Virginia cession provided only that the territory
"shall be and enure for the use and benefit of such of the United States . . . and for no
other use or purpose whatsoever; [that the land was] to be granted, disposed of and appropriated in such manner only, as Congress of the United or confederated States shall order
and direct." New York Deed of Cession (Mar. 1, 1781), in 2 TERRITORIAL PAPERS OF THE
UNITED STATES 3, 4-5 (C. Carter ed. 1934) [hereinafter cited as TERRITORIAL PAPERS]. See
19JOURNALS, supra note 98, at 208-13 (1781). Similarly, the Massachusetts and Connecticut cessions provided only that the ceded territory was "for the common benefit" of the
Confederation. 28 id. at 281 (1785) (Massachusetts: "to be disposed of for the common
benefit of" the United States); 31 id. at 655 (1786) (Connecticut: "for the common use and
benefit of said states"). None of these cessions impose any obligation that the land be
disposed of, "formed into distinct republican states," or that any states actually created be
admitted into the Union on an equal footing. They required only that the land be used for
the common good and specified that Congress was the judge of the common good. If the
Connecticut, Massachusetts, or New York cessions were viewed as containing the terms of
the trust, Congress would have been justified in renting the territory and using the proceeds to sink the revolutionary war debt, a recurrent topic apparently first suggested by
Silas Deane in 1776, more than two years before the Articles of Confederation were finally
drafted. Letter from Silas Deane to Secret Committee (Dec. 1, 1776), in 3 AMERICAN
ARCHIVES (5th Ser.), supra note 98, at 1020-21, 1051.
The fact that not all the cessions constrained Congress as the Virginia cession attempted to do is perhaps the reason that Professor Patterson asserts that one of the significant results of the conditions was that "Congress recognized Virginia as the sole owner of
these lands." Patterson, supra note 1, at 49. The statement is simply incorrect. First, the
Confederation made no determination on the validity of any of the cessions. A determination that Virginia had been the sole owner of the territory would also have been a determination that the Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New York claims were without merit. For
the Confederation to have made such a decision would have involved it in precisely the
type of disputes over limiting state charter rights that it wisely refused to consider. E.g., 17
JOURNALS, supra note 98, at 806 (1780) (refusing to consider the respective claims of right
of Maryland and Virginia "as they involve questions, a discussion of which was declined on
mature consideration, when the articles of confederation were debated.") See P. ONUF,
supra note 70, at 94-102. Second, if Congress recognized Virginia as the sole prior owner
of the land ceded, the subsequent acceptance of Connecticut's cession is puzzling because
that state reserved lands totaling some 6 million acres west of Pennsylvania. See 30JouRNALS, supra note 98, at 299-301, 307-08, 310-11 (1786); 31 id. at 654-55. Letter from William Grayson to James Madison (May 28, 1786), in 8 LETrERS OF MEMBERS OF THE
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 372-75 (E. Burnett ed. 1936) [hereinafter cited as vol. CONFEDER-

ATION LETTERS]; Letter from James Monroe to Richard Lee (May 24, 1786), in id. at 36566; Letter from William Grayson to George Washington (May 27, 1786), in id. at 371-72.

108.

17 JOURNALS, supra note 98, at 806 (the proposal of Sept. 6, 1780).
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pendence, as the other states."' 0

9

521

In conjunction with this language,

109. 18 id. at 915. See Patterson, supra note 1, at 47. The resolution of October 10,
1782, was a political solution to an unacceptable stalemate; it was achieved only after a
lengthy process of conciliation involving the colonial land companies as well as the landed
and landless states.
In June, 1778, Congress narrowly rejected a resolution to empower Congress to fix
the western boundaries of states claiming the "South Sea". 11 JOURNALS, supra note 98, at
631-32, 636-37 (1778). Maryland responded by declaring that it would ratify the Articles
only if they were amended, "giving full power to the United States in congress assembled
to ascertain and fix the western limits of the states claiming to extend to the Mississippi, or
South Sea." 10 W. HENING, supra note 93, at 549, 551 (Richmond 1822); 13 JOURNALS
supra note 98, at 29 (1779). Maryland's actions are subject to differing interpretations;
many leading Maryland politicians were financially interested in the land companies and
the state in many instances seemed more concerned with the potential speculative gain of
the companies than with the common benefit of the states. Compare H. ADAMS, MARYLAND's INFLUENCE UPON LAND CESSIONS TO THE UNITED STATES (1885) (arguing that Maryland's actions are traceable to altruistic motives) with T. ABERNETHY, supra note 95, at 16974, 230-46, 270-72; M.JENSEN, THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION 150-56, 198-238 (1940);
Jensen, The Cession of the Old Northwest, 23 Miss. VALLEY HIST. REV. 27 (1936);Jensen, The
Creation of the National Domain, 1781-1784, 26 id. 232 (1939) (arguing that Maryland's actions were traceable to the economic interests of its leading politicians). Some complex
mix of motives seems likely. See also Molovinski, supra note 82; Sioussat, The Chevalierde la
Luzerne and the Ratification of the Articles of Confederation by Maryland, 1780-81, 60 PA. MAG.
HIST. & Bio. 391 (1936).

Maryland's refusal meant that the thirteen states were unable to form a government;
Congress was simply a caucus of thirteen independent nations that lacked any dejure relationship, a fact many felt was hampering the war effort. E.g., Letter from James Duane to
George Washington (May 4, 1780), in 5 CONFEDERATION LETTERS, supra note 107, at 125;
M. JENSEN, THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION 228. It was apparent that unanimity was

impossible without some compromise. The deadlock was broken in September and October, 1779, when Congress accepted the petitions of land companies whose claims had
been declared invalid by Virginia and referred them to a committee for consideration. 15
JOURNALS, supra note 98, at 1064-65, 1155, 1223-24, 1226-30 (1779). The North Carolina
delegates reported that for many members of Congress
the question respecting the justice or injustice of the claims of the [land] companies is not so much in View as that of laying down some principle or pursuing
such a line of conduct as may be most likely to obtain the main object, namely
that Congress shall have the disposal of all the unappropriated lands on the Western frontiers of these States and that such lands may become the common property of the whole.
Letter from the North Carolina Delegates to the Governor of North Carolina (Nov. 4,
1779), in 4 CONFEDERATION LETrERS, supra note 107, at 507. In December 1779, the Vir-

ginia's General Assembly issued a remonstrance, asserting that a congressional assumption of jurisdiction would be "expressly contrary to the fundamental principles of the
confederation" and would create a precedent that could be used "to deprive of territory or
subvert the sovereignty" of any of the states. 10 W. HENING, supra note 93, at 557. In
February 1780, the New York legislature authorized its representatives to Congress to
cede its western claims, and shortly thereafter a committee was appointed to consider
Marvland's declaration, Virginia's remonstrance and New York's proffered cession. 17
JOURNALS, supra note 98, at 559-60 (1780). The committee reported that it was "unnecessary to examine into the merits or the policy" of the respective positions because such an
examination had been "declined on mature consideration, when the articles of confederation were debated [and could not now be] revived with any prospect of conciliation." Id. at
806. Instead, the committee recommended that Congress "press upon those states which
can remove the embarrassment respecting the western country, a liberal surrender of a
portion of their territorial claims, since they cannot be preserved entire without endangering the stability of the general confederacy." Id. The report was made on June 30, 1780,
id. at 580; it was read on July 3, id. at 586, and was approved without intervening formal
consideration on September 6. Id. at 806-07. With the adoption of the committee report,
Congress was fully committed to the nationalization of the western lands.
Immediately following approval, Jones and Madison of Virginia moved that any land
so ceded "shall be laid out in separate and distinct States at such time and in such manner
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the classical theorists emphasize the language of the Virginia cession
that echoed it. The cession act provided that the territory ceded "shall
be laid out and formed into states . . . and the states so formed shall be
distinct republican states, and admitted members of the Federal Union,
having the same rights of sovereignty, freedom and independence, as
the other states."1 0 The classic theorists contend that the language of
these two documents forbids the retention of any lands because the cessions were made and accepted on the promise that the ceded lands
would be "disposed of" by creating "distinct republican states [with]
the same rights of sovereignty, freedom, and independence, as the other
states." I I
The classic theorists' historical arguments thus rest upon the same
untenable assumptions as their equal footing analysis: the argument resolves into the contention that when the Confederation agreed that new
states carved from the ceded land were to have the "same rights of sovereignty, freedom and independence, as the other states" they necessarily meant that new states would either have title to or complete control
over all the vacant land within their borders. The classical theorists
again seek to equate "sovereignty" with "complete governmental au2
thority over land." 1
This interpretation is, however, undercut by other parts of the congressional resolution. The ceded lands, the document states, "shall be
granted and settled at such times and under such regulations as shall
hereafter be agreed on by the United States in Congress assembled
...
"lis Such an independent congressional determination is at least
anomalous if the resolution was intended to create a trust requiring
complete and immediate divestiture of federal control. This anomaly is
compounded by Congress's actions when it finally adopted regulations
for the settling of the ceded lands. The statute specifically provided for
as Congress shall hereafter direct"; the ceded land "shall be considered as a common fund
for the use and benefit" of the members of the Confederation and "therefore all purchases
and deeds [by the land companies] from. . . any Indian Nation . . .shall be deemed and
taken as absolutely void." Id. at 808. On October 10, 1780, Congress adopted a resolution pursuant to the committee report and the subsequent motion by the Virginia delegates. Id
110. Act ofJan. 2, 1781, 10 W. HENING, supra note 93, at 564, reprinted at 25JOURNALS,
supra note 98, at 560.
111. 18JouRNALS, supra note 98, at 915.
[I]t is of the essence of the writer's contention that [this resolution is] the basis
for only a trusteeship of territory by Congress for the exclusive purpose of statehood. . . and that it forbids the holding of territory by Congress within a state by
declaring that states created from such territory shall be admitted into the Union
on an equality with the original states in which at this time Congress did not own
one single foot of land.
Patterson, supra note 1, at 4748.
112. See supra notes 45-53 and accompanying text. Patterson, for example, takes the
most extreme position, stating that "it was intended that when a territorial government
was created it would be given the right to distribute the undeveloped lands within its borders just as the American colonies had done." Patterson, supra note 1, at 49. He cites no
authority for his statement and it is amply refuted by the wording of the very documents
upon which he relies. See infra
note 114 and accompanying text.
113. 18JouRNALS, supra note 98, at 915 (1780).
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retention of lands by the central government after the admission of a
state "to a share in the federal councils on an equal footing with the
original States" and prohibited any state interference with or taxation of
such federal lands. 1 4 Thus, Congress saw nothing inconsistent with retention of land by the federal government and compliance with the compromise. Indeed, Congress adopted a far more restrictive and
15
imperialistic land policy than the states during the same period."
Again, the equation of state sovereignty with ownership or political control of land is untenable.
The participants' primary concern was not with specific uses for the
ceded lands; the language of the various resolutions, cessions, and ordinances contain only general statements on the future uses of the ceded
lands. 1 16 Instead, the primary issue was determining who would make
the specific decisions. The compromise was the determination that the
decision would be made on a federal, instead of a state basis. Henceforth, the western lands would be held for the common good with no
particular state's citizens to be preferred. The essence of the compromise was the specification of the decision maker, not the specification of
a decision. 1 7 There was general agreement that the ceded lands would
not be held in perpetual colonial status, but this decision could not be
114. An Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the United States northwest of the river Ohio (July 13, 1787), reprinted at 1 Stat. 51 n.(a) (1789). The Ordinance
provides that "[tihe legislatures of those districts or new States, shall never interfere with
the primary disposal of the soil by the United States in Congress assembled, nor with any
regulations Congress may find necessary for securing the title in such soil to the bona fide
purchasers." Id. This provision was initially included in Resolutions for the Government
of the Western Territory (Apr. 23, 1784), in T. DONALDSON, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 148, 149
(1884). See B. HINSDALE, THE OLD NORTHWEST 247-69 (rev. ed. 1899); Berkhofer,Jefferson,

the Ordinance of 1784, and the Origins of the American TerritorialSystem, 29 WM. & MARY Q. (3d.
Ser.) 231 (1972).
115. See Tatter, State and Federal Land Policy Duringthe Confederation Period,9 AGRIc. HIST.
176 (1935).
116. E.g., 30JOURNALS, supra note 98, at 654-55 (Connecticut deed of cession); 28 id. at
281 (Massachusetts deed of cession); 19 id. at 208-13 (New York deed of cession); 18 id. at
915 (Congressional resolution on disposition of ceded lands).
117. "[I]t
was understood before adoption [of the Articles of Confederation] that the
tremendously important matter of the ownership of the back lands, and the administration
of the back settlements - in other words the extension of the empire - was to be in the
hands of Congress." McLaughlin, The Background of American Federalism, 12 AM. POL. Sci.
REv. 215, 239 (1918).
Furthermore, there is no indication in the debates surrounding the compromise or in
the terms of the compromise that the imperium/dominium dichotomy was considered a crucial aspect of the dispute. The participants were aware of the distinction; the deeds of
cession, for example, conveyed all claims to "soil" and "jurisdiction." The New York legislature authorized its representatives to limit the state's boundaries "either with respect to
the Jurisdiction as well as the Right. . .of Soil; or Reserving the Jurisdiction in part or in
whole over the Lands which may be ceded." 2 TERRITORIAL PAPERS, supra note 107, at 4
(New York). See id. 7, 9 (Virginia's deed); id. II (Massachusetts' deed). The question simply attracted no particular attention. In part this is traceable to the fact that to have done
so would have required consideration of the nature of the interests actually conveyed by
the deeds and of the right of the various states to convey. Because the rights asserted by
the various states were inconsistent, such an examination was something that "by the acts
of Congress it appears to have been their intention . . . to avoid all discussion of the
territorial rights of individual states, and only to recommend and accept a cession of their
claims, whatsoever they might be, to vacant territory." 25 JOURNALS, supra note 98, at 563
(1783).
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made binding on the Congress. The specifics of the state-building process and the relationship of the new states to the Union were spelled out
with even less clarity in the compromise. 118 These questions were necessarily left for future resolution."19
C.

Drafting the Constitution: Creating a More Energetic Government

It was against the background of the Confederation's compromise
and its evolving statutory thought on state-building that the delegates to
the Federal Convention met during the summer of 1787. The Convention was called in part because of the problems associated with the western lands: the Confederation Congress lacked the express power to hold
the public domain it owned as a result of the state cessions, to create
new states, or to admit those states into the Union. 120 Given these
118. The lack of agreement on the specific nature of the state-building process and of
the relationship of the new states to Congress is demonstrated by the changing requirements adopted in the various Confederation land ordinances. In the 1784 ordinance,
Congress was to mark off the boundaries of the new states that were to have immediate
self-government and were to be admitted into the Union when they had a population equal
to that of the least populous of the original states. 26 JOURNALS, supra note 98, at 277-78
(1784). By 1786, Congress was considering a colonial government "similar to that which
prevail'd in these States previous to the revolution" followed by admission into the Union
when they achieved the previously specified population. Letter from James Monroe to
Thomas Jefferson (May 11, 1786), in 9JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 96, at 511. The Ordinance of 1787 wound up somewhere between the earlier positions: appointed territorial
officials with a popular assembly. See Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50, 51 n.(a) (reenactment of Ordinance of 1787). For differing interpretations, compare M. JENSEN, THE
NEW NATION 352-59 (1950) (arguing that the ordinance of 1787 repealing that of 1784 was
an antidemocratic victory for the land speculators and their political supporters) with
Berkhofer, supra note 114 (the 1787 ordinance was the fruition of the 1784 ordinance
because both accepted the need for a preliminary period of central control).
119. There is an additional problem with the classical theorists' argument. Even assuming that their interpretation is correct and that the congressional resolution and the
state cessions created a legally binding (if somewhat nebulous) compact that the Confederation Congress was incapable of violating, the advocates of the classical doctrine face a
final hurdle: the Confederation Congress was replaced by the current constitutional government. Thus, unless the compromise retains constitutional stature, the advocates of the
classic doctrine are in the striking position of arguing that the compromise has a supraconstitutional effect and remains valid despite the fact that it is the arguably unconstitutional product of a defunct government.
Patterson attempts to circumvent this difficulty by arguing that "when the Congress
. . . readopted the Ordinance of 1787 in 1789, it pledged itself to the same [equal footing]
doctrine, thereby superseding the old Congress as the party to the compact." Patterson,
supra note 1, at 56. Congressional readoption of the ordinance, however, actually undercuts the classical argument. First, the first Congress concluded that it was necessary to
readopt the ordinance, that it did not survive the change in government. Second, because
the readoption was by simple statute, Congress is not bound by the terms of the Ordinance if it decides to change policy. Finally, some classic theorists argue that the Confederation Congress acted unconstitutionally in adopting the Ordinance of 1787. E.g., id. at
52 (quoting 3 E. CHANNING, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 546 (1912)). If the Confederation's ordinances were illegal, it is difficult to see how the compromise retains continuing vitality. Either the compromise amended the Articles of Confederation and thus
validated the Ordinance, or it did not and the entire process was unconstitutional. If the
latter, the statutory adoption of the Ordinance lacks constitutional stature and was repealed at the latest by those provisions of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of
1976 formally ending the policy of disposing of the fee in federal land. See Federal Land
Policy and Management Act of 1976 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701(a)(1), 1713 (1982)).
120. E.g., THE FEDERALIST, supra note 23, at No. 43, (J. Madison) at 290-91; id. No. 7, at
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shortcomings in the Confederation, the classic theorists' insistence on
continuity through the governmental change is surprising.
Despite the alleged constitutional stature of the classic doctrine, its
advocates devote remarkably little attention to the events of the Convention.' 2' For classic theorists, the lack of explicit statement authorizing
the federal government to hold property within states is conclusive: because both the colonies and the states under the Confederation had
been the exclusive landholding entities, the lack of specific constitutional authorization to manage land - in conjunction with the terms of
the enclave clause of article I - means that Congress lacks the power to
12 2
do so.
As we have seen, this argument from silence is false. 123 The colonies were not the exclusive landholding unit and the states ceded their
land claims to the Confederation in order to nationalize decision making
on the future of the ceded lands. In addition, the advocates' argument is
one of misdirection. The members of the Convention, like those of the
Confederation, were concerned with determining what institution would
make decisions regarding the territory acquired or to be acquired by the
federal government. Thus, the lack of explicit provisions for future uses
of the public domain reflects the fact that these questions were left for
subsequent political resolution. Article IV, section 3 simply reaffirmed
the Confederation's decision that the future of the public domain was a
national question rather than a state question.
The fact that the Convention chose largely to avoid specific decisions regarding the disposition of the back lands does not mean that the
issues were of no concern. In fact, the Convention debated the issues
that had plagued the Confederation: ownership of the back lands and
24
the concomitant guarantees of the existing states' territorial integrity, 1
the political status to be accorded the western territory, and the conditions under which the new states would be admitted into the Union.
36-39 (A. Hamilton); Brodie, supra note 1, at 696; Hardwicke, Illig & Patterson, supra note
1, at 422 n.74; Patterson, supra note 1, at 52, 53.
121. Brodie, supra note 1, at 724; Engdahl, supra note 1, at 288 n.10, 291 n.24; Hard-

wicke, Illig & Patterson, supra note 1, at 422-23; Patterson, supra note 1, at 57-60.
122. E.g., Patterson, supra note 1, at 57-59.
123. In most colonies, land was controlled by either the Crown or the proprietor rather
than a popularly elected body of colonists. See supra notes 74-97 and accompanying text.
Furthermore, the central constitutional compromise of the Confederation involved a
transfer of control over the back lands from some of the states to the Confederation Congress, a transfer intended to shift decision making from the state to the national level. See
supra notes 108-119 and accompanying text.
124. Although New York (1782), Virginia (1784), Massachusetts (1785), and Connecticut (1786) had made cessions, Connecticut retained claims to the Western Reserve in what
is now northeastern Ohio, Massachusetts continued to control Maine, and Virginia retained its claims south of the Ohio River. In addition, Georgia and the two Carolinas had
not made final cessions. These retained claims figured in the debates. For example, in the
debate on whether new states would be allowed equal representation with the existing
states, Morris of Pennsylvania expressed fears that North and South Carolina and Georgia
would soon be the majority because of their "great interior Country." I CONVENTION
RECORDS, supra note 23, at 605. Luther Martin, a delegate from Maryland, stressed the
same points in his subsequent Anti-Federalist pamphlet. L. MARTIN, GENUINE INFORMATION (Baltimore, Md. 1787-88), reprinted in 3 id. at 172, 187, 189.
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These questions on the disposition of the western lands were also part
of a constellation of issues central to the Convention's compromise on
representation. The effect of the public domain on the precarious balance between North and South was a recurrent concern because most
delegates to the Convention assumed that the back lands would eventually become states. Although the general principle that Congress should
have the power to admit new states prompted little debate,1 2 5 the details
presented more difficulties because they were intertwined with the rep1 26
resentation issue and the more pervasive problems of sectionalism.
1. The Admission of New States: Equality or Congressional
Discretion?
One of the troublesome details was the question of whether new
states were to be admitted into the Union on an equal footing with the
original states or whether Congress was to be given discretion in the
matter. Many delegates feared that if new states were admitted on the
basis of political equality they would soon come to dominate the national government; they, therefore, argued against proportional representation and sought to prevent the! 27new states from ever achieving a
Morris of Pennsylvania was the
majority in the proposed Congress.
125. Resolutions stating the general proposition were adopted unanimously every time
they were proposed. E.g., 3 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 23, at 117, 245; 2 id. at 39.

126. As Madison recognized:
[T]he States were divided into different interests not by their difference of size,
but by other circumstances; the most material of which resulted partly from climate, but principally from [the effects] of their having or not having slaves.
These two causes concurred in forming the great division of interest in the
U[nited] States. It did not lie between large and small States: it lay between the
Northern & Southern.
1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 23, at 486. Sectionalism was intrinsically intertwined
with the debate on the western lands because states formed from such lands would necessarily affect the delicate balance that existed between Northern and Southern states.
The debate on proportional representation is exemplary. Although delegates from
other sections spoke in favor of proportional representation, the southern states were the
most vocal in support of such representation and thus the interests of the proposed new
states. The reasons for their support was succinctly stated by Mason of Virginia when he
noted that
the objection was that the Legislature would cease to be the Representatives of
the people. It would continue so no longer that the States now containing a majority of the people should retain that majority. As soon as the Southern & Western population should predominate, which must happen in a few years, the power
w[oul]d be in the hands of the minority, and would never be yielded to the majority, unless provided for by the Constitution.
Id. at 586. Morris of Pennsylvania acknowledged that this was the central issue, stating
that "the South[er]n Gentlemen will not be satisfied unless they see the way open to their
gaining a majority in the public Councils"; if they do so "and be joined as they will be with
the interior Country they will inevitably bring on a war with Spain for the Mississippi" to
the ruin of the commercial Northern states. Id. at 604. Butler of South Carolina acknowledged that "[t]he people & strength of America are evidently bearing Southwardly &
S[outh] westw[ar]dly." Id. at 605. The Convention rejected the use of wealth as a measure
of representation. Id. at 606. See C. WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 593
(1928).
127. E.g., I CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 23, at 533-34 (Morris PA); id. at 534 (Rutledge SC); id. at 559-60 (Gorham MA); id. at 571 (Morris PA); 2 id. at 2-3 (Gerry MA).
Despite an initial rejection, the issue returned in an altered from in a motion by Gerry
of Massachusetts to limit the number of western states so "that they should never be able
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most persistent opponent of equality for the new states, arguing that
[a]mong other objections it must be apparent [that the West]
would not be able to furnish men equally enlightened, to share
in the administration of our common interests. The Busy
haunts of men not the remote wilderness, was the proper
School of political Talents. If the Western people get the
power into their hands they will ruin the Atlantic interests. The
128
Back members are always most averse to the best measures.
Others argued for the inclusion of wealth as a method of at least initially
29
limiting the power of the new states.'
In late August when the Committee on Detail presented its report,
the clause on admission of new states provided that they were to be admitted "on the same terms with the original States."' 30 When this provision came up for debate, Morris of Pennsylvania moved to strike the
requirement, not wishing "to bind down the Legislature to admit Western States on the terms here stated [because he did not want] to throw
the power into their hands."' 13 1 Langdon of New Hampshire agreed,
arguing that "he did. not know but circumstances might arise which
would render it inconvenient to admit new States on terms of equality.'

1 32

Williamson of North Carolina "was for leaving the Legislature

free."' 3 3 Despite the argument of Madison and Mason of Virginia that
"the best policy is to treat them with that equality which will make them
friends not enemies,"' 134 Morris's motion was adopted by a nine-to-two
35
vote. 1

The convention thus specifically debated and rejected a constitutional requirement that new states be admitted on an equal footing with
to outnumber the Atlantic States." 2 id.at 3. The motion was only narrowly defeated,
five-to-four with one state divided. Id.
128. 1 id.at 583. Madison of Virginia tartly responded that Morris apparently "determined human character by the points of the compass." Id. at 584. If so, Morris was not
alone. In his journal, Patterson of New Jersey noted that it was "[n]ecessary, that the
Atlantic States should take Care of themselves; the Western States will soon be very numerous." Id. at 562. In fact, the view that the initial settlers on the frontier were at best
halfway between "tractable people" and "Indians" - in Jefferson's phrase - was commonly held. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (July 9, 1786), in 10 JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 96, at 112-13; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison
(Dec. 16, 1786), id. at 603; Letter from the Virginia Delegates to the Governor of Virginia
(Nov. 1, 1783), 7 CONFEDERATION LETrERS, supra note 107, at 365 (settlers as "lawless

banditii and adventurers"); Letter from New York Delegates to the Governor of New York
(Sept. 19, 1783), id. at 300-01 (settlers as "lawless men"). See generally Berkhofer, The Republican Origins oftheAmerican TerritorialSystem, in THE WEST OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 152,
159-60 (1970) (arguing that republican legislators in Congress were in fundamental agreement that frontiersmen were not immediately ready for complete political rights).
129. E.g., 1 CONVErcrTIoN RECORDS, supra note 23, at 446 (Williamson NC); id. at 542
(Butler SC); id. at 582 (Rutledge SC). Initially a majority favored allowing new states an
equal representation in Congress and the Convention rejected a proposal to include
wealth as one basis for representation. Id. at 534 (Mason VA); id. at 560 (Williamson NC);
id.at 584-85 (Madison VA); 2 id. at 3 (Sherman CT). The issue, however, was not dead.
130. 2 id. at 188.
131. Id. at 454.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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the existing states. Because the arguments of the classic theorists ultimately distill into equal footing claims, it is perhaps not surprising that
they largely ignore the Convention's work.
2.

The Admission of New States: Guaranteeing the Territory of
the Existing States

Another of the troublesome details that produced recurrent debate
was whether Congress would be granted the power to admit new states
within the territory of an existing state without that state's consent. One
of the original resolutions offered by Virginia Governor Randolph "provided that a Republican Government & the territory of each State . . .
ought to be guaranteed by the United States ....
.136 The territorial
guarantee was removed when Read of New Jersey objected that "[t]he
guarantee will confirm the assumed rights of several states to lands
1 37
which do belong to the confederation."'
Given the remaining western claims of some states 13 8 and the
boundary disputes among others, 139 the issue was not so easily avoided.
It returned when the Convention took up the Committee of Detail's report. The report provided that new states "may be admitted" upon approval of a two-thirds majority in Congress and the consent of the state
legislature if the new state "shall arise within the limits of any of the
present States .... ."140 Morris moved to amend the language so that
"no new State shall be erected within the limits of any present States,
without the consent of the Legislature of such State, as well as of the
Gen[era]l Legislature." 141 Martin of Maryland objected that the resolu14 2
tion guaranteed the boundaries of the landed states.
The tenuousness of the Confederation's compromise was evident in
136. 1 id.
at 22. When the resolution came up for debate on June 5, it was deferred on
the motion of Patterson of New Jersey who wanted the representation question settled
first. Id. at 121.
137. Id. at 206. Following adoption of this resolution, the question of guaranteeing
territorial integrity became intertwined with the question of admitting new states. The
guarantee of a republican government became article IV, section 4 of the Constitution.
138. Virginia had ceded only its claims north of the Ohio River and thus retained what
became Kentucky. Georgia, North and South Carolina had not made any cessions of the
transmontane claims. Connecticut asserted a shadowy claim to lands west of Pennsylvania.
See B. HIBBARD, A HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC LAND POLICIES 7-14 (1924).
139. The most troublesome dispute concerned Vermont, which was claimed by New

York. See 2

CONVENrION RECORDS,

supra note 23, at 455 (Martin MD); id. at 463 (Morris

PA).

140. Id. at 188. The article originated in Governor Randolph's tenth resolution, which
hedged on the territorial guarantee issue by stating only that "provision ought to be made
for the admission of States lawfully arising within the limits of the United States, whether
from a voluntary junction of Government and Territory or otherwise." 1 id. at 22. It was
subsequently adopted without recorded debate. Id. at 121; 2 id. at 46. The ambiguous
phrase "lawfully arising within the limits of the United States" is clarified by a draft from
the Committee on Detail which defines the phrase as either "in the territory of the united
states, with the assent of the legislature [Congress]" or "within the limits of a particular
state, by the consent of a major part of the people of that state." Id. at 147. This definition was the basis of the Committee of Detail's report of August 6, which triggered the
debate on August 29th.

141. 2 id. at 455.
142. Id.
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the ensuing debate as both sides rehearsed well-worn arguments. Delegates from the landless states of the mid-Atlantic urged "the unreasonableness of forcing. . . the people of Virginia beyond the Mountains, the
Western people, of N[orth] Carolina & of Georgia, & the people of
Maine, to continue under the States now governing them, without the
consent of those States to their separation."' 4 3 Their opponents countered that "[w]hen the majority of a State wish to divide they can do so.
The aim of those in opposition to the article. . . was that the Gen[era]l
Government should abet the minority, & by that means divide a State
against its own consent."' 144 Williamson of North Carolina reminded
the delegates that "compulsion was not the policy of the U[nited]
S[tates]."' 14 5 The Maryland delegates' motions to strike the guarantee
and to give Congress the power to erect New States "within as well as
without the territory claimed by the several States" were both easily de47
feated.14 6 The Convention then approved Morris's resolution.1
Carroll of Maryland then sought at least to preserve his state's argument that the West was a common resource by adding a proviso that
"nothing in this Constitution shall be construed to affect the claim of the
U[nited] S[tates] to vacant lands ceded to them by the Treaty of peace."
He noted that this was to be understood as applying to "lands not
claimed by any particular State [as well as] some of the claims of particular States."'148 Wilson of Pennsylvania objected that there was nothing
in the Constitution affecting any claims and it was best to leave it that
way. 14 9 Madison of Virginia also thought it best to be silent on the subject, but suggested that "to make it neutral and fair, it ought to go farther & declare that the claims of the particular States also should not be
affected."' 150 Carroll accepted this suggestion and amended his motion. 15 1 Morris of Pennsylvania then proposed a substitute:
143. Id. at 463 (Martin). Carroll of Maryland noting that "such was our situation with
regard to the Crown lands . . .that he perceived we should be at sea, if no guard was
provided for the right of the U[nited] States to the back lands" ominously suggested that
"all risks would be run by a considerable minority, sooner than give their concurrence" to
the proposed guarantee. Id. at 461-62. See also id. 456 (Dickenson) (arguing that it was
improper for the small states to guarantee the large states "their extensive claims of territory"). See generally L. MARTIN, supra note 124, at 223-27 (rehearsing Maryland's arguments
against extensive state land claims).

144. 2 CONVENTION

RECORDS,

supra note 23, at 456 (Wilson). Rutledge of South Caro-

lina noted that the thrust of the proposal was that "the States are to be cut up without their
own consent." Id. at 462. Morris added that "[i]f the forced division of the the States is
the object of the new System" those states would soon leave the Union. Id. at 456. See alo
id. at 455 (Butler) (arguing that if a new state could be created without the approval of the
existing state that demagogues would seize upon fancied grievances to dismember the
states).
145. Id. at 462. He was careful to point out that his state was "well disposed to give up
her Western lands." Id.
146. Id. at 464.
147. Id. Dickinson of Delaware moved to add language covering the conjunction of
two states; the proposal was approved without counting votes. Id. at 465.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 465-66.
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The Legislature shall have power to dispose of and make all
needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other
property belonging to the U[nited] States; and nothing in this
constitution contained, shall be so construed as to prejudice
any claims
either of the U[nited] S[tates] or of any particular
52
State. '
Morris' motion was adopted without informative debate and with only
Maryland in opposition.15 3 The Convention then turned to another
article.
The central dispute among the members of the Convention thus
mirrored the constitutional compromise of the Confederation. Again
there was a general agreement that Congress should have the discretion
to admit new states. The primary dispute centered on how states were
to be created and on their relationship to the new federal government.
Two specific issues in the dispute divided the Convention's delegates.
The first was whether the new Congress was to have unilateral authority
to admit states from lands within the claims of existing states, an issue
that echoed the ownership question of the Confederation's debates.
The landless states again sought to give the federal government this
power because they believed that the back lands had been gained "by
the blood and treasure of all, and ought therefore to be a common es154
tate to be granted out on terms beneficial to all the United States."'
The landed states, on the other hand, favored state consent when a new
state was to be formed from part of an old state. The landed states'
position was ultimately adopted: state consent was required.
The second divisive issue was whether to mandate admission of the
new states on terms of equality with the original states. The Convention
was split on this issue between those who feared the West - because its
inhabitants were not refined, because its emerging economy would draw
away capital and population, or because ultimately it would change the
precarious balance among the existing states - and those who viewed
the West as the future, a perspective that eventually seized the imagination of the country. Although the members of the Convention were unable to bridge their divergent perceptions, they did agree that the
decision was a political question for the new Congress and refused to
impose a constitutional equal footing requirement.
152. Id. Martin proposed adding a provision stating that such claims were to be decided by the Supreme Court. Id. Morris argued that this was unnecessary since the
Supreme Court was to decide all cases in which the federal government was a party. Id.
Martin's motion was defeated.
153. Id. It has been suggested that possible sources of this language were two proposals made by Madison. C. WARREN, supra note 126, at 599-600. On August 18, he had
presented a list of nine additional powers that he felt the Congress should be granted.
Among these were the power "[to dispose of the unappropriated lands of the U[nited]
States [and] [t]o institute temporary Governments for New States arising therein." 2 CoNVENTION RECORDS, supra note 23, at 324. This list along with another offered by Pinkney of
South Carolina was referred to the Committee of Detail. Id. at 325. The provisions were
never formally reported from the Committee.
154. Declaration of the Maryland General Assembly (Dec. 15, 1778), reprintedin 10 W.
HENING,

supra note 93, at 540, 541.
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Having determined that state boundaries would be guaranteed and
that Congress would have discretion to both admit new states and set
the terms of their admission, Morris proposed the "Territory or other
Property" clause to complete the necessary congressional authority:
that Congress be given the power to dispose of the public domain and to
make those rules and regulations it deemed necessary to govern and
manage the lands. In light of the broad discretion that the Convention
chose to vest in Congress over the entire state-building process, the
classic theorists' argument that the Convention denied Congress any
discretion as to the future uses of the public domain is nonsensical.
Because of his role in the adoption of the language of article IV,
section 3,155 Morris' subsequent interpretation of its meaning is informative. In response to a question on whether Congress could admit a
state formed from territory not belonging to the United States at the
time of the adoption of the Constitution, Morris wrote:
I always thought that, when we should acquire Canada and
Louisiana it would be proper to govern them as provinces, and
allow them no voice in our councils. In wording the third section of the fourth article, I went as far as circumstances would
permit to establish the exclusion. Candor obliges me to add
my belief, that, had it been more pointedly
expressed, a strong
156
opposition would have been made.
Those who would argue that the language of the property clause necessitates divestiture of federal title or state control over federal lands
within a state must thus contend with the fact that its author believed
that it carried the opposite meaning. The point is not that Morris's construction is required, but that the language is capable of supporting a
range of interpretations: the constitutional text is almost as uncertain as
the text of the Confederation's compromise.
The debates in the Federal Convention reiterated the debates of the
Confederation Congress and the solution that the convention reached
echoed the compromise that the Confederation Congress had achieved.
The central government was to be the recipient of voluntary state cessions; compulsion was not to be used. As in other areas where it was
unable to resolve strongly held opposing views, 15 7 the Convention
155. The final language in article IV, section 3 came almost exclusively from Morris. It
was his language with the addition of the phrase from Dickinson that became the first
clause providing for the admission of new states only with the approval of Congress and an
existing state or states if the land was within one of more states. Morris also provided the
"Territory or other Property" language of the second clause. Only the savings provision
which ends the second clause, which was provided by Carroll and Madison, is not Morris's.
See supra notes 141-53 and accompanying text.
156. Letter from Gouveneur Morris to Henry Livingston (Dec. 4, 1803), 3 CONVENTION
RECORDS, supra note 23, at 404. But see generally Powell, The OriginalUnderstandingof Original
Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985) (arguing that the Farmers intended the Constitution to
be interpreted in terms of objective rather than individualistic intent).
157. The classic example of this process was the decision to grant Congress the power
to determine whether to create "inferior tribunals." A majority of the states were unwilling to create such tribunals within the body of the Constitution, but were willing to authorize Congress to make the decision. I CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 23, at 104-05, 119,
124-25; 2 id. at 45-46. See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND
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passed the dispute along to the Congress it was creating. Thus, it did
not impose a constitutional equal footing requirement, nor specify the
uses to be made of the back lands. The delegates chose instead to decide who would decide.
CONCLUSION

In the final analysis, the arguments of the advocates of the "classic"
property clause doctrine on each point are unpersuasive. They fail to
provide a textual analysis to support their contention that the operative
terms in the article IV property clause must be given different effect
when used in other parts of the document. Furthermore, they offer no
justification for their presumption that land is necessarily different than
other subjects of federal preemptive authority. Their analysis of the
case law is equally unpersuasive: a straining of dicta that relies upon a
never-accepted equation of state sovereignty with state control. The
history they offer is mythology.
These problems result from the fact that the classic theorists' prop58
osition is inconsistent with the very structure of the Constitution. 1
The Constitution is foremost a grant of powers to the federal government, allocating the authority to decide. As Chief Justice John Marshall
noted, because these are grants from all of the people, it is illogical to
assume that people residing in one state have the authority to frustrate
the decisions of all the people: "They did not design to make their government dependent upon the States."' 15 9 Just as the power to tax federal instrumentalities is necessarily inconsistent with structure of the
Constitution, so is the power to regulate the uses of federal land. The
determination of the Constitutional Convention that decisions on the
use of the back lands were to be national decisions, not state decisions,
means precisely that a state may not control or frustrate those decisions.
The inconsistency between the classic theorists' proposition and the
structure of the Constitution is ultimately the fatal flaw in their theory.
It seeks to redefine the very structure of the government, to resuscitate a
position rejected at the very outset of the current constitutional government. The argument that the language granting the power "to dispose
of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory
or other Property [of] the United States" 160 restricts instead of expands
federal authority is inconsistent with the basic structure of the federal
government as an institution and with its relationship with the states.
Thus, it is hardly surprising that since the earliest days of this governWECHLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 11-12
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES

158. See generally C.
(1969)

(the

very
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structure

of

the
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document

necessarily

(1973); C. McGOWAN,
18-20 (1969).

IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

implies

certain

federal

relationships).
159. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 432 (1819). See id. at 404-06,
431-32.
160. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl.2.
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ment the Supreme Court has consistently held that the federal power
over article IV lands "is vested in Congress without limitation."'1' 1

161. United States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 526, 537 (1840). See also Kleppe v. New
Mexico, 526 U.S. 529, 539 (1976); United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 27 (1947);
United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29 (1940); Light v. United States, 220 U.S.
523, 537 (1911) (quoting the same language).

THE POTENTIAL APPLICATION OF

RICO

IN THE

NATURAL RESOURCES/ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW CONTEXT
DENIS BINDER*

INTRODUCTION

In recent years the Racketeer Inspired and Corrupt Organizations
Act (RICO)' has been the source of much litigation and great controversy. Although relatively little RICO litigation has occurred in the natural resources/environmental law area, the areas in which RICO cases
have been brought are quite diverse and include such fields as antitrust
and products liability. The purpose of this article is to illustrate RICO's
potential application in the natural resources/environmental law area. 2
This investigation will begin with a review of the statute and its judicial
interpretation and then examine some possible applications of RICO in
the natural resources/environmental law area.
I.

BACKGROUND

RICO was enacted by Congress as part of the Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970. It contains extensive criminal and civil remedies.
RICO's primary purpose was to provide a means for government prosecutors to act against criminal syndicates. 3 A secondary purpose was to
afford private citizens a remedy for injuries caused by such syndicates. 4
To accommodate this second purpose, civil RICO penalties include
5
treble damages and reasonable attorney's fees.
The general scheme of RICO is relatively simple. The plaintiff must
prove that a person, through a pattern of racketeering, directly or indi* Professor of Law, Western New England College. A.B., J.D. San Francisco;
LL.M., S.J.D. Michigan. The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Professor
Barry Stern in preparing this article.
I. RICO makes it unlawful "for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to
conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs
through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt." 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(c) (1982).
2. For detailed overviews of RICO, see Patton, Civil RICO: Statutory and Implied Elements of the Treble Damage Remedy, 14 TEX. TECH L. REV. 377 (1983) and Symposium, 21 CAL.
W.L. REV. 243-434 (1985).
3. As the Supreme Court recognized, "[tihe legislative history clearly demonstrates
that the RICO statute was intended to provide new weapons of unprecedented scope for
an assault upon organized crime and its economic roots." Russello v. United States, 464
U.S. 16, 26 (1983).
4. It should be noted that RICO expressly provides for a civil cause of action. 18
U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982). Therefore, the problems of implying a cause of action from a
silent statute do not exist. See, e.g., Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea
Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
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rectly participated in an enterprise whose activities affect interstate commerce, 6 which injured the plaintiff's business or property by reason of
the pattern of racketeering activity. The terms "person," "enterprise,"
and "pattern of racketeering activity" are broadly defined in RICO, reflecting a congressional intent to provide for the wide application of the
statute to combat organized crime. Thus, the burden of proof is the civil
standard of preponderance of the evidence. 7 However, as with many
legislative "solutions," what may seem simple in theory becomes difficult in practical application. As long as only criminal RICO cases were
brought, the courts construed RICO liberally. 8 Once civil suits were
brought, judicial interpretation became less expansive.9
RICO's criminal provisions have been extensively enforced from
the Act's inception. However, civil RICO remained dormant until the
late 1970's.0 In recent years, however, a growing awareness of the ease
with which common law fraud claims could be converted into civil RICO
claims has unleashed a veritable avalanche of civil RICO claims.
In the face of this proliferation of civil RICO claims, many courts
have not been receptive to civil RICO claims" 1 and have established barriers to plaintiff's claims, 12 by applying RICO only to members of organized crime,' 3 by requiring a crinminal conviction as a prerequisite to a
civil suit,14 by narrowly construing the definition of "enterprise," 15 and
by limiting standing to assert RICO claims. 16 Some of these decisions
verge on impermissible judicial legislation, and in light of the recent
6. As with many areas of the law, the "effect on interstate commerce" is construed
broadly, such that it is sufficient if any of the activities of the enterprise affect interstate
commerce. See Bunker Ramo Corp. v. United States Business Forms, Inc., 713 F.2d 1272,
1280-81 (7th Cir. 1983). For example, in United States v.Joseph, 526 F. Supp. 504 (E.D.
Pa. 1981), the court held that requisitions for supplies subsequently purchased in interstate commerce were sufficient to meet the jurisdictional test of RICO.
7. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3282-83 (1985).
8. See, e.g., Note, The Availability of Equitable Relief in Civil Causes of Action in RICO, 59
NOTRE DAME LAw. 945, 950-51 (1984).

9. As one district court stated, "[tihe broad construction given RICO in criminal
prosecutions is simply inconsistent with the narrower construction which must be applied
in the context of a civil case." Berg v. First American Bankshares, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 500,
506 (D.D.C. 1984). On the other hand, some courts have made it clear that civil RICO will
receive the same construction as criminal RICO. See, e.g., Slattery v. Costello, 586 F. Supp.
162, 164 (D.D.C. 1983); Eaby v.Richmond, 561 F. Supp. 131, 134 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
10. One study found only two civil RICO opinions by 1978 and only 13 by early 1981.
Long, Treble Damagesfor Violations of the Federal Securities Laws: A Suggested Analysis and Application of the RICO Civil Cause of Action, 85 DICK. L. REV. 201, 206 n.32 (1981). The two reported RICO cases that existed prior to 1978 are Barr v. WUI/TAS, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 109
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) and King v. Vesco, 342 F. Supp. 120 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
11. See, e.g., Note, Civil RICO and the Prior CriminalConviction Requirement: Has the Second
CircuitDrawn the Net too Tight?, 60 WASH. L. REV. 461, 466 (1985). One commentator summarized many of the RICO decisions as the product of "results-orientation;" that is, the
courts have ignored the statute to achieve desired results. Horn,JudicialPlague Sweeps U.S.,
NAT'L L.J., May 23, 1983, at 13.
12. See Note, Prime-Rate Fraud Under RICO, 72 GEO. L.J. 1885, 1893 (1984).
13. See infra notes 107-15 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 135-37 and accompanying text.
15. See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 117-34 and accompanying text.
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Supreme Court decision of Sedima, S. P.R.L. v. Imrex
ued viability is questionable.

Co.,17

their contin-

Two major reasons explain this growing judicial hostility. The first
is the fear of dockets overwhelmed by RICO claims.' 8 The second reason concerns RICO's antitrust analogy. Many commentators have argued that the courts should be more receptive to treble damages in
RICO cases than in antitrust cases because the purpose of RICO is to
put criminal enterprises out of business, 19 whereas in antitrust cases the
purpose is to preserve the competitive market.
This rationale, however, does not survive close scrutiny. In many
antitrust opinions, courts have shown a great reluctance to award treble
damages to "undeserving" plaintiffs who seek a windfall. 20 This element is also present in many RICO cases, where it is clear that skillful
attorneys have cleverly drafted a RICO complaint that narrowly meets
minimal pleading requirements. In this respect, these plaintiffs may also
appear to be undeserving claimants seeking a windfall. Thus, it is understandable that many judges are unsympathetic to these RICO
claimants.
It is also important to recognize that through liberal interpretation
of statutes, such as the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 2 1 or
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,22 courts have sought to further
underlying societal commitments. Although the legislative histories of
such statutes may be obfuscated, the statutes themselves reflect strong
social policies. Although there is no doubt that criminal RICO reflects a
broad public concern that organized crime represents a threat to society
and should be eliminated, such a consensus, however, does not exist
with civil RICO. Not only is there an absence of legislative history supporting the view that otherwise legitimate enterprises should be subject
to draconian penalties, but there is also no evidence of a strong societal
commitment to this end. Moreover, many courts have not perceived
any broad societal interest in subjecting legitimate businesses to the
wrath of RICO.
17. 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985).
18. Terre Du Lac Ass'n, Inc. v. Terre Du Lac, Inc., 601 F. Supp. 257, 258-59 (E.D.
Mo. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 772 F.2d 467 (8th Cir. 1985).
19. See, e.g., Blakey & Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Ba-

sic Concepts - Criminal and Ciil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009, 1042 (1980). Similarly.
"RICO... is precisely designed to ruin those individuals and enterprises it is aimed at. It
is not designed to increase their efficiency or protect them from insolvency. Thus, the
rationale behind the antitrust standing concerns have no applicability." Ralston v. Capper, 569 F. Supp. 1575, 1580 (E.D. Mich. 1983).
20. See, e.g., Laurie Visual Etudes, Inc. v. Chesebrough-Pond's, Inc., 473 F. Supp. 951
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); see also M. HANDLER, H. BLAKE, R. PITOFSKY & H. GOLOSCHMID, TRADE
REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 168 (5th ed. 1975) ("The theory underlying cases in
this area is not always clear and the cases themselves not entirely reconcilable. The courts
are obviously anxious to avoid windfall profits to parties who are not targeted victims of
aggressive business conduct.").

21. 42 U.S.C. § 4321-4370 (1982).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1982).
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Legislative History

It is hombook law that statutory construction begins with the actual
words of the statute 23 and its legislative history. Although there are numerous well-recognized canons of construction, there are numerous situations in which these canons do not work well. A few examples are
illustrative.
For instance, some statutes, such as the Clean Air Act or Federal
Water Pollution Control Act, are verbose, internally inconsistent, and
replete with legislative history sufficient to support almost any position.
Yet, the courts must make some sense of the legislative morass. Thus,
courts often hold that, of all the possible interpretations of a statute, the
to promote
agency's construction was as reasonable as the rest, or 2try
4
what they believe to be the overall intent of the statute.
Another example are statutes, such as NEPA, in which the legislative history is basically non-existent because Congress enacted such legislation with little debate. These statutes have generally been broadly
construed by the courts to facilitate generally recognized societal goals,
such as environmental protection. With such statutes, searching for
meaningful legislative history is akin to reading tea leaves.
A third alternative is a variation of the first two examples in that a
significant provision is added as an afterthought to a well-debated
broader measure. Although there is ample legislative history on the
overall statute, the significant amendment exists in a virtual vacuum. An
example of this type of statutory provision is the sex discrimination provisions (Title VII) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. A search of the committee reports, hearings, and debates for evidence of legislative intent
on this provision is futile. The sex discrimination provisions were added
to the Act one day prior to House passage in an amendment proposed
by Representative Howard Smith, Chairman of the House Ways and
Means Committee and an outspoken opponent of the Act. 2 5 His intent
apparently was to prevent passage of the Civil Rights Act by confusing
the issues and by adding an unpopular section to the Act. His plan
failed, however, and debate on the sex discrimination provisions lasted
only an hour, adding little of substance to the legislative history of the
Act.

26

23. See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 60 (1980). As Chief Justice Burger
stated:
We have emphasized in the recent past that "[o]ur individual appraisal of the
wisdom or unwisdom of a particular [legislative] course ... is to be put aside in
the process of interpreting a statute .... " Our task, rather, is the narrow one of
determining what Congress meant by the words it used in the statute; once that is
done our powers are exhausted.
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 318 (1980) (quoting Tennessee Valley Auth. v.
Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978)).
24. See generally Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 87
(1975) ("We therefore conclude that the Agency's interpretation . . . was 'correct,' to the
extent that it can be said with complete assurance that any particular interpretation of a
complex statute such as this is the 'correct' one.").
25. See Note, Sex as a Bona Fide OccupationalQualification, 1968 UTAH L. REV. 395, 398.
26. Note, Sex Discriminationin Employment Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 21
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RICO is analogous to Title VII in that it too was added to a welldebated broader measure just prior to passage and with little debate.
Criminal RICO had been extensively considered by Congress, its legislative history going back twenty years. Congress clearly intended to enact
a meaningful and effective weapon for use against organized crime. To
facilitate this end, the statute contains a "liberal construction clause,"
27
under which RICO is to be liberally construed to effect its objectives.
Civil RICO, on the other hand, was added as an "afterthought" by the
House Judiciary Committee as an amendment to the Senate version of
the bill, which did not contain a civil cause of action. Accordingly, the
legislative history of civil RICO is relatively scant. Due to the dearth of
legislative history on civil RICO, the courts have struggled with its interpretation and have yet to reach a consensus. Rarely has Congress enacted such a sweeping piece of legislation with such a modicum of
legislative history.
If civil RICO is construed in accordance with the "liberal construction" clause, almost all forms of "garden variety fraud" can be encompassed by the statute. In fact, under liberalized pleading requirements
almost any civil action could conceivably be pled under civil RICO. As
one court has noted, "[a] slavish literalism would escort into federal
courts through RICO what traditionally have been civil actions in state
28
courts."
Although the statutory language appears clear on its face, some
courts have found it difficult to apply. As one court has noted, RICO
seems to be "constructed on the model of a treasure hunt."'29 Another
court, in limiting RICO, relied on the "familiar rule that a thing may be
within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute because [it
'30
is] not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers."
Because of the fear of federalizing state common law claims and the
fear of "flooding" federal dockets with RICO claims, restrictions to limit
RICO's application have been created. As one commentator has noted,
"Ujudicial resistance to the use of RICO in civil litigation has arisen, in
large part, because of the apparent inconsistency between the narrow
'3
spirit and the broad letter of the statute." '
VAND. L. REV. 484, 491 (1968); Note, Classification on the Basis of Sex and the 1964 Civil Rights
Act, 50 IOWA L. REV. 778, 790 (1965).
27. RICO "shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purpose." Pub. L.

No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947 (1970). This statement of purpose and construction is,
of course, contrary to the normal rule that criminal statutes are to be narrowly construed.
See, e.g., United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 411 (1973).

28. Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology of Cal., Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1125, 1136 (D.
Mass. 1982).

29. Sutliff, Inc. v. Donovan Cos., 727 F.2d 648, 652 (7th Cir. 1984). Another court
noted that RICO is not a model of legislative draftsmanship. Salisbury v. Chapman, 527 F.

Supp. 577 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
30. Adair v. Hunt Int'l Resources Corp., 526 F. Supp. 736, 746 (N.D. Ill. 1981); see also
Aliberti v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 591 F. Supp. 632, 633 (D. Mass. 1984) (quoting United
Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201 (1979)).
31. Moran, Pleading A Civil RICO Action Under Section 1962(c): Conflicting Precedent and the

Practitioner'sDilemma, 57 TEMP. L.Q. 731, 732 (1984). Similarly, one judge wrote: "I have
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Many courts, however, have rejected any distinction between civil
and criminal RICO. For these courts, the remedy to any overbreadth in
civil RICO lies with Congress.3 2 The Eighth Circuit has led the way in
positing that it is not the role of the courts to arbitrarily limit RICO by
stating that:
[i]nsofar as the door of the federal courthouse is similarly
opened by RICO in a civil context, we are cautioned by the
Supreme Court that broad Congressional action should not be
restricted by the courts in the name of federalism.33 It is beyond
our authority to restrict the reach of the statute.
Other courts as well have found civil RICO to be unambiguous and have
concluded that, in the absence of a clearly expressed legislative intent to
the contrary, the language of the statute will be regarded as conclusive.3 4 Furthermore, some courts have been hesitant to construe RICO
narrowly, fearing that a loophole could be created for racketeers to es35
cape through.
B.

Enterprise

One of the critical provisions of RICO has to do with the conduct of
an "enterprise." An "enterprise" is broadly defined to include "any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and
any union or group of individuals associated in fact though not a legal
entity." 3 6 This definition is so broad as to include almost any organization, 3 7 ranging from labor unions 3 8 to governmental bodies.3 9 Pursuconcluded that Congress did not intend to federalize every tort or breach of contract in
business transactions involving the use of the mails." Doxie v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 603
F. Supp. 624, 628 (S.D. Ga. 1984).
32. See, e.g., Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1361 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1002 (1983); Callan v. State Chem. Mfg. Co., 584 F. Supp. 619, 622 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
33. Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1064 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom. 484 U.S.
1009 (1983).
34. See, e.g., Alexander Grant & Co. v. Tiffany Indus. Inc., 742 F.2d 408, 412 (8th Cir.
1984).
35. As stated in Sutliff, Inc. v. Donovan Co., 727 F.2d 648, 654 (7th Cir. 1984):
Congress deliberately cast the net of liability wide, being more concerned to
avoid opening loopholes through which the minions of organized crime might
crawl to freedom than to avoid making garden-variety frauds actionable in federal
treble-damage proceedings - the price of eliminating all possible loopholes. We
must abide by Congress's decision, made at a time of less sensitivity than today to
the workload pressures on the federal courts and to the desirability of maintaining a reasonable balance between state and federal courts, however much we may
regret not only the burdens that the decision has cast on the federal courts but
also the displacement of state tort law into the federal courts that it has brought
about.
36. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1982). In turn, the term "person" is broad enough to include not only natural persons, but also the estate of a deceased. See State Farm Fire &
Casualty Co. v. Estate of Caton, 540 F. Supp. 673, 676 (N.D. Ind. 1982).
37. See generally United States v. Whitehead, 618 F.2d 523, 525 n.l (4th Cir. 1980)
(individuals involved in a prostitution ring constituted an enterprise); United States v.
Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1354, 1358 (7th Cir. 1974) (illegal gambling ring constituted an enterprise), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975); United States v. Joseph, 526 F. Supp. 504, 507
(E.D. Pa. 1981) (an enterprise may consist of one person).
38. United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47, 52 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961
(1981).
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ant to this definition, even a mere association of individuals may qualify
as an "enterprise. ' 40 For example, an allegation that defendants were
in a joint real estate venture and directed its business relations with
plaintiff over a significant period of time constituted the existence of an
"enterprise." ' 4 1 However, in the oft-cited Eighth Circuit opinion
of Bennett v. Berg,4 2 the court held that the:
Mere participation in the predicate offenses listed in RICO,
even in conjunction with a RICO enterprise, may be insufficient
to support a RICO cause of action. A defendant's participation
must be in the conduct of the affairs of a RICO enterprise,
which ordinarily will require some participation in the operation or management of the enterprise itself.
Yet, the unlawful racketeering activity need not be part of the day-to-day
business operations of the enterprise. 4 3 It is sufficient that the enter44
prise was used as a front for illegal activities.
Thus, the federal courts have broadly construed the word "enterprise," ' 4 5 based both upon the liberal construction clause and upon the
phrase "any enterprise." To date, the major case construing "enterprise" is United States v. Turkette,4 6 which involved a defendant participating in an association that, ab initio, performed only illegal acts and had
not infiltrated or attempted to infiltrate a legitimate enterprise. The defendant claimed RICO was inapplicable to illegitimate enterprises and
the court of appeals agreed. 4 7 The Supreme Court, however, unanimously reversed the decision, holding that the term "enterprise" encompasses both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises. 48 The Court
39. See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 685 F.2d 993 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1072 (1982).
40. As the Supreme Court has recognized in the leading case of United States v.
Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981): "There is no restriction upon the associations embraced by the definition: an enterprise includes any union or group of individuals associated in fact."
41. Battlefield Builders, Inc. v. Swango, 743 F.2d 1060 (4th Cir. 1984).
42. 710 F.2d 1361, 1364 (8th Cir. 1983).
43. Engl v. Berg, 511 F. Supp. 1146, 1156 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (quoting United States v.
DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)).
44. See United States v. Swiderski, 593 F.2d 1246 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S.
933 (1979).
45. See Comment, Reading the "Enterprise" Element Back Into RICO: Sections 1962 and
1964(c), 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 100, 104-05 (1981). See generally Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 564 F.
Supp. 1347 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (limited partnership); Gunther v. Dinger, 547 F. Supp. 25
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) (decedent's estate); Teleprompter of Erie, Inc. v. City of Erie, 537 F.
Supp. 6 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (city council); State v. Buzz Berg Wrecking Co., 496 F. Supp. 245
(D. Md. 1980) (city agency).
46. 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
47. United States v. Turkette, 632 F.2d 896 (1st Cir. 1980).
48. "In view of the purposes and goals of the Act, as well as the language of the
statute, we are unpersuaded that Congress nevertheless confined the reach of the law to
only narrow aspects of organized crime, and, in particular, under RICO, only the infiltration of legitimate business." 452 U.S. at 590 (emphasis in original). The Court cited several excerpts of legislative history in support of its opinion. A typical excerpt from a
Senate Report reads:
What is needed here, the committee believes, are new approaches that will deal
not only with individuals, but also with the economic base through which those
individuals constitute such a serious threat to the economic well-being of the Na-
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concluded that "neither the language nor structure of RICO limits its
application to legitimate enterprises." 4 9 Although the Court noted the
presence of the liberal construction clause, it did not base its decision on
it.

50

Two important constraints exist, however, with respect to the scope
of the term "enterprise." First, several circuits have held that the culpable person must be an entity distinct and separate from the "enterprise"
with which it associates. 5 1 Thus, a person or entity cannot be both a
defendant and an "enterprise." Second, RICO does not hold the enterprise itself liable, but only those who seek to participate in the affairs of
52
the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity.
C.

Pattern of Racketeering Activity

The key phrase in section 1962(c) is a "pattern of racketeering activity." Under the statute, "racketeering activity" includes "any act or
threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery,
extortion, or dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, which is
chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more
than one year,"153 as well as any other act indictable under a series of
federal criminal statutes, such as mail fraud, wire fraud, and securities
fraud. 54 These acts of racketeering are usually referred to as "predicate
55
acts."
RICO requires the commission of two predicate acts within a ten
year period. 5 6 Most courts have held that predicate acts need not be
related to each other, to a common pattern of illegal activity, 57 or to the

day-to-day business operations of the "enterprise." '5 8 For example, the
Fifth Circuit 59 has held that no interrelationship had to be shown betion. In short, an attack must be made on their source of economic power itself, and the
attack must take place on all available fronts.
Id. at 591-92 (emphasis supplied in opinion).
49. Id. at 587.
50. Id.
51. B. F. Hirsch v. Enright Ref. Co., 751 F.2d 628, 634 (3d Cir. 1984); Haroco, Inc. v.
American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 400 (7th Cir. 1984), aff'd 105 S.Ct. 3291
(1985); Rae v. Union Bank, 725 F.2d 478, 481 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v. Computer
Sciences Corp., 689 F.2d 1181 (4th Cir. 1982); Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053 (8th Cir.
1982). Contra United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961 (11th Cir. 1982).
52. See, e.g., Bays v. Hunter Say. Ass'n, 539 F. Supp. 1020 (S.D. Ohio 1982). In United
States v. Turkette, the Supreme Court construed RICO to require the "enterprise" to exist
separately from the pattern of racketeering activity, but also noted that in appropriate
cases, proof of the enterprise's existence may coalesce with proof of the "pattern of activity." 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981).
53. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(l)(A) (1982).
54. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(l)(B) (1982).
55. RICO incorporates by reference 24 types of federal crimes and eight types of state
felonies. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982).
56. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982).
57. See, e.g., United States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
871 (1980); United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nora. Hawkins v.
United States, 439 U.S. 953 (1978); Engl v. Berg, 511 F. Supp. 1146, 1156 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
58. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
59. United States v. Elliot, 571 F.2d 880, 899 (5th Cir.), rehg denied, 575 F.2d 300 (5th
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tween the predicate acts because:
The graveness of the offense .

.

. is the conduct of an enter-

prise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity. Thus,
the Act does require a type of relatedness: the two or more
predicate crimes must be related to the affairs of the enterprise
but need not otherwise be related to each other.
On the other hand, one court has held that multiple bribes pursuant
to a vote-rigging plan for a cable T.V. franchise did not constitute distinct predicate acts. 60 The court required a series of schemes to defraud
under the mail fraud statute and not just a single scheme with multiple
mailings. More significantly, dicta in a recent Supreme Court decision
supports a more narrow reading of "pattern" than that which the major1
6
ity of courts have given it.

RICO, however, does not prohibit the predicate acts, but instead
prohibits three specified actions: (1) the legal acquisitions of or investment in an enterprise with money derived from a pattern of racketeering
activity; 6 2 (2) the illegal acquisition of an enterprise through a pattern of

racketeering; 63 or, (3) participation in an enterprise through a pattern of
racketeering activity. 64 The Supreme Court has held that the purpose of
RICO is to eliminate the "infiltration of legitimate businesses" by individuals who have obtained investment capital from a "pattern of racketeering activity."' 65 Thus, the purpose of the provision is to prevent
"racketeers" from using their ill-begotten gains to diversify into legitimate businesses.
The language of RICO makes it clear that the statute is directed at
conduct or acts (the predicate offenses) and not at status; that is, membership in organized crime. 6 6 The reason for this focus is simple. It was
feared that severe constitutional problems would arise if the statute attempted to strike at membership in an organization. It was thought imCir.), cert. denied sub nor. Hawkins v. Hill, 439 U.S. 953 (1978); see also United States v.
Karas, 624 F.2d 500, 540 (4th Cir. 1980) (citing Elliot).
60. Teleprompter of Erie, Inc. v. City of Erie, 537 F. Supp. 6, 12-13 (W.D. Pa. 1981);
see also United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) ("Pattern" should be
construed as requiring more than accidental or unrelated instances of proscribed
behavior.).
61. In a significant footnote the Court stated:
As many commentators have pointed out, the definition of a "pattern of racketeering activity" differs from the other provisions in § 1961 in that it states that a
pattern "requires at least two acts of racketeering activity," § 1961(5) (emphasis
added), not that it "means two such acts." The implication is that while two acts
are necessary, they may not be sufficient. Indeed, in common parlance two of
anything do not generally form a "pattern." The legislative history supports the
view that two isolated acts of racketeering activity do not constitute a pattern ....
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3285 n.14 (1985) (emphasis in
original).
62. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1982).
63. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1982).
64. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1982).
65. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 591-93.
66. See generally Bennett, 685 F.2d at 1063 ("We are convinced that the better reasoned
approach . . . rejects any attempt to interpret [civil] RICO as creating a status offense
aimed only at organized crime in any colloquial sense of that phrase .... ").
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possible to define the concept of "organized crime" with the precision
necessary to avoid constitutional challenges, such as "void for vagueness." 67 Congress was also very concerned about the constitutional
problems involved in singling out a specific ethnic group as the target of
a statute as well as the difficulties involved in defining a nebulous concept such as "organized crime."68 These problems were thought not to
exist with a statute directed at conduct. Thus, the rationale for the specified predicate acts was that these offenses are characteristic of organized crimes. 69 However, one consequence of using conduct offenses as
a statutory focus is that the statute reaches beyond organized crime
members. This possibility was recognized by Senator McClellan who
noted that, "it is impossible to draw an effective statute which reaches
most of the commercial activities of organized crime, yet does not include offenses commonly committed by persons outside organized
crime as well." 70 Consequently, RICO makes unlawful racketeering activities, regardless of who the participant is, thereby raising the issue of
whether RICO should be used only against the Vito Corleones of the
world or against any "enterprise" that has engaged in the requisite
predicate acts.
Broadly construed, RICO can apply to traditional organized crime
activities, such as loan sharking, or, depending upon the applicable state
laws, school children pitching pennies. 7 1 Although criminal RICO cases
are constrained by the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, 72 no such
limits exist in civil RICO cases, where the pot-of-gold (treble damages)
lying at the end of the rainbow serves as a powerful magnet to plaintiffs
67. See, e.g., Note, Civil RICO: The Temptation and Impropriety ofJudicial Restriction, 95
HARV. L. REV. 1101, 1106-09 (1982).

68. It should be noted that at one point in the RICO deliberation, Representative
Biaggi proposed an amendment which would limit RICO's application to the "Mafia" and
"La Cosa Nostra," and also required that any defendant be of Italian ancestry. 116 CONG.
REC. 35,343 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1970) (statement ofRep. Biaggi). Constitutional objections
were raised by Representatives Celler and Poff. Id. at 35,344.
69. See McClellan, The OrganizedCrime Act (S.30) or Its Critics: Which Threatens Civil Liberties?, 46 NOTRE DAME Law. 55 (1970).
70. Id. at 143. In addition, Representative Poff, floor manager of the bill stated, the
"concept of organized criminal activity is broader in scope than the concept of organized
crime; it is meant to include any criminal activity collectively undertaken .... S. REP. No.
30, 91st Cong. 2d Sess., 116 CONG. REC. 35,293 (1970).
71. Congressional opposition to RICO was limited. Those who did oppose the bill
included Congressmen Conyers, Mikva and Ryan, who stated:
Indeed, another section of this title - section 1964(c) - provides invitation for
disgruntled and malicious competitors to harass innocent businessmen engaged
in interstate commerce by authorizing private damage suits. A competitor need
only raise the claim that his rival has derived gains from two games of poker, and,
because this title prohibits even the "indirect use" of such gains - a provision
with tremendous outreach - litigation is begun. What a protracted, expensive
trial may not succeed in doing, the adverse publicity may well accomplish - destruction of the rival's business.
H.R. Rep. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 187, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 4083.
72. Occasionally, courts have warned against undue prosecutorial zeal in invoking
RICO even in the criminal context. See, e.g., United States v. Ivic, 700 F.2d 51, 64-65 (2d
Cir. 1983); United States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118, 1123 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
871 (1980).
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and their lawyers. The reality is that civil RICO has been used only
against "legitimate enterprises." The reason for this situation is that in
criminal RICO cases the prosecution is undertaken by the federal government, which usually uses several sources for evidence and provides
various degrees of protection for these witnesses and informants. In a
civil RICO case, however, the claimant would have to proceed directly
against the organized crime member, an action which would not be conducive to the claimant's life expectancy.
D.

Mail and Wire Fraud

The inclusion of mail fraud and wire fraud among the predicate
RICO acts creates the potential to federalize much of the common law
fraud under the RICO rubric because the mail and wire fraud statutes
are the broadest statutes of general applicability incorporated in
RICO.7 3 Almost every significant commercial transaction involves use
of the mails, telephone, or interstate wires. Wire fraud can occur, for
example, when a telephone conversation takes place in furtherance of a
scheme to defraud. 74 Therefore, RICO violations could conceivably be
alleged in every major transaction with an unsatisfied party. The reality
has been that many civil RICO actions allege a pattern of racketeering
activity predicated upon mail or wire fraud, such as use of the mails to
send fraudulent statements. As a federal district court noted in Warner
Communications Co. v. Murdock, 7 5 the broad scope of RICO has created
the risk of abusive private enforcement because most garden-variety
fraud claims can be creatively converted into a facially viable RICO
claim.
The vast majority of cases involving mail fraud require only two elements for recovery: (1) a scheme to defraud 76 and (2) the mailing of a
letter or other material for the purpose of executing the scheme. 77 The
scheme to defraud consists of a pattern of behavior that must be calculated to deceive persons of ordinary prudence and comprehension. 78
73. By way of illustration, the mail fraud statute prohibits any "scheme or artifice to
defraud." 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982). It has thus been extended to include such a myriad of
activities as kickbacks, political corruption, illicit divorce mills, insurance frauds, and consumer fraud. See Comment, Survey of the Law of Mail Fraud, 1975 U. ILL. L. F. 237, 238
(1975); see also Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8 (1954); De Mier v. United States, 616
F.2d 366, 369 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v. Beitscher, 467 F.2d 269, 273 (10th Cir.

1972).
74. See, e.g., Furman v. Cirrito, 578 F. Supp. 1535, 1538 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); see also
United States v. Morelli, 643 F.2d 402, 411 (6th Cir) (interstate phone calls to obtain
money for illegal scheme), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981).
75. 581 F. Supp. 1482, 1497 (D. Del. 1984).
76. Congress never defined, for purposes of the mail fraud statute, the phrase
"scheme or artifice to defraud." However, as one court pointed out, "[t]he law does not
define fraud; it needs no definition; it is as old as falsehood and as versatile as human
ingenuity." Weiss v. United States, 122 F.2d 675, 681 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 687

(1941).
77.
stein v.
78.
United

See, e.g., Bender v. Southland Corp., 749 F.2d 1205, 1215-16 (6th Cir. 1984); EpUnited States, 174 F.2d 754, 765 (6th Cir. 1984).
See, e.g., United States v. Beitscher, 467 F.2d 269, 273 (10th Cir. 1972); Irwin v.
States, 338 F.2d 770, 773 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 911 (1965).
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The existence of a fraudulent intent, that is, a "conscious knowing intent
to defraud," is part of this requirement. In theory, plaintiff must show a
specific intent to defraud on defendant's part. 79 The reality, however, is
that courts recognize the difficulties of establishing a subjective intent
and have allowed the requisite intent to be inferred from the totality of
the circumstances. 80 It is also generally agreed that an offense occurs
even if the scheme or artifice to defraud was not intended to affect the
victim's money or property.8 1
Consequently, most courts construe the phrase "scheme or artifice
to defraud" very broadly in furtherance of the statute's perceived policy
82
of prohibiting the misuse of the mails to further fraudulent enterprises
and "[t]he result has been to include within the term many schemes involving deception, such as bribery, 83 which employ the mails in their
execution, if they are contrary to public policy and fail to measure up to
84
accepted moral standards and notions of honesty and fair play."
Thus, for many courts the outer limits of the term are such that "any
scheme contrary to public policy that involves deception can be prosecuted under the mail fraud statute if the mails are used in the execution
of the scheme." 85 Therefore, violations can include breach of a fiduciary duty owed an employer 8 6 or government corruption involving use of
87
the mails or wires.
79. United States v. Kreimer, 609 F.2d 126, 128 (5th Cir. 1980).
80. See, e.g., United States v. Rhoads, 617 F.2d 1313, 1316 (8th Cir. 1980); Blachly v.
United States, 380 F.2d 665, (5th Cir. 1967); Gusow v. United States, 347 F.2d 755, 756
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 986 (1965).
81. See generally United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S.
976 (1974); United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761 (8th Cir. 1973) (prosecution for use of
mails to further vote fraud scheme stated an offense even though scheme was not intended
to affect money or property); United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997 (D. Md. 1976)
(political corruption involving the governor of Maryland), supplemented by 415 F. Supp.
1025, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1072 (1976).
82. Cf. Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 312-14 (1895) (Court rejected argument that the term "scheme or artifice to defraud," as used in the statute, was limited to
common law concepts of fraud and false pretenses). See generally Note, A Survey of the Mail
Fraud Act, 8 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 673 (1978) (Offenses prosecuted under the mail fraud
statute have not been limited to common fraud situations. Instead, they have ranged from
divorce mills granting decrees of questionable validity to bribery of public officials, as well
as ballot tampering and pyramid schemes.).
83. Mandel, 591 F.2d at 1362.
84. Id. at 1360. See, e.g., United States v. Kreimer, 609 F.2d 126, 128 (5th Cir. 1980)
("the measure of fraud is its departure from moral uprightness, fundamental honesty, fair
play and candid dealings in the general life of members of society"); see also Gregory v.
United States, 253 F.2d 104, 109 (5th Cir. 1958).
85. See also United States v. Edwards, 458 F.2d 875, 880 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
891 (1972). In Isaacs v. United States, 301 F.2d 706, 713 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S.
818 (1962), the Eighth Circuit stated:
[W]e recognize that the forms of fraud are as multifarious as human ingenuity can
devise; that courts consider it difficult, if not impossible, to formulate an exact,
definite, and all-inclusive definition thereof; and that each case must be determined on its own facts. In general, and in its generic sense, fraud comprises all
acts, conduct, omissions, and concealment involving breach of legal or equitable
duty and resulting in damage to another.
86. See, e.g., Bradford v. United States, 129 F.2d 274 (5th Cir. 1942); Shushan v.
United States, 117 F.2d 110 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 574 (1941).
87. See Note, Government Corruption and Civil RICO, Providing Compensationfor Intangible
Losses, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1530 (1983).
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It should be noted at this point that because mail fraud is included
as a racketeering activity, the mail fraud statute prohibits the act of mailing, instead of a scheme to defraud. 8 8 Consequently, a violation of
RICO can be established by proving two mailings in furtherance of a
scheme to defraud. For example, in a case involving alleged bribery of
the director of a redevelopment authority, a district court concluded
that each act of mailing constituted a separate offense. The court stated
that "a single ongoing scheme to defraud by obtaining bribes or kickbacks, which involves a series of unlawful acts, can establish a "pattern"
for purposes of RICO, and that it is not necessary to establish two or
more totally independent criminal acts." 89 The minority view was expressed by Teleprompter of Erie, Inc. v. City of Erie,90 which required a series of schemes to defraud under the mail fraud statutes and not just a
single scheme with multiple mailings.
In light of the liberal interpretation of "fraud," the relative ease of
establishing a pattern of racketeering activity through multiple use of
the mails or wires and the liberal pleading requirements of the federal
procedural rules, civil RICO claims are not difficult to frame and plead.
Consequently, almost all "garden variety" common law fraud claims can
now be pled as civil RICO claims. 9 1
One important caveat, however, is that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) requires that in "all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be be stated with
particularity."' 92 Thus, it has been held that general allegations of a
scheme or artifice to defraud are insufficient to meet the pleading requirements. Therefore, a plaintiff must, at a minimum, allege the time,
place, and contents of the misrepresentation relied upon. Conclusion93
ary allegations of a conspiracy have been held to be inadequate.
A more liberal interpretation of Rule 9(b), however, was announced
by the Seventh Circuit in Tomera v. Gait,9 4 where the court held that Rule
88. Weatherspoon v. United States, 581 F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1978).
89. United States v. Salvitti, 451 F. Supp. 195, 200 (E.D. Pa. 1978); see also Illinois
Dep't of Revenue v. Phillips, 771 F.2d 312 (7th Cir. 1985) (state was successfully able to
argue a RICO claim based upon the mailing of nine separate fraudulent state sales tax
returns over a nine month period).
90. 537 F. Supp. 6 (W.D. Pa. 1981).
91. Schacht, 711 F.2d at 1356, noted that Congress could avoid RICO's application to
"garden variety" fraud claims by removing mail and securities fraud from the list of racketeenng activities.
92. FED. R. Cxv. P. 9(b). For many courts, this requirement means plaintiff must, at a
minimum, allege the time, place, and contents of the misrepresentation upon which he
relied. See, e.g., Bender, 749 F.2d at 1216.
93. See, e.g., Bennett, 685 F.2d at 1062; Chambers Dev. Co. v. Browning-Ferris Indus.,
590 F. Supp. 1528, 1538 (W.D. Pa. 1984). It has also been held that where there are
allegations of a fraudulent scheme with multiple defendants, the complaint must inform
each defendant of the specific fraudulent acts that constitute the basis of the action against
-the particular defendant. Lincoln Nat'l Bank v. Lampe, 414 F. Supp. 1270, 1279 (N.D. Ill.
1976).
94. 511 F.2d 504, 509 (7th Cir. 1975). Part of the reason for the Seventh Circuit's
view is that the strict pleading requirement of Rule 9(b) clashes with the liberal pleading
policy of the federal rules. See Schacht, 711 F.2d at 1359.
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9(b) was satisfied by a "brief sketch of how [a] fraudulent scheme operated, when and where it occurred, and the participants." Several more
95
recent opinions have adopted this liberal interpretation of Rule 9(b).
E.

Remedies
1.

Damages

The major penalty of RICO, which makes it so attractive to private
plaintiffs, is the awarding of treble damages and reasonable attorney's
fees. 9 6 The purpose of this provision is not only to compensate the injured victim, but also to significantly reduce the power of the criminal
organization. The prospect of treble damages at trial, accompanied by
the prospect of a relatively quick and advantageous settlement, has been
an attractive allure to plaintiffs.
One significant limitation, however, exists with RICO - it is based
on the premise that it was "designed to eliminate pernicious commercial
activities." Therefore, damages should be limited to business or property damages: a limitation which effectively precludes any recovery for
97
physical injuries or emotional distress.
2.

Injunctive Relief

One of the most important RICO remedies, particularily in the natural resources context, is the possibility of injunctive relief. At present,
however, injunctive relief is generally not a viable remedy under
RICO.9 8

Under section 1964(a), federal district courts have jurisdiction to
95. See, e.g., Seville Indus. Mach. Corp. v. Southmost Mach. Corp., 742 F.2d 786, 791
(3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 195 S. Ct. 1179 (1985), which held the rule does not require
"date, time or place" allegations, and that plaintiffs "are free to use alternative means of
injecting precision and some measure of substantiation into their allegations of fraud."
Caliber Partners, Ltd. v. Affeld, 583 F. Supp. 1308, 1311 (N.D. Ill. 1984) held plaintiff
"need only set forth the basic outline of the scheme, who made what misrepresentation
and the general time and place of such misrepresentations." See also Finn v. Davis, 602 F.
Supp. 801 (S.D. Fla. 1985).
96. There is limited authority for the proposition that plaintiff is not entitled to attorney's fees if plaintiff settled his claim with defendant. See, e.g., Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v.
Liebowitz, 570 F. Supp. 908 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 730 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1984).
97. See, e.g., Callan v. State Chem. Mfg. Co., 584 F. Supp. 619, 623 (E.D. Pa. 1984); see
also Cuzzupe v. Paparone Realty Co., 596 F. Supp. 988, 991 (D. N.J. 1984) ("RICO was
designed to eliminate pernicious commercial activities.") (emphasis in original). Allegations
of injury to business reputation and customer goodwill, and loss of revenues satisfies the
injury requirement of RICO. Wang Laboratories, Inc. v. Burts, 612 F. Supp. 441, 444 (D.
Md. 1984).
In the recent Supreme Court decision of Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct.
3275, 3285-86, (1985), the Court stated plaintiff "only has standing if, and can only recover to the extent that, he has been injured in his business or property by the conduct
constituting the violation." It is also important to note that Justice Marshall's dissent in
Sedima agreed with the majority on this point. Id. at 3303 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
98. See generallyJohnson, PreditorsRights: Multiple Remedies for Wall Street Sharks Under the
Securities Laws and RICO, 10 J. CORP. L. 3 (1984); Note, The Availability of Equitable Relief in
Civil Causes of Action in RICO, 59 NOTRE DAME LAw. 945, 953 (1984) (Commentators, however, argue for a construction of section 1964(c) allowing a private plaintiff equitable
relief.).
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prevent and restrain violations of section 1962 through the exercise of
broad equitable powers, including divestitures, reorganizations and dissolutions. 9 9 This section clearly applies to cases brought by the United
States Attorney General, but is silent on the issue of private equitable
relief. Similarly, section 1964(b) authorizes courts to "enter such restraining orders or prohibitions, or [to] take such other actions, including the acceptance of satisfactory performance bonds, as it shall deem
proper" in civil actions brought by the United States under RICO, but is
also silent on the issue of private relief.' 0 0 Thus, in light of the broad
list of express RICO remedies, the absence of private injunctive relief is
glaring.
This omission, however, is not an accidental oversight. Although
civil RICO legislative history is scarce, there is clear evidence that Congress specifically intended to preclude private equitable relief.' 0 1 Consequently, several courts have denied injunctive relief.'0 2 Yet, a few
courts have allowed injunctive relief by exercising the inherent traditional equitable powers of the federal courts. 103 Another argument supporting the use of injunctive relief is based on interpreting the language
of RICO in light of the development of parallel language in the Sherman
Act.
After the Supreme Court twice construed the Sherman Act to preclude a private antitrust plaintiff from obtaining injunctive relief,' 0 4 section 16 of the Clayton Act was subsequently enacted to expressly
provide for private injunctive relief. The argument, therefore, is that
"[h]ad Congress intended a private RICO plaintiff to be able to obtain
injunctive relief, it surely would have avoided language that had previ10 5
ously been held by the Supreme Court not to permit such relief."'
Several commentators have also argued that injunctive relief should
be allowed private plaintiffs in civil RICO cases. Their arguments are
based on the broad intent of Congress to curb organized crime as well
as on the application of the liberal construction clause. 10 6
99. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1982).
100. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(b) (1982).
101. An amendment was offered on the floor of Congress to allow injunctive relief by
private parties. It was sent back to committee. See S. REP. No. 30, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.,
116 CONG. REC. 35,346 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Pofl) (quoted in DeMent v. Abbott Capital
Corp., 589 F. Supp. 1378, 1383 (N.D. Ill.
1984)).
102. Dan River, Inc. v. Cann, 701 F.2d 278 (4th Cir. 1983); Miller v. Affiliated Fin.
Corp., 600 F. Supp. 987, 994 (N.D. Ill.
1984); DeMent v. Abbott Capital Corp., 589 F.
Supp. 1378 (N.D. Il1. 1984); Kaushal v. State Bank of India, 556 F. Supp. 576, 581-84
(N.D. Ill.
1983).
103. Chambers Dev. Co., 590 F. Supp. at 1540-41; Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v.
Liebowitz, 570 F. Supp. 908, 910 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), afftd, 730 F.2d 1905 (2d Cir. 1984);
Marshall Field & Co. v. Cahn, 537 F. Supp. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
104. See Minnesota v. Northern Sec. Co., 194 U.S. 48 (1904); Paine Lumber Co. v.
Neal, 244 U.S. 459 (1917). To overrule that authority, Congress expressly amended the
antitrust laws to allow injunctive relief. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1982).
105. DeMent, 589 F. Supp. at 1383.
106. Blakey & Gettings, supra note 19, at 1037-38 & n. 133; see, e.g.,
Note, supra note 98,
at 953.
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F. The Organized Crime Defense
The most obvious defense to a RICO claim is that the defendant is
not linked to "organized crime" in any way. This defense is premised
on RICO's purpose of being a tool against organized crime and has
been approvingly recognized by a few district courts. For example, in
Barr v. WUI/TAS, Inc., 107 the district court held that a defendant must
be connected in some way to organized crime as a prerequisite to a
plaintiff stating a claim under RICO. Barr noted that the legislative history made frequent reference to "racketeers," "organized crime" and
"organized crime families" as well as to the "syndicate," the "Mafia"
and the "Cosa Nostra."' 10 8 Based upon this legislative history, the court
concluded RICO was not aimed at legitimate business organizations, but
instead at the "society of criminals who seek to operate outside of the
control of the American people and their governments." 109 The court's
conclusion is supported by legislative history that indicates that RICO's
sanctions and remedies would be used primarily against individuals engaged in organized crime." 10
In Lopez v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. , another federal district court
required an allegation that the "racketeering" enterprise was organized
solely for criminal purposes. The court stated that there was "no evidence that Congress intended such a drastic alteration in the civil remedies available to victims of garden variety fraud" in enacting section
1964.112
However, the vast majority of cases, including every appellate decision on point, have rejected the organized crime defense.' 13 For most
courts, the persuasive factor is that Congress acted against conduct (the
107. 66 F.R.D. 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). It should be noted that on the merits, the court
characterized the RICO claim as "specious, frivolous, and without merit." Id. at 113. Barr
involved the customers of a telephone answering service suing it for fixing the price of its
services and wilfully overcharging the customers. RICO was alleged based upon mail
fraud violations of sending out bills containing message units for messages never actually
received.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 30, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 116 CONG. REC. 18,945 (1970) (remarks of Senator McClellan). In Adair v. Hunt Int'l Resources Corp., 526 F. Supp. 736,
747 (N.D. Ill. 1981), the court stated, "it seems reasonably clear that the limit of the Act's
application is to entities involved with 'organized crime' or activities within the penumbra
of that phrase."
111. 591 F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
112. Id. at 588. See American Say. Ass'n v. Sierra Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 586 F. Supp.
888, 889 (D. Colo. 1984) (footnote omitted); see also Aliberti v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 591 F.
Supp. 632, 633 (D. Mass. 1984), which looked to the intent of RICO to eliminate organized crime, and thus subscribed to the familiar Supreme Court rule that "a thing may be
within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because it is not within its
spirit, nor within the intention of its maker."
113. Gilbert v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 769 F.2d 940 (3d Cir. 1985); Owl Constr.
Co. v. Ronald Adams Contractor, Inc., 727 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1984); Moss v. Morgan
Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984); Schacht v.
Brown, 711 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1002 (1983); Bennett v. Berg, 685
F.2d 1053 (8th Cir. 1982), aff'd on rehearing, 710 F.2d 1361 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1008 (1984); United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1050, reh g denied, 424 U.S. 950 (1976).
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predicate acts) and not status (organized crime); therefore, the plain
words of the statute control. Consequently, anyone who has engaged in
the proscribed conduct should be liable. As the Eighth Circuit noted in
Bennett v. Berg, 1 4 "[t]he better reasoned approach is one which rejects
any attempt to interpret RICO as creating a status offense aimed only at
organized crime in any colloquial sense of the phrase .... [RICO] is
aimed more broadly at organized criminal activity as well."' 15 The rationale of Barr has also been rejected by several commentators.' 1 6
G.

Standing: The Racketeering Enterprise Injury Requirement

The most difficult and controversial aspect of RICO is the question
of standing. On its face, RICO explicitly provides standing for "[a]ny
person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation ...
may sue therefore in any appropriate United States district court and
shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit,
including a reasonable attorney's fee." 1 17 Because of the express language of this provision, plaintiffs do not have to confront the problem of
inferring a civil cause of action1 18 or the traditional concepts of
standing.' 19
Many courts, however, have construed standing narrowly in civil
RICO cases in order to limit their numbers. The most frequently used
method has been to require plaintiffs to plead what has been termed a
"racketeering enterprise injury" or a "racketeering injury." Whether or
not there must be a "racketeering injury" has been one of the most hotly
debated aspects of RICO. The issue arose because RICO does not define "injury" or "racketeering injury." Consequently, these terms have
been subject to extensive judicial interpretation. The argument for imposing the condition is based on two premises. First, that legislative history indicates that Congress did not intend to create a new set of
remedies for injuries resulting from offenses that traditionally have been
the province of state tort law or federal securities law. Second, that legislative history also indicates that Congress was primarily concerned
with the disruption of free competition by organized crime.
In the oft-cited case of North Barrington Development, Inc. v. Fanslow, 120 a federal district court held that a plaintiff must allege some type
of "competitive injury" to his business. The court held that "[t]he pur-

l14. 685 F.2d 1053 (8th Cir. 1982). Bennett involved a suit by residents of a retirement
community against the owners and officers of the community for fraud.
115. Id. at 1063.
116.

See, e.g.,

Atkinson,

"Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations", 18 U.S.C.

§§ 1961-68: Broadest of the Federal Criminal Statutes, 69 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 9-10
(1978); Note, Putting a Halt to judicial Limitations on Civil RICO, 52 UMKC L. REV. 56, 60
(1983).
117. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
118. See, e.g., Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453
U.S. 1 (1981).
119. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727
(1972).
120. 547 F. Supp. 207 (N.D. 111.1980).
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pose of section 1964(c) was not to transform state law violations into
federal violations, but to prevent interference with free competition
... ."
In short, plaintiff must allege how it was injured competitively by
the RICO violation in order to state a cause of action under section
1964(c).1 2 1 Under this approach, injuries resulting solely from the
predicate acts might only provide a state law or pre-existing federal
criminal law claim, but not a civil RICO claim.
The analogy to antitrust law evident in the North Barrington opinion
is based on the fact that the civil remedies of RICO are modeled on
section four of the Clayton Act, which provides a private cause of action
in treble damages for "any person who shall be injured in his business
or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws
....
,"122 The argument continues that because standing limitations exist under the Clayton Act, similar restrictions should apply under
23
RICO. 1
The antitrust case most frequently cited in support of this argument
is Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc. ,124 where the Supreme Court
held that because of the "by reason of" language in the antitrust laws, a
plaintiff must prove an antitrust-type injury; that is, injury reflecting the
ant.-compettive effects of th violation, not just any injury proximately
caused by the antitrust violations. Under this "competitive injury" requirement, plaintiff has to establish both an injury to his business or
property and that the injury was caused by a violation of the antitrust
laws.
Therefore, by analogy, standing under RICO should similarly be
limited to injuries inflicted by a rackeetering enterprise. This proposition was set out in the case of Landmark Savings & Loan Association v.
Rhoades:
What is required for standing to bring a civil RICO damage
action is an allegation that the plaintiff has suffered a "racketeering enterprise injury .... " A rackeetering enterprise injury
might occur, for example, if a civil RICO defendant's ability to
harm the plaintiff is enhanced by the infusion of money
from a
25
pattern of racketeering activity into the enterprise.'
This view also limits recovery to persons injured in their business, as
12 6
opposed to in a personal capacity.
One major problem with the "racketeering injury" requirement is
121. Id. at 210-11.
122. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982).
123. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Harper v. New Japan Sec.
Int'l, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1002 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
124. 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
125. 527 F. Supp. 206 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
126. One effect of the "racketeering injury" requirement is to reject claims based on
consumer fraud. See, e.g., Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology, 535 F. Supp. 1125 (D.
Mass. 1982). One commentator argues that based on the plain language of the statute and
legislative history, "treble damages should be available only to those who are injured competitively through the distinctive involvement in the racketeering acts by an interstate enterprise."

Comment, Reading the "Enterprise" Element Back Into RICO. Sections 1962 and

1964(c), 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 100, 103 (1981).
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that it has never been precisely defined. One court critical of the requirement has aptly described it as a "slippery concept whose definition
has eluded even those courts professing to recognize it." ' 1 2 7 In lieu of
defining "racketeering injury," two courts have echoed Justice Stewart's
famous definition of obscenity by stating that even if they could not define it, 1 2 8 they would know a "racketeering injury" when they saw
one.12 9 Nevertheless, in spite of whatever semantical difficulties may exist with defining the requisite "racketeering injury," it may be viewed as
30
an injury to competition.'
Most other courts and commentators, however, have rejected the
"racketeering enterprise injury" requirement, basing their rejection on
the plain words of the statute. 131 Thus, the majority view is that a plaintiff states a RICO claim even if he suffers injury only from the predicate
acts.
Moreover, the offered analogy to the antitrust law is not very persuasive. When initially drafted, RICO was proposed as an amendment
to the antitrust laws. However, the ABA Section on Antitrust Law studied the proposed legislation and reported back to Congress that the
maintenance of competition, which is the goal of antitrust laws, could
not properly be adapted to the goal of curtailing organized crime's influence over business. Part of the section's comments emphasized that antitrust concepts, such as standing and proximate cause, would create
inappropriate and unnecessary obstacles for persons seeking treble
32
damages under RICO. '
In the antitrust context, courts have narrowly construed standing
requirements or imposed other restrictions on recovery, in part to prevent a "windfall" for the plaintiff. 13 3 Even though the antitrust laws
clearly prescribe treble damages, judges have not always been willing to
invoke this remedy when they perceive the plaintiff to be undeserving.
However, with respect to RICO, the congressional intent was clearly to
put racketeering organizations out of business.' 3 4 Because of this societal consensus, this determination may help to explain why standing requirements in RICO cases are more liberally construed than in antitrust
cases.
127. Alexander Grant & Co. v. Tiffany Indus., Inc., 742 F.2d 408, 413 (8th Cir.), vacated, 105 S. Ct. 355 (1984).
128. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184. 197 (1964) (Stewart, J.. concurring).
129. See Willamette Sav. & Loan v. Blake & Neal Fin. Co., 577 F. Supp. 1415, 1430 (D.
Or. 1984); Waste Recovery Corp. v. Mahler, 566 F. Supp. 1466, 1468 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
130. In addition, one court has held that "to establish injury 'by reason of a pattern of
racketeering injury,' a plaintiff must, at least, demonstrate that the existence or effects of
such pattern - or some unfair advantage derived therefrom - either caused or in some
material way contributed to the injury claimed." Margolis v. Republic Nat'l Bank of New
York, 585 F. Supp. 595, 597 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
131. The overwhelming rejection of the competitive injury requirement was led by the
Seventh Circuit in Schacht, 711 F.2d at 1357-58.
132. S. REP. No. 2048-49, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. REC. 6994-95 (1969).
133. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
134. S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2, 81 (1969); see also Note, Prime-Rate
Fraud Under RICO, 72 GEO. L.J. 1885, 1900-01 (1984).
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THE SEDIMA/HAROCO REDUX

Differing Interpretations of Civil RICO

A trilogy of Second Circuit cases are representative of the narrow
approach that some courts have taken towards civil RICO. In the first,
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,13 5 a two-to-one majority dismissed a civil
RICO claim because the defendant had not been criminally convicted of
a predicate violation under the Act. 136 In addition, the court held that
the plaintiff must show injury "by reason of" a violation of RICO; that
is, an "injury different in kind from that occurring as a result of the
predicate acts themselves, or not simply caused by the predicate acts,
3 7
but also caused by an activity which RICO was designed to deter."'
The court's restrictive interpretation of RICO was influenced by
several factors. First, the court expressed concern about the extraordinary lengths to which civil plaintiffs have brought garden-variety fraud
cases under RICO.' 38 The court in Sedima also noted the "clanging silence" of legislative historyl 39 behind civil RICO. Judge Oakes, writing
for the majority, concluded that Congress was unaware of RICO's possible implications and noted that "[i]f Congress had intended to provide a
federal forum for plaintiffs for so many common law wrongs, it would at
least have discussed it."' 40 He then observed that there was no evidence that Congress intended to create such a broad civil cause of
action. 141
After determining that RICO was enacted to fight organized
crime, 14 2 Judge Oakes concluded that standing should be limited to
those suffering a "racketeering injury." Upon this conclusion, the court
further held that "RICO was intended not simply to provide additional
remedies for already compensable injuries, but rather to provide added
remedies and procedures to fight certain specific kinds of organized
43
criminality." 1
Commenting on the limited legislative history of the Act, the court
noted that the private cause of action was added "in the House as an
afterthought, subsequent to the inclusion of the liberal construction
clause in the Senate version of the bill."' 14 4 For this reason, the court
135. 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985). Although, as discussed,
the Supreme Court has rendered the Sedima/Haroco debate moot, it is critical to look at
these appellate decisions to fully comprehend the judicial underpinnings of RICO
litigation.
136. Id. at 496.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 487. The court noted that civil RICO had not been used against mobsters,
but against registered and legitimate enterprises, such as American Express, E.F. Hutton &
Co., Lloyd's of London, Bear Stearns & Co., and Merrill Lynch. See infra notes 199-202
and accompanying text.
139. 741 F.2d at 492.
140. Id. at 492.
141. Id. at 487.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 494.
144. Id. at 502-03.
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observed, the statute cannot be viewed as a symmetric whole.14 5
The court in Sedima, a case that arose out of a claim of securities
fraud, explained the criminal conviction requirement as follows:
A person who is charged in a civil case with securities fraud (for
example, by way of willful misrepresentation in a proxy statement), proof of which is by a preponderance of the evidence,
can surely not be said to have committed "an offense," conviction of which requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt, 46
with
all of the traditional constitutional and other safeguards.1
Judge Cardamone vigorously dissented in Sedima, arguing that a prior
criminal conviction is not required by either the statute or its legislative
history. 147
14 8
In the second opinion of the trilogy, Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades,
Judge Kearse construed the statutory phrase "person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962" to require a
plaintiff to show a proprietary type of damage, 149 a causal connection
between the prohibited conduct and the proprietary injury, 150 and an
injury caused by a RICO violation instead of by a defendant's predicate
acts.' 5 1 Judge Kearse reasoned that section 1962 does not itself pro52
hibit the predicate acts that constitute racketeering activity.1
Judge Cardamone again dissented, complaining that the majority
opinion "has pulled the teeth from the statute and reduced its effectiveness nearly to zero .... ',153 He also noted that "[i]f civil RICO does not
provide a remedy on the facts of this totally outrageous case, it never
will.' 1 5 4 The third opinion of the trilogy, Furman v. Cirito,155 was authored by Judge Cardamone, who felt obligated to follow the earlier
opinions of Sedima and Bankers Trust.
On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit in Haroco, Inc. v. American
National Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago,156 held that a special "racketeering
enterprise injury," separate and distinct from the injuries caused by the
acts that constitute the pattern of racketeering, was not a prerequisite to
asserting a treble damages claim under RICO. The court also rejected
the argument that because RICO violations are premised on criminal
activity, complaints must establish probable cause in the absence of
prior criminal convictions.
The court went on to conclude that "a civil RICO plaintiff need not
145.
146.
147.
148.
Court's
149.
150.
151.

id. at 503.
Id. at 499 n.48.
Id. at 504.
741 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated and remanded, 105 S. Ct. 3550 (1985).
action was based on its rulings in Sedima and Haroco.
Id. at 515.
Id. at 516.
Id.

152. Id.

153. Id. at 518.
154. Id.

155. 741 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1984).
156. 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984), afftd, 105 S. Ct. 3291 (1985).
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allege or prove injury beyond any injury to business or property resulting from the underlying acts of racketeering."' 1 57 Thus, in Haroco, the
claim of excessive interest charges resulting from the allegedly fraudulent scheme to overstate the prime rate constituted a cause of action
under civil RICO. Haroco also held that a plaintiff need only plead fraud
with sufficient specificity to put the defendants on fair notice of the
charges against them.
For the court in Haroco, the issue was not that of an ambiguous statute, but that of legislation that is deliberately and extraordinarily broad.
The court noted that "Congress deliberately chose to employ broad
terms which would defy judicial confinement."' 58 On this basis, the
court concluded the breadth of the statute was a deliberate policy choice
by Congress, which special standing and injury requirements would
frustrate because "[w]hen Congress deliberately chooses to unleash
such a broad statute on the nation, in the absence of constitutional
prohibitions, complaints must be directed to Congress rather than to the
59
courts." 1

The Haroco court also recognized that "the white-collar crime alleged in some RICO complaints against 'legitimate' businesses is in
some ways at least as disturbing as the bringing of RICO claims against
'legitimate and respected' defendants."' 16 0 For example, Bennett v.
Berg 1 6 1 involved a scheme whereby a group of businessmen, lawyers,
and accountants, acting in concert with an insurance company, allegedly
concocted a fraudulent plan to induce elderly persons to invest in a retirement village. The defendants then took the retirement village to the
point of bankruptcy, thereby leaving the investors without assets or the
"life care" they had bargained for.
Two caveats, however, were set out in Haroco. First, the court construed the "by reason of" language so as to impose a proximate cause
requirement; that is, the criminal conduct in violation of section 1962
must directly or indirectly have injured the plaintiff's business or property. 16 2 Second, the "enterprise" and the "person" must be distinct;
therefore, an "enterprise" is an improper defendant in a section 1962(c)
1 63
action.
B.

The Criminal Conviction Defense

Another defense asserted against RICO claims is that defendants
must have been criminally convicted of RICO or the underlying predicate acts as a condition precedent to civil liability. Most courts, however,
have rejected this defense, 164 holding, as succinctly expressed by one
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id. at 398.
Id.
Id. at 399.
747 F.2d at 395 n.14.
685 F.2d at 1056.
747 F.2d at 398.
Id. at 402.
See, e.g., Terre Du Lac Ass'n, Inc. v. Terre Du Lac, Inc., 601 F. Supp. 257 (E.D.
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trial court, that "[i]f Congress had intended to require a prior conviction
it could have easily said so."'1 6 5 Yet, a few courts have nonetheless required a criminal conviction. 16 6 The major argument underlying this
requirement is that RICO is primarily a criminal statute proscribing
criminal conduct. Arguably, the criminal conviction requirement could
limit RICO's application to those situations for which Congress intended to provide relief, thereby denying compensation to the victims of
certain types of criminal conduct.
C.

Supreme Court Analysis

On July 1, 1985, the Supreme Court reversed Sedima in a five-tofour decision. 167 Justice White, writing for the majority, looked to the
plain language of the statute, its legislative history, and the policy considerations underlying it in rejecting the prior criminal conviction requirement. The "racketeering enterprise injury" requirement was also
rejected by the Court, 168 which concluded it was "somewhat hampered
by the vagueness of that concept." The Court observed that the difficulty of defining "racketeering injury" cautioned against imposing such
a requirement. 169 In rejecting the requirement, the Court relied heavily
on the plain language of the statute. As a result of the Court's decision,
a violation of section 1962(c) now requires: (1) conduct, (2) of an enter0
prise, (3) through a pattern, (4) of racketeering activity.17
The Court's decision was based, in part, on the statute's liberal construction clause. 17 1 The Court noted that the remedial purposes of
RICO was evidenced by its provision for private causes of action. 172 A
liberal interpretation of RICO, including section 1964(c), the Court observed, was necessary to further the statutory goal of fashioning new
173
remedies for fighting crime.'
Although the Court recognized, as did the Second Circuit, that
most private suits are being brought against respected businesses and
not organized crime, the Court did not view this experience to be ajustification for limiting RICO. On the contrary, the Court noted that "[t]his
defect - if defect it is - is inherent in the statute as written, and its
74
correction must lie with Congress."1
Mo. 1984); Southgate Bank v. Public Water Supply Dist. No. 7,601 F. Supp. 262 (E.D. Mo.
1984).
165. ORA Corp. v. Vinson, 596 F. Supp. 1546, 1548 (D.S.C. 1984).
166. Bernstein v. Bank Leumi Le-Israel, 598 F. Supp. 922, 925 (E.D. Pa. 1984); State of
New York v. O'Hara, 595 F. Supp. 1101 (W.D.N.Y. 1984).
167. 105 S.Ct. 3275 (1985).
168. Id. at 3284.
169. Id. at 3285. As the Court stated: "If the defendant engages in a pattern of racketeering activity in a manner forbidden ...and the racketeering activities injure the plaintiff
in his business or property, the plaintiff has a claim ....There is no room in the statutory
language for an additional, amorphous 'racketeering injury' requirement." d.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 3286.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174.

Id. at 3287. The Court recognized that the statute was evolving into something
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Justice Marshall, in a dissenting opinion, noted that "[t]he Court's
interpretation . . .validates the federalization of broad areas of state
common law of frauds, and it approves the displacement of well-established federal remedial provisions. We do not lightly infer a Congressional intent to effect such fundamental changes."' 17 5 For Marshall, it
was clear that the principal target of RICO was the economic power of
racketeers and its detrimental effect on legitimate businesses. RICO was
17 6
to fill a gap in the existing civil and criminal statutes.
With the Supreme Court's affirmation of Haroco and reversal of
Sedima, the way is now clear, absent new judicial limitations on congressional changes, for an expansive application of civil RICO. As long as
plaintiffs can allege two predicate offenses and a related enterprise, such
complaints will fall within the technical gambit of RICO.
III.

THE BREADTH OF

RICO

Considering the broadness of RICO's language and the liberal construction accorded it, the number of situations in which RICO cases
have been brought, albeit quite often unsuccessfully, should not be surprising. RICO was one of the causes of action asserted in IBM's commercial bribery case against Hitachi. 177 Ina corruption case, the pattern
of racketeering activity can be established by separate acts of bribery or
similar predicate acts. 178 Other specific applications include antitrust, 179 banking relationships (prime rate fraud), 180 bankruptcy, 18 1
commercial bribery,

18 2

consumer fraud, 1 83 corporate takeovers,

18 4

mat-

85

rimonial and family disputes, ' municipal graft and corruption, 186 partnership fraud, 18 7 products liability, 18 8 securities fraud, 18 9 and co-op
quite different from the enactors' original conception. However, the reason for the extraordinary uses of RICO is "primarily the result of the breadth of the predicate offenses,
in particular the inclusion of wire, mail and securities fraud, and the failure of Congress
and the courts to develop a meaningful concept of 'pattern' " of racketeering activity.
175. Id. at 3293 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 3296 (Marshall, J., dissenting), 3288-89 (Powell, J., dissenting).
177. See Comment, RICO and Equitable Remedies Not Availablefor Private Litigants, 21 CAL.
W.L. REV. 385, 386 n.8 (1985).
178. United States v. Salvitti, 451 F. Supp. 195 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 588 F.2d 822 (3d Cir.
1978).
179. See, e.g., Municipality of Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable, Ltd., 547 F. Supp. 633 (D.
Alaska 1982) (purchasing contract bid rigging - followed criminal RICO action by United
States); Maryland v. Buzz Berg Wrecking Co., 496 F. Supp. 245 (D. Md. 1980) (demolition
contract bid rigging - followed criminal RICO prosecution by United States).
180. See, e.g., Kleiner v. First Nat'l Bank of Atlanta, 526 F. Supp. 1019 (N.D. Ga. 1981),
overruled sub nom. Morosani v. First Nat'l Bank of Atlanta, 703 F.2d 1220 (11 th Cir. 1983).
181. See, e.g., Bankers Trust Co. v. Feldesman, 566 F. Supp. 1235 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), affd
sub nom. Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1984).
182. Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. O'Hearn, 523 F. Supp. 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
183. Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology, 535 F. Supp. 1125 (D. Mass. 1982).
184. See, e.g., Dan River, Inc. v.Icahn, 701 F.2d 278 (4th Cir. 1983).
185. See, e.g., Gunther v. Dinger, 547 F. Supp. 25 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
186. See, e.g., United States v. Aimone, 715 F.2d 822 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1003 (1984).
187. See, e.g., USACO Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy, Inc., 689 F.2d 94 (6th Cir. 1982).
188. See, e.g., Bast v. A.H. Robbins Co., Inc., 616 F. Supp. 333 (E.D. Wis. 1985); Campbell v. A.H. Robbins Co., Inc., 615 F. Supp. 496 (W.D. Wis. 1985).
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conversions. 1 90 RICO can also encompass cases of extortion or at92
tempted extortion'91 as well as corruption cases involving kickbacks,1
fraudulent work orders, tax abatements, and bribes for construction
contracts. 19 3 Among the officials involved in RICO actions have been
19 6
19 5
19 4
a sheriff,
the director of a redevelopment authority,
mayors,
197
and a governor's office.
Typical defendants in civil RICO suits have
included such major companies as American Express, 19 8 E.F. Hutton &
20 2
20 1
20 0
199
Lloyd's of London,
Bear Stearns & Co.,
Merrill Lynch,
Co.,
20 5
20 4
20 3
Morgan Stanley,
Prudential-Bache Securities,
Sears, Roebuck,
20 8
20 7
20 6
and Browning-Ferris Industries.
Ford,
General Motors,
IV.
A.

THE NATURAL RESOURCES APPLICATION

Possible Actions Under RICO

Up to now RICO has been of marginal importance in the natural
resources/environmental law area of practice with only a few cases having been brought under its provisions. For instance, two RICO claims
were filed for remedial work at Love Canal 2 0 9 and another suit was
brought to obtain damages to property arising out of the operation of a
189. See, e.g., Trane Co. v. O'Connor Sec., 561 F. Supp. 301 (S.D.N.Y.), dismissedas moot,
718 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1983).
190. See generally Gramercy 222 Residents Corp. v. Gramercy Realty Assocs., 591 F.
Supp. 1408 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (alleged failure of architects to discover defective conditions
in the conversion).
191. Battlefield Builders, Inc. v. Swango, 743 F.2d 1060 (4th Cir. 1984).
192. Bernstein v. IDT Corp., 582 F. Supp. 1079 (D. Del. 1984).
193. United States v. Aimone, 715 F.2d 822 (3d Cir. 1983).
194. Id.
195. See generally United States v. Salvitti, 451 F. Supp. 195, 200 (E.D. Pa.) ("[A] single,
ongoing scheme to defraud by obtaining bribes or kickbacks, which involves a series of
unlawful acts, can establish a 'pattern' for purposes of RICO, and ... it is not necessary to
establish two or more totally independent criminal acts."), aff'd, 588 F.2d 822 (3d Cir.
1978).
196. See, e.g., United States v. Welch, 656 F.2d 1039 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 915 (1982) (sheriff was bribed to overlook gambling); see also United States v. Lee
Stoller Enters., Inc., 652 F.2d 1313 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1082 (1981).
197. See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 685 F.2d 993 (6th Cir. 1981) (defendants
charged with "selling" executive clemency and immunity from extradition through governor's office), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1072 (1982).
198. Mauriber v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 1231 (S.D.N.Y.
1983).
199. Alfaro v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 606 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Roche v. E.F.
Hutton & Co., 603 F. Supp. 1411 (M.D. Pa. 1984): Hokama v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 566 F.
Supp. 636 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
200. Nunes v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 609 F. Supp. 1055 (D. Md. 1985).
201. Taylor v. Bear Steams & Co., 572 F. Supp. 667 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
202. Barker v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 564 F. Supp. 352 (E.D. Mich. 1983).
203. Hurst v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 613 F. Supp. 1210 (W.D. Pa. 1985).
204. Gilbert v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 769 F.2d 940 (3d Cir. 1985).
205. Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983).
206. Sellers v. General Motors Corp., 590 F. Supp. 502 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
207. Doxie v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 603 F. Supp. 624 (S.D. Ga. 1984).
208. Chambers Dev. Co. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 590 F. Supp. 1528 (W.D. Pa.
1984).
209. See State of New York v. O'Hara, 595 F. Supp. 1101 (W.D.N.Y. 1984), vacated, 779
F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1985).
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hazardous waste landfill. 2 10 RICO was also asserted in a case where the
plaintiff alleged that the defendant deprived it of waste acid shipments
and of payments for disposal of the shipments. 2 1' In addition, one of
the largest trash hauling and waste removal companies was sued under
to attempt to gain conRICO for its use of unlawful and coercive means
2 12
trol of the Western Pennsylvania market.
The most likely area of application of RICO is in the land use planning arena, particularly at the local level. Since fraud, kickbacks, and
corruption are very common in land development, it should be relatively
easy to allege a pattern of racketeering activity based on the predicate
acts of mail or wire fraud. Because RICO covers extortion and attempted extortion, the victims of such conduct, which presumably include aggrieved residents opposed to the project, may now have a
powerful weapon with which to seek redress. Similarly, in real estate
development activities, RICO should be readily applicable in cases involving partnership fraud, tax shelter scams, and similar nefarious activities. These situations also arise in other areas of development, such as
mineral exploration and timber harvests.
An example may help clarify RICO's applicability in the natural resources/environmental law area of practice. Let us posit a dispute between a mineral extractor and a royalty holder. The dispute may well be
of a legitimate nature and would not ordinarily give rise to RICO litigation. The developer, however, may be deliberately shorting a large
number of landowners, hoping to succeed because of the landowners'
ignorance, unsophistication, or financial inability to bring a suit against
the developer. In this situation, such a pattern of conduct in relation to
the other property owners will buttress a RICO case based on mail or
wire fraud allegations.
Another area of possible RICO application would be in the toxic
waste area. An advantage of this approach would be the circumvention
of limitations involved in common law or other statutory approaches.
One such approach is the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA). 2 13 The interest of providing various causes of action and theories for relief of injuries resulting
from hazardous waste has prompted Congress to enact CERCLA, commonly referred to as Superfund. As is common with controversial legislative endeavors, the CERCLA is a product of tradeoffs and
compromises. The private cause of action is exceedingly narrow, being
limited to "response CoStS, ' 214 which are part of a "clean up" or re210. Cuzzupe v. Paparone Realty Co., 596 F. Supp. 988 (D.N.J. 1984) (defendant's motion to dismiss granted because plaintiffs did not allege the requisite RICO business or
property damage).
211. Ora Corp. v. Vinson, 596 F. Supp. 1546 (D.S.C. 1984).
212. Chambers Dev. Co. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 590 F. Supp. 1528 (W.D. Pa.
1984).
213. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-57 (1982). CERCLA provides for a private cause of action. See
infra note 214 and accompanying text.
214. Respond or response means "remove, removal, remedy and remedial action." 42
U.S.C. § 9601(25) (1982).
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sponse to a hazardous waste problem. Thus, investigative costs and attorney's fees are not recoverable as "response costs." Only once a party
has begun to implement a government-authorized clean up program can
"response costs" be recovered. 2 15 Consequently, a private cause of ac2 16
tion for only damages is unavailable under CERCLA.
RICO may also be of great value in providing compensation to
landowners and residents affected by toxic waste dumps underlying
their property or leaching into their water supplies. The cause of action
may be premised on fraud or statutory violations of the facility's operator or, if it is an unauthorized facility, the "midnight dumper" or the
producers of the toxic wastes. For example, if the toxic waste operator
or producer filed false reports or made misrepresentations to the public
or governmental authorities, two predicate acts of mail or wire fraud
may be established.
RICO should also be applicable to real estate transactions. For instance, in Engl v. Berg2 1 7 several investors alleged that the defendant
defrauded them through a series of real estate syndications and limited
partnerships organized to construct a commercial office building. The
investments proved worthless and the investors sued alleging breach of
fiduciary and contractual duties.
Similarly, a breach of fiduciary duty in a partnership may give rise to
RICO liability. For example, in USACO Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy,
Inc.,2 18 the issuance of a preliminary injunction was affirmed, prohibiting the defendants from selling, transferring, or otherwise disposing of
assets pending a resolution of the RICO claims. Relief was premised on
the alleged breach of fiduciary duties.
A more ingenious approach would require stretching RICO to its
limits by using the mail fraud predicate of multiple mailings arising out
of the same incident. This situation could occur when an invalid environmental impact statement (EIS) has been mailed out on a proposed
project. Under many state statutes the developer (or proponent) of a
project is charged with developing the EIS. 2 19 Because the natural propensity of the developer is to "shade" the facts on behalf of the project,
it should not be difficult to, at least, allege "fraud" on the part of the
215. See, e.g., Bulk Distribution Centers, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437 (D.C.
Fla. 1984). It has been held though that costs, such as medical testing could be included as

response cost." Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1425 (S.D. Ohio 1984).
216. Philadelphia v. Stepan Chemical Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1146 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
217. 511 F. Supp. 1146 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
218. 689 F.2d 94, 96 (6th Cir. 1982). The allegation was that the defendant had defrauded investors in a German limited partnership entity because of his fiduciary position.
The limited partnership was formed for the purposes of entering the coal business, constructing a tipple facility, and mining coal in Kentucky. In holding the promoter liable, the
court quoted from a much earlier Supreme Court decision, McCandless v. Furlaud, 296
U.S. 140, 164 (1935):
[B]reaches of the fiduciary duty make promoters accountable 'for everything that
comes to them as a result of the conspiracy in excess of consideration furnished
on their [the promoters] side' .....
Everything of profit arising out of the abused
relation must now be yielded up.
219. See, e.g., 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.10(c); 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 621.3(5)(iii).
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proponent. Even without relying on two separate mailings of a defective
EIS to establish the requisite pattern of racketeering activity, in many
instances the pattern could be established by showing a history of "deficient" EIS's or other proscribed activities on the part of the developer. 2 20 This option may be particularly attractive when a suit is
brought by surrounding landowners aggrieved by the proposed project,
such as a toxic waste recovery center. Injury could be shown through a
diminution of value of the owner's property. Although RICO does not
expressly provide for equitable relief,2 2 1 an EIS violation could perhaps

result in the issuance of an injunction. 2 22 A RICO judgment would provide treble damages and reasonable attorneys fees to environmental
plaintiffs; relief that is generally unavailable under existing environmental law.
B.

Caveats

Before bringing a RICO cause of action, it is important to consider
certain caveats. First, because of the hostility several courts have shown
towards RICO, forum shopping is advisable. It would be wise to ascertain the prevailing attitude of the judges in the district and circuit where
the suit is to be filed. For example, it would avail a plaintiff little to bring
a tenuous RICO case in a jurisdiction where RICO is frowned upon. In
fact, plaintiff could be a double loser - both in terms of losing on the
merits and being subject to court costs and attorney fees if the trial court
2 23
viewed the case as frivolous.
Conversely, in a jurisdiction where RICO is not disfavored, a plaintiff would have a fair opportunity to prevail on the merits, subject only to
the normal vagaries of litigation. In addition, under these circumstances
a plaintiff would be in a better negotiating position for settlement
purposes.
A second caveat is that RICO may be modified at any time, either by
congressional or judicial action. Although Sedima eliminated some of
the judicially-created limitations on RICO, the opportunity for others
exist. Courts previously unsympathetic to RICO are not likely to change
their attitudes simply because of Sedima. In fact, as of this date two lower
courts have already followed Sedima's dicta in construing narrowly the
requisite two predicate acts of racketeering activity. 224

An alternative

220. It is likely that if the defendant is a large developer or a publicly owned corporation, that, at some point during the preceding ten years, the defendant could have run
afoul of the mail, wire, or securities fraud statutes.
221. See supra notes 98-106 and accompanying text.
222. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. Froehlke, 477 F.2d 1033, 1037 (8th Cir.
1973) ("injunction is the vehicle through which the congressional policy behind NEPA can
be effectuated .... "); see also Note, ProgramEnvironmental Impact Statements: Review and Remedies, 75 MICH. L. REV. 107, 132 (1976). But see Weinberger v. Romero Barcelo, 456 U.S.
306 (1982) (court is not required to grant injunctive relief in all circumstances).
223. See Rodarmor, Runaway RICO, 5 CAL. LAw. 44, 49 (1985). The sanctions are imposed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, which allows courts to punish plaintiffs who bring frivolous actions.
224. See generally Professional Assets Management, Inc. v. Penn Square Bank, 616 F.
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might be, in a manner analogous to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 causes of action,
2 25
to severely limit the new theory if existing remedies are adequate..
Even absent such judicial constraints, more subtle pressures can occur
through evidentiary and burden of proof rulings by the trial judge.
C.

Conclusion

Subject to these caveats, it is clear that so long as a plaintiff can
meet certain minimal pleading requirements of a RICO claim, a cause of
action can be stated. As the Supreme Court held in Sedima, a RICO violation is established where a plaintiff is able to prove the existence of an
enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. 2 2 6 However, in re-

ality, so long as plaintiff can establish property or commercial damage
through the defendant's fraudulent conduct, no matter how loosely defined or pled, and two separate predicate acts by the defendant, a plaintiff can press a RICO claim.
If the case law elsewhere is any indication, then absent new congressional or judicial restraints, the application of RICO in the natural resources/environmental law area of practice is limited only by the
ingenuity of counsel. Because of the pleading and equitable relief limitations, RICO will probably not be used as frequently as NEPA has been
in restraining proposed developmental activities. However, RICO may
be extremely important in providing compensation for past and present
injuries to public and private interests in natural resources.

Supp. 1418, 1423 (W.D. Okla. 1985) (certified public accounting firm's dissemination of
an audit report is a "single, unified transaction"); Northern Trust Bank/O'Hare v. Inryco,
Inc., 615 F. Supp. 828, 831 (N.D. 11. 1985) (allegations of two specific acts to carry out

alleged kickback scheme insufficient to establish "pattern of racketeering activity").
225. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), where a state prisoner alleged that state
officials negligently lost a hobby kit he had ordered through the mails, thereby depriving
him of due process of law. The Supreme Court reversed a grant of summary judgment in
the prisoner's favor. The Court held that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment is not violated when a state official negligently deprives an individual of property,
provided the state makes available a meaningful post-deprivation remedy. Parratt was subsequently extended by the Supreme Court to apply to some intentional deprivations of
property. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
226. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.

TRUSTING THE PUBLIC INTEREST TO JUDGES:

A

COMMENT ON THE PUBLIC TRUST WRITINGS OF
PROFESSORS SAX, WILKINSON, DUNNING
AND JOHNSON
JAMES

L.

HUFFMAN*

INTRODUCTION

After several decades of chugging along far more slowly than the
Illinois Central Railroad,i the public trust doctrine has taken flight during the last decade. Courts from Massachusetts to California have increasingly relied upon the public trust doctrine to justify an assortment
of decisions that have the purpose of protecting natural resources from
degradation or destruction. Proponents of the public trust doctrine
urge that it is time to realize that the continent has been conquered and
that something must be done to save it from those who would unknowingly or selfishly destroy it. 2 Because legislators and administrators
have been parties to rampant environmental destruction, proponents argue that we must look to the courts for our salvation and offer the public
trust doctrine as an ideal remedy for the courts to prescribe. Unfortunately, the doctrine is a bit limited in its historic application, 3 but that
* Professor of Law and Director of the Natural Resources Law Institute, Lewis and
Clark Law School. B.S., Montana State University; M.A., Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy; J.D., University of Chicago. I am grateful to James Zehren for research assistance and to Professor Michael C. Blumm for his helpful comments. I am sure Professor
Blumm would want me to make it clear that the ideas expressed are strictly my own.
1. The leading case in public trust law is Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S.
387 (1892). This case has been read to justify a wide range ofjudicially imposed limits on
the powers of legislatures to transfer resource allocation decisions to private parties. As
with any evolving legal doctrine, the substance of modem public trust law is far broader
than the substance of the decision which forms its foundation.
Although the Illinois Cent. R.R. case has been interpreted as invalidating the Illinois
Legislature's transfer of title to submerged lands to the Illinois Central Railroad, this interpretation is in error. The decision actually holds that the railroad may not object when
the legislature revokes such a grant. In other words, the public trust does not preclude the
legislature from authorizing a railroad to manage submerged lands. It does preclude an
irrevocable grant of such authority in the form of fee simple title: "The legislation which
may be needed one day for the harbor may be different from the legislation that may be
required at another day." Id. at 460. To read the case any other way is to deny the legislature power to decide how the submerged lands will best serve the public interest, and to
transfer that power to the courts. The 1869 grant to the railroad was valid, but "[a]ny
grant of [this] kind is necessarily revocable, and the exercise of the trust by which the
property was held . .. can be resumed at any time." Id. at 455.
2. "Americans have demonstrated almost no success with self-limitation, particularly
in non-renewable resource consumption ....
With a seemingly inexhaustible American
land frontier, this waste posed no apparent difficulty. One could simply move on - over
the next hill or across the river."

R. APPLEGATE, PUBLIC TRUSTS: A NEW APPROACH To

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 12 (1976).
3. See Stevens, The Public Trust: A Sovereign's Ancient Perogative Becomes the People's Environmental Right, 14 U.C.D. L. REV. 195 (1980). "For reasons largely historical, this public
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should be no problem for the creative judge. A good hard look will
4
surely reveal that something needs to be done.
The rebirth and dramatic growth of the public trust doctrine is in
no small part the product of a classic article on the subject by Joseph
Sax. Those who are troubled by the new public trust doctrine must
therefore pay close attention to Sax's writing. Other legal scholars have
come to Sax's aid in shouldering the burden ofjustifying and explaining
the public trust doctrine. Their writings therefore also deserve attention. In this article, I will comment on the writings of Professors Joseph
7
6
Sax, Charles Wilkinson, 5 Ralph Johnson, and Harrison Dunning.
The doctrine has been used by courts to invalidate a legislative
grant of submerged lakeshore lands to the Illinois Central Railroad, 8 to
invalidate an agreement between Massachusett's Greylock Tramway Authority and a private ski area developer, 9 to invalidate the issuance of a
permit by the Wisconsin Public Service Commission for the construction
of a dam on the Namekagon River,' 0 and to allow the California Water
Resources Board to reconsider water rights permits granted to the City
trust has commonly been associated with the sovereign's ownership of the beds of navigable waters, and its purposes have been traditionally delineated as those of 'commerce,
navigation and fisheries.' " Id. at 195-96.
4. Professor William Rodgers has suggested that the federal courts "hard look" doctrine is similar to the public trust doctrine. See discussion infra at note 57.
5. Joseph L. Sax is a Professor of Law at the University of Michigan. Sax has discussed the public trust doctrine in several writings, including: SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: A HANDBOOK FOR CITIZEN ACTION (1971); SAX, THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN
NATURAL RESOURCES LAW AND MANAGEMENT 9 (H. Dunning ed. 1981); Sax, Helpless Giants:
The National Parks and the Regulation of Private Lands, 75 MICH. L. REV. 239 (1976); Sax,
Liberating the Public Trust Doctrinefrom itsHistorical Shackles, 14 U.C.D. L. REV. 185 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Sax, Liberatingthe Public Trust Doctrine];Sax, Some Thoughts on the Decline
of Private Property, 58 WASH. L. REV. 481 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Sax, Decline of Private
Property]; Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971); Sax, The
Public Trust Doctrine In Natural Resources Law: Effective JudicialIntervention, 68 MICH. L. REV.
471 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Sax,Judicial Intervention]; Sax & Conner, lichigans Environmental Protection Act of 1970."A Progress Report, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1003 (1972); Sax & DiMento, Environmental Citizen Suits: Three Years' Experience Under the Michigan Environmental
Protection Act, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1974);
6. Charles F. Wilkinson is a Professor of Law at the University of Oregon School of
Law. Wilkinson has authored numerous works, including: Wilkinson, The Field of Public
Land Law: Some Connecting Threads and Future Directions, I PUB. LAND L. REV. 1 (1980); Wilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law, 14 U.C.D. L. REV. 269 (1980).
7. Ralph W.Johnson is a Professor of Law at the University of Washington School of
Law. His works include: R. HILDRETH & R. JOHNSON, OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW (1983);
JOHNSON, THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN NATURAL RESOURCES LAW AND MANAGEMENT 118

(H. Dunning ed. 1981); Johnson, Public Trust Protectionfor Stream Flows and Lake Levels, 14
U.C.D. L. REV. 233 (1980);Johnson & Cooney, Harbor Lines and the Public Trust Doctrine in
Washington Navigable Waters, 54 WASH. L. REV. 275 (1979).
8. Harrison C. Dunning is a Professor of Law at the University of California, Davis,
School of Law. His writings include: Dunning, The Public Trust Doctrine and Western IVater
Law: Discord or Harmony? 30 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 17-1 (1985); Dunning, The Public
Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law and Management: A Symposium, Forward, 14 U.C.D. L.
REV. 181 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Dunning, Forward]; Dunning, The Significance of California's Public Trust Easementfor California's Water Rights Law, 14 U.C.D. L. REV. 357 (1980).
9. Illinois Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 387.
10. Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm'n, 35 Mass. 410, 215 N.E.2d 114 (1966).
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of Los Angeles in 1940.11 The doctrine's central idea is that the state is
limited in its disposition and management of particular resources; that
the state holds those resources in trust for the public and must dispose
of or manage those resources consistent with that trust.
Historically, the doctrine has been associated with submerged
lands,' 2 but some commentators, 13 including Sax, 14 and some courts
have sought to liberate the doctrine from this constraint. 15 This may
sound straightforward enough, but the discussion of particular cases can
be deceiving. As Professor William Rodgers has noted, "the public trust
doctrine is resoundingly vague, obscure in origin and uncertain of purpose .

. . .

16 He also notes that "[t]here are few experts on the subject

of the public trust and not many more who claim to be experts.' 17 No
doubt the public trust doctrine has determinable historic and modern
content, but like much of the law, the doctrine is what we make of it. It
is a tool to be used in pursuit of our objectives, 18 to be refined, redesigned, or discarded as our needs require.
The fact that we may find the public trust doctrine while rummaging
about in our bag of legal tricks is convenient but not really very important because if the public trust doctrine does not fill our needs something else will. 19 The Oregon Supreme Court found the doctrine of
custom in its warehouse of legal tools, 20 rusty and in need of oil, but still
workable. Modern proponents of the public trust doctrine are influential not because of their expertise on the intricacies of the doctrine, but
because of their expertise at bringing about judicial action in a legal sys11. Muench v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 261 Wis. 492, 53 N.W.2d 514, aff'd, 261 Wis. 492,
55 N.W.2d 40 (1952).
12. Nat. Audubon Soc'y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine County, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709,
189 Cal. Rptr. 346, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
13. Stevens, supra note 3.
14. See, e.g., APPLEGATE, supra note 2; Hannig, The Public Trust Doctrine Expansion and
Integration:A Proposed Balancing Test, 23 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 211 (1983); Wilson, Private
Property and the Public Trust: A Theory for Preserving the Coastal Zone, 4 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y. 57 (1984); Comment, The Emergence of the Public Trust Doctrine as a Public Right to
Environmental Preservation in South Dakota, 29 S.D.L. REV. 496 (1984). Other authors have
argued that the public trust doctrine should be limited to its historical applications. See,
e.g., Jawetz, The Public Trust Totem in Public Land Law: Ineffective - and Undesirable-Judicial
Intervention, 10 ECOLOGY L.Q. 455 (1982); Walston, The Public Trust Doctrine in the Water
Rights Context: The Wrong Environmental Remedy, 22 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 63 (1982).

15. Sax, Liberating the Public Trust, supra note 5.
16. See, e.g., State v. Sup. Ct. of Placer Cty., 29 Cal. 3d 240, 625 P.2d 256, 172 Cal.
Rptr. 713, cert denied. 454 U.S. 865 (1981); City of Madison v. State. 1 Wis. 2d 252, 83
N.W.2d 674 (1957).
17. W. RODGERS, HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 2.16 (Supp. 1984).
18. Id.
19. This instrumentalist view of the law is rooted in the work of Willard Hurst. See,
e.g., W. HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY
UNrrED STATES (1967).

20. State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 254 Or. 584, 462 P.2d 671 (1969); see Delo, The
English Doctrine of Custom in Oregon Property Law: State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 4 ENVTL. L.
383 (1974). Delo reports that only New Hampshire had resorted to the English doctrine
of custom, and, at that, no more recently than 1851 in Knowles v. Dow, 22 N.H. 387
(1851). ld. at 387. Delo argues that "[t]he Oregon Supreme Court's unexpected revival
and modification of the English doctrine of custom presents significant logical and constitutional problems." Id. at 384.
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tern that requires us to justify where we are going in terms of where we
have been. It will not do to tell a court that it should authorize the review of 1940 water rights permits simply because circumstances have
changed and the public interest requires review. What the court really
needs is a legal doctrine that purports to authorize the requested judicial action. The public trust doctrine is interpreted by many as just such
2
a doctrine. I
The foregoing comments reflect a perception of the law that does
not conform to my perception of the dominant approach of American
legal scholarship. Although American law teachers and legal scholars
are all legal realists, 2 2 we are also the flag bearers for Langdellian legal
science. 23 For the most part, we teach and write about law in the same
manner as Langdell did. 2 4 We sort through the evidence, the legal data,
25
in our libraries and seek to explain what the courts have been doing.
The literature on public trust is no different. A 1980 conference at
the University of California at Davis Law School was asked by Professor
Harrison Dunning to consider several questions including: "[I]s there a
single 'public trust doctrine' in natural resources law?"; "[I]s the public
trust doctrine applicable to any natural resource, or is it limited to certain ones?"; and "[Wihat is the nature of the public trust?" 26 These
questions are much like those which might be posed to a conference of
scientists: Is there a single species of a particular type of animal, or, what
is the nature of matter? Scientists do not ask whether there should be a
21. The doctrine of stare decisis, which requires this constant backward glance, is an
effective, but not foolproof, way of assuring that the courts are kept within appropriate
boundaries. Although ostensibly a doctrine that requires the courts to limit themselves, it
is dependent upon constant extra-judicial scrutiny. The adversary process encourages
clever lawyers to propose creative interpretations and applications of current or antiquated doctrines. The role of the critical commentator is central to assuring that stare
dec/sis
operates as a limit on the abuse ofjudicial power, instead of as a license for judicial
government. Driven by the appeal of power, our courts will expect no more of themselves
than we expect of them.
22. Legal scholars are all legal realists in the sense that we all recognize that the law is
employed as a tool for a multitude of purposes. We know that the law is not a force
independent from human values and human choice; we have exercised choice in charting
our legal history and, as Grant Gilmore vividly reminds us, will choose to sink or swim in
the future. Gilmore, The Age of Antiquarius: On Legal History in a Time of Troubles, 39 U. CHI.
L. REV. 475, 488 (1972).

23. Dean Langdell sought to explain the law in terms of a few general principles that
could be indirectly derived from the data of case law and from which judges and lawyers
would deductively determine the results in future cases. For an excellent analysis of
Langdellian Legal Theory, see Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1 (1983).
24. Langdell believed that law students should be taught from appellate cases and
asked to extract the common principles from those cases for the purpose of determining
what the law is. Id. One does not have to sit through very many law classes or look at very
many casebooks to know that that is precisely what happens in most law classes. Although
legal scholars are certainly doing other things as well, such as investigating the policy
questions which our instrumental realism brings to mind, Dean Langdell would be pleased
to know that the basic structure of what we do is his.
25. For an illustration of how this Langdellian approach pervades the legal enterprise
from law school and legal scholarship through legal argument and judicial decision making, see HUFFMAN, Legal Science is Alive and Well in American Law Schools, in PROCEEDINGS
FROM CONFERENCE ON LEGAL EDUCATION: 2000 (Glasgow University, August, 1985).

26. Dunning, Foreword, supra note 8, at 181.
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single species or whether matter should have a particular nature. Nor
do lawyers ask what the public trust doctrine should be. We prefer instead to cover our tracks with stare decisis, at most suggesting new direc27
tions by discussing trends, as if the law has a life of its own.
This brief detour into legal theory should serve to explain my approach in critiquing Professors Sax, Wilkinson, Dunning, and Johnson. I
will not engage in a debate about the historical roots of the doctrine,
although I suspect that in-depth research on the Roman doctrine of res
communes, 2 8 which writers on public trust like to cite as the ultimate authority, 29 may reveal something quite different from the current conception of public trust. Nor will I review the American case law, which dates
from the early nineteenth century. 30 My purpose is to look behind the
legal analysis to see if I can uncover each writer's policy agenda, and to
assess how well they justify the consequences of the legal interpretations
they propose. Although legal scholars generally talk and write as if the
law has some independent source of life, few of us are fooled. We all
know that the public trust doctrine is intended by its proponents to have
particular consequences. Therefore, the merits of those consequences
should be debated and the doctrine should be assessed to determine the
likelihood that it will actually promote its intended purposes.
I.

THE PUBLIC TRUST JURISPRUDENCE OF PROFESSOR SAX

In his 1970 article, Professor Sax wrote that the issue is whether the
states are limited only by the ordinary constraints upon the police
power, constraints that have as their purpose the protection of individual rights or by more restrictive limits on the legislative will. 3 1 The legislative will could be further limited in the interest of individual
freedom, but we would not require a new doctrine for that purpose. We
need only restate or reinterpret the so-called ordinary constraints upon
the police power. 3 2 The more restrictive limits that Sax had in mind
27. For example, the New York Court of Appeals supported its decision to abandon
charitable immunity for hospitals by noting that "the trend of decision throughout the
country has more and more been away from nonliability." Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656,
659, 143 N.E.2d 3, 7 (1957). Sax notes a judicial trend in the treatment of property rights.
Sax. Decline of Private Property, supra note 5.
28. The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the Roman doctrine as applying to running waters, the air and the sea - "things Common to all and property of
none." United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 724, 744 (1950). The doctrine
of r-ecommunes was defined in the Institutes ofJustinian in these terms: "Res communes:

open to everyone: the air, running water, the sea.., and the seashore to the highest winter
floods." It was distinguished from private property and res publicae, which were the
"'[p]roperty of the state" and "were highways, rivers, and harbours .... that all might
navigate and fish ... the use of banks being public for this purpose." THE INSTITUTrEs OF
JUSTINIAN 2.1.1 (Moyle trans. 5th ed. 1912).
29. See, e.g., Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrinefrom Its HistoricalShackles, supra note
5, at 185; Dunning, The Public Trust Doctrine and Western Water Law, supra note 14, at 17-4.

30. For discussions of the American history of the doctrine, see Stevens, supra note 3
and Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law, supra note 5, at 475-91.

31. Sax,Judicial Intervention, supra note 5, at 477.
32. For example, consider the reliance upon constitutional protections of individual
liberty, or an effort to give constitutional definition to the police power concept. Neither
approach is likely to be appealing to most public trust advocates because both could serve
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were to have a different purpose; the protection not of private rights,
33
but of the public interest.
What is the public interest? Sax does not offer many thoughts on
that question. I suppose that he, like so many others, assumes that the
answer is obvious - the very purpose of a government's existence is to
serve the public interest. Political scientists, whose business it is to define concepts like "public interest," usually tell us that "public interest"
is what the public authorities, properly constituted, say it is. 3 4 In our
society, the proper constitution of public authority is democracy, but
Professor Sax suggests that the courts should employ the public trust
doctrine to limit the democratic legislature in the name of the public
interest. 3 5 Everyone knows that the legislature is a far more democratic
institution than the judiciary. Therefore, it seems that Sax may have
gotten it backwards. How can the counter-majoritarian courts protect
the public interest from the democratic legislature?
Although Sax admits that "there is no well-conceived doctrinal basis that supports a theory under which some interests are entitled to
special judicial attention and protection," ' 3 6 he argues that some important ideas converge in the public trust doctrine. First is the idea that
certain interests are intrinsically important to a frce society. 37 Surely no
one will dispute this idea. Consider the interest of the individual to be
free from abuse of criminal process or to express one's political views?
But these types of interests are not quite what Professor Sax has in
mind. Instead, he is thinking more about those interests which have
38
I
been at the heart of every call for freedom: fishing and navigation.
to
the
navigation
fishing
and
of
do not mean to belittle the importance
the interests of either side in resource allocation disputes. The one-sided nature of the
public trust approach is discussed infra at notes 78-83 and accompanying text.
33. Professor Sax begins his 1970 article with the statement that: "[plublic concern
about environmental quality is beginning to be felt in the courtroom." Sax,Judicial Intervention, supra note 4, at 473. His very next sentence states that "[p]rivate citizens, no
longer willing to accede to the efforts of administrative agencies to protect the public interest, have begun to take the initiative themselves." Id. at 473. Professor Sax would
surely be among the first to challenge the invisible-hand arguments of the free enterprise
advocates, yet his evidence of detriment to the public interest is private unrest. The only
difference would seem to be that free enterprise proponents admit to being motivated by
self-interest, while Sax's private citizens claim to be motivated by the public interest.
34.

See, e.g., THE PUBLIC INTEREST (C. Friedrich ed. 1962).

35. Professor Sax states that some democratic decisions will be "ultimately found to
be unjustifiable." Sax, Judicial Intervention, supra note 5, at 491. Later in the article, he
explains that the democratic failures addressed by the public trust doctrine are different
from the failures which result from the influence of a tyrannical majority. The latter requires judicial intervention in the name of individual rights. The democratic failures requiring public trust intervention result when "a diffuse majority is made subject to the will
of a concerted minority." Id. at 560. Professor Sax would have the courts remand "appropriate cases to the legislature after public opinion has been aroused." Id. See infra text
accompanying notes 47-61. Professor Sax does, however, state that the courts will "probably not impose public trust constraints on explicit legislative acts," id. at 542, but then
identifies two exceptions where such judicial intervention in the legislative process will be
appropriate. Id. at 542-43. See infra text accompanying notes 60-61.
36. SaxJudicialIntervention, supra note 5.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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enterprise and commerce of eighteenth and nineteenth century American society, but in 1970, neither fishing nor navigation on internal waters were essential to a free American society. The once mighty
Columbia River had been reduced by dams to a long string of ponds
with a sadly depleted fishery, 3 9 but freedom was doing about as well in
the Pacific Northwest as anyplace else in the world. What is important
to the concept of freedom is not fishing and navigation in-and-of themselves, but rather what they have symbolized in American history: free
enterprise, commerce, and the right of every individual to share in the
exploitation of nature's bounty.
This concern for nature's bounty, although stated somewhat differently by Sax, is the second idea which Sax argues intersects the public
trust doctrine. He believes that that there are some interests that "are
so particularly the gifts of nature's bounty that they ought to be reserved
for the whole of the populace."' 40 Sax analogizes the legislative protection of the "great ponds" of early New England to the twentieth century
protection of national parks. 4 1 However, there is a fundamental difference between early New England and our modern society that the intervening centuries have obscured. Seventeenth-century New Englanders
were not protecting their great ponds from destruction by communal
exploitation, which is the central purpose of today's national parks,
rather they were asserting the right of everyone to exploit nature's
bounty against a King who had sought to keep all the natural resources
of the early colonies for the Crown. 4 2 Thus, Sax has unwittingly relied
upon the right of all individuals to exploit natural resources as a foundation for the public trust doctrine.
Finally, Sax grounds his public trust doctrine on the recognition
"that certain uses have a peculiarly public nature that makes their adaptation to private use inappropriate. ' 43 His example is the usufructuary
nature of private interests in water. He argues that riparian and appropriation water law recognize only usufructuary rights because of the perceived importance of protecting the public interest in the water
resource. 44 This, however, is simply not true. The usufructuary nature
of water rights is a product of the migratory nature of the water resource. Recognition of title in the water itself is not practical in light of
its evanescent character. The fact that a water right is a usufruct makes
it no less enforceable against private or public interference than are
rights in land. Indeed, state interference with private use of land has far
outstripped state regulation of private water use over the last half century, notwithstanding that water rights are usufructs. Anyone who says,
as Sax did in 1970, that "[i]t is . . .thought to be incumbent upon the
39.

See Blumm, The Northwest's Hydroelectric Heritage: Prologue to the Pacific Northwest Elec-

tric Power Planning and Conservation Act, 58 WASH. L. REV. 175 (1982).
40. Sax,Judicial Intervention, supra note 5, at 484.
41.

Id. at 484-85.

42. See also Sax, Decline of Private Property, supra note 5.
43. Sax,Judicial Intervention, supra note 5, at 485.
44.

Id.
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government to regulate water uses for the general benefit of the community .... -45 either knows little about American water law to that
date, or is trying to mislead4 6 us. It is clear that Professor Sax knows a
good deal about water law.
Despite the weakness of Sax's purported foundation for the public
trust doctrine, the doctrine is flourishing, 4 7 often with reliance on the
Sax argument. But Sax does not rely exclusively on history. His central
thesis is that democracy sometimes does not work; that some democratic
decisions are "ultimately found to be unjustifiable." '4 8 Sax urges that
this finding is to be made by the courts because "it will often be the case
that the whole of the public interest has not been adequately considered
by the legislative or administrative officials." 4 9 Among the reasons that
Sax cites for democratic failures are "limited visibility" policy decisions, 50 "inequality of access to, and influence over, administrative
agencies" 5 1 and localism. 52 According to Sax, "[t]he public trust concept is not so much a substantive set of standards ... as it is a technique
by which courts may mend perceived imperfections in the legislative and
administrative process." 5 3 Sax goes on to state that the doctrine is "a
medium for democratization. ' '54 It is an idea that John Hart Ely would
later apply to a broad interpretation ofjiudicial review under the Constitution, 5 5 and one which neither Sax nor Hart have adequately justified. 56 Unanswered is the question of why the judiciary, an elitist
institution with few democratic credentials, should be in a position to
second-guess the actions of a legislature and its administrators.
In his environmental law handbook, Professor Rodgers describes
the public trust doctrine as the state's version of the federal courts'
45. Id.
46. SeeJ. SAX, WATER LAW, PLANNING & POLICY (1968).

47. W. RODGERS, supra note 17. Professor Rodgers cites California, New Jersey, Illinois, and Wisconsin as states where the doctrine has received recent consideration. Other
states adopting the public trust doctrine are: Florida [Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc.,
369 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 1981)]; Louisiana [Gulf Oil Corp. v. State Mineral Bd., 317 So. 2d
576 (La. 1975)]; Massachusetts [Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 378
Mass. 629, 393 N.E.2d 356 (1979)]; North Dakota [United Plainsmen Assocs. v. North
Dakota State Water Conservation Comm'n, 247 N.W.2d 457 (N.D. 1976)] and Oregon
[Morse v. Oregon Div. of State Lands, 285 Or. 197, 590 P.2d 709 (1979)].
48. Sax, Judicial Intervention, supra note 5, at 484.
49. Id. at 495.
50. Id.

51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 498.
Id. at 531.
Id. at 509.
Id.

55. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). Professor Hart's concern is about a dif-

ferent type of democratic failure. The focus of his concern is the problem of the "discrete
and insular minority" rather than the silent majority that Sax wishes to protect. See supra
note 35.
56. The inadequacy which Professors Sax and Hart share is in failing to explain why
democracy is or ought to be a fundamental value of the American political process. If we
accept that it is,Professor Hart's argument is more persuasive than Professor Sax's because the "discrete and insular minority" has in a real sense been excluded, while the
silent majority has simply failed to get involved.
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"hard look" doctrine. 5 7 Sax apparently agrees with this characterization, having noted that "[ilt is no more - and no less - than a name
courts give to their concerns about the insufficiencies of the democratic
process." 5 8 Thus perceived, the justification of the public trust doctrine
is merely part of the general effort to justify an activist and interventionist judiciary. 59 Defenders of the "hard look" doctrine are at pains to
explain that it is purely a form of procedural intervention 60 and maintain, as Sax does with the public trust doctrine, that it "has no life of its
own and no intrinsic content."' 6 1 Nevertheless, courts must have standards which tell them when there has been a short in the democratic
circuits. Do the courts really look at the process, assuming they will
know a democratic failure when they see one, or do they look at the
substantive product of the suspect democratic action? It might be argued that the answer to this question does not really matter if the available remedies are purely procedural. However, it would be naive to
suggest that procedural remedies do not have substantive consequences. The history of environmental litigation over the last two decades is one of procedural remedies being employed for well-defined
62
substantive purposes.
Sax suggests that the courts are hesitant to overturn explicit legislative action "even if [the] authorization seems to go to the outer edge of
legitimacy." '63 Presumably this "outer edge of legitimacy" is where the
democratic process is being abused. According to Sax, the hesitant
courts will recognize this realm of legislative abuse by "blatant evidence
of corruption"64 or by the need for specific legislative authorization by a
broadly representative agency. 6 5 The courts will know as much about
corruption as any other public institution, so perhaps they can effectively intervene when votes have been sold or officials have been bribed.
But they surely need nothing so obscure as the public trust doctrine to
justify intervention in such cases. So, it is really Sax's second character57.

W.

58.

Sax, Judicial Intervention, supra note 5, at 521.

RODGERS, HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAw §

2.16 (1977).

59. Proponents of the public trust and the "hard look" approaches will deny that judicial application of these doctrines constitutes either activism or interventionism. Yet, however labeled, these doctrines undeniably involve the judiciary in decisions that would
otherwise be the exclusive domain of the legislative and administrative branches of
government.

60. Some are at greater pains than others. Judge Wright of the District of Columbia
Circuit Court of Appeals argues for a substantive review of agency actions. Wright, The
Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The Limits of Judical Review. 59 CORNELL L. REV. 375

(1984). Judge Bazelon of the same court argues for a purely procedural review. Bazelon,
Science and Uncertainty: A jurist's
View, 5 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 209 (1981).

61. Sax,Judicial Intervention, supra note 5, at 521.
62. One example of a procedural remedy being employed for substantive purposes is
the litigation occurring under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42
U.S.C. § 4321 et. seq. (1970). For discussions of the substantive aspects of this act, see
Comment, The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969: Toward a Substantive Standardof Review, 4 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 163 (1974) and Note, Substantive Review under the

National Environmental Policy Act: EDF v. Corps of Engineers, 3 EcOLOGY L.Q. 173 (1973).
63. Sax, Judicial Intervention, supra note 5, at 542.
64. Id. at 542-43.
65.

Id. at 543.
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istic of legislative abuse which will identify cases requiring public trust
intervention. Thus, Sax is really concerned about those cases where not
everyone had a fair opportunity at influencing a decision, not because
someone illegally precluded their input, but because of inadequacies inherent in the representative democratic process. Sax's concern for democratic failures is legitimate. In a complex society where government is
called upon to do many things, the opportunities for democratic breakdown are numerous. Because every special interest will recognize the
possibilities for gaining particular advantage, Professor Sax would have
the courts ever on the lookout for decisions that are the consequence of
legal, but unfair influence.
There is an intriguing parallel between this justification of the public trust doctrine, which according to Sax provides "considerable opportunity for fruitful judicial intervention, ' '6 6 and the standard justification
for government intervention in the market allocation of resources. Market system failures are said to justify government regulation or ownership of resources. By entrusting a democratically constituted government with the power to allocate resources, society guards against the
ancient abuses wrought by kings and emperors. Thus, we substitute
fairness for efficiency as our resource allocation goal, while guarding
against power-hungry political bosses picking up where the robber barons left off. Sax argues that democratic failures require intervention,
and that no one but the courts are left to do it. Thus, governmental
intervention to correct for market failures is paralleled by Sax's insistence that courts must intervene to correct for legislative and administrative failures. Sax, however, neglects to address the questions of who
will intervene to correct for judicial failures, and more importantly,
whether the situation has been improved or worsened by judicial interventions in private decision making.
Sax insists that the courts are quite competent in intervening in the
allocation of natural resources, noting that the California and Wisconsin
courts have "fruitfully engaged" in the process of discriminating be67
tween appropriate and inappropriate dealings with public trust lands.
But whether or not a particular use of public trust lands is appropriate
depends on the standards of propriety applied. Assume for a moment
that Professor Sax is Judge Sax sitting with Judge Posner on the federal
bench. Will Sax and Posner agree that the Wisconsin and California
decisions are "fruitful?" They might agree that a particular decision was
"fruitful," but for very different reasons. Judge Posner does not mind a
68
little judicial activism in the name of efficient resource allocation.
Sometimes Posner's standard of propriety (efficiency) will coincide with
Sax's idea of the appropriate use of public trust lands, but often it will
not. Posner will be able to explain his conclusion in the relatively pre66. Id. at 544.
67. Id. at 552.
68. "Since any ruling of law will constitute a precedent, the judge must consider the
probable impact of alternative rulings .
R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 19
(2d ed. 1977).
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cise concepts of resource economics. A debate with him would focus on
his interpretation and application of economic principles and the propriety of the value of efficiency as a goal in resource allocation.
A debate with Judge Sax would be less fruitful. This is because it is
almost impossible to predict what result the democratic process, when
functioning properly, will produce; therefore, it is extremely difficult to
discern whether or not there has been a democratic failure leading to an
inappropriate use of public trust lands. The democratic failures which
concern Sax are not those which result from blatant racial discrimination
or rural dominance in malapportioned state legislatures. 69 The equal
protection clause is adequate to correct for such failures. Sax is concerned about the subtle democratic failures inherent in the dayto-day lobbying, negotiating, vote-swapping, log-rolling, back-slapping,
and even back-stabbing that are the staples of the legislative process.
Unfortunately, Sax neglects to tell us how to identify this sort of democratic failure, nor does he even suggest that we will know it when we see
it. What we will know, including those of us who are judges, is whether
or not we like the resource allocation decision which has been made.
Sax likes the results of the public trust decisions of the Wisconsin
and California courts. I also like those results, but cannot defend the
means employed to accomplish them. Sax has failed to provide an adequate justification. His democracy argument is a smoke screen for a
doctrine that permits some losers in the political arena to have a second
chance in the courts. 70 I say some political losers because it is, in effect,
a biased doctrine which serves the personal values of Joe Sax and Jim
Huffman, but not of everyone, or even necessarily a majority, in American society. Not only do judges determine the standard of propriety,
but they establish many of the rules for access to judicial review. Thus,
even when judges are elected, the courts by nature of their function are
not democratic institutions. Not everyone is in a position to bring their
concerns before a policy-making court.
Ten years after his 1970 article, Sax wrote a short piece for a symposium on the public trust doctrine. 7 1 In that article he introduced an
additional argument for the public trust doctrine. Sax argued that
"It]he central idea of the public trust is preventing the destabilizing disappointment of expectations held in common, but without formal recognition such as title."' 72 In support of this argument, Sax employed the
familiar example of the commons. Although Sax acknowledged the inefficiencies of the commons described by Hardin 73 and many others, he
focused on the expectations developed by the common folk in the use of
69. See, e.g., Reynolds v.Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Brown v.Board of Education, 347
U.S. 483 (1954). These are the types of democratic failure that concerned Professor Hart
in his book, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). See supra notes 35 and 53.
70. I have developed this theme in more detail in a review ofR. APPLEGATE, Supra note
2. Huffman, Public Trusts: Gaining Access to the Courts, 8 ENVTL. L. 217, 230-31 (1977).

71. Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 5.
72. Id. at 188.
73. Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
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the commons, which were subsequently disappointed by the assertions of power by knights, lords, and other members of the exploitative
class. 7 4 For Sax, the commons was a battleground of class struggle and
feudal exploitation, not a place of inefficient resource allocation. According to Sax, the disappointment of the expectations of the common
folk led to agrarian revolts. 75 Sax implies that if there had been a public
trust doctrine at the time, the courts could have told the knights and
lords to let the peasants continue to farm. 7 6 Although such a result
would undoubtably have satisfied Sax, Judge Posner would probably not
be impressed with the solution.
Without a doubt this latest pronouncement by Sax on the public
trust doctrine offers an activist court additional ammunition to justify its
intervention. Yet, from a theoretical point of view, there seems to be
little connection between the democracy justification and the stability
justification. Indeed, a properly functioning democracy is capable of upsetting popular expectations and thereby destabilizing society. Thus, it
appears that Sax would have the courts intervene even in those instances
where the democratic process has worked properly, but expectations
have been upset. One wonders ifjudicial action will also be appropriate
where expectations are being protected by a malfunctioning democracy.
A democracy is capable of confirming, as public rights, popular expectations which have the purpose and effect of disadvantaging particular segments of society. Many democratically confirmed expectations
were upset by the civil rights laws of the 1950's and 1960's, but all recognize that those expectations did not merit protection. How about the
expectations of those who have fished, hiked, and driven on the public
lands for decades and are now precluded in the interest of resource protection? Professor Sax will have no difficulty in refusing to protect those
expectations, but others will disagree. There are expectations and there
are expectations. There is stability and there is stability.
In a 1984 article for the University of Pittsburgh Law Review, Sax
refers to a picturesque village, in rural Arkansas, Boxley Valley, to illus77
trate his argument for protecting the expectations of a community.
Perhaps Boxley Valley will make a fine museum, but should we preserve
its quaint "vernacular country architecture" 7 8 and agricultural lifestyle
in the name of community stability. Every rural community, including
those less quaint than Boxley Valley, is interested in stability. A community identical in appearance to a hundred other communities is no less a
community. Change, while often uncomfortable, is inevitable. Sax does
74. Professor Sax attributes the shift from the "agrarian economy of the forest, with
its common uses and customary rights," to the pressures for privatization, class separation, and resource exploitation. Sax, Liberatingthe Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 5, at 19091.
75. Id. at 189-90.

76. Id.
77. Sax, Do Communities lave Rights? The National Parks as a Laboratory of New Ideas, 45
U. Prrr. L. REV. 499, 507 (1984).

78. Id.
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not claim that the public trust doctrine can or should be employed to
preserve the unique community of Boxley Valley, but that conclusion
flows from his earlier arguments for democracy and the protection of
expectations. A doctrine that serves "to prevent the destabilizing disappointment of expectations held in common" 79 for the use of beaches
and navigable waters, certainly would serve to prevent disappointment
for those who treasure the quaintness of Boxley Valley.
What really concerns Professor Sax is the question of local autonomy in a highly integrated national political and economic system. It is
an important issue that is better addressed on its merits than obscured
by the mysteries of public trust doctrine or other forms ofjudicial intervention. Although the public trust doctrine may serve the nostalgic interests of those who choose to live where community is of little
importance, it is unlikely, indeed impractical, that it will serve the interests of those whose lives and expectations are strongly tied to a particular community. Those people, absent the assistance of benevolent
outsiders, can preserve their community through the political and economic processes.
II.

THE PUBLIC TRUST JURISPRUDENCE OF PROFESSOR WILKINSON

Professor Wilkinson is concerned with the application of the public
trust doctrine to the management of the federal public lands, which he
notes "are at the outer reaches of the public trust doctrine."8 0 Wilkinson describes a parallel between the public trust doctrine and public
land law. He identifies three historical eras in public land law, the most
recent of which dates from 1970.81 Since that date, with the adoption of
the Federal Land Policy and Management Act 8 2 and other legislation,
public land law has become a source of public rights. 8 3 The government
has moved from the role of proprietor to the role of sovereign in relation to the public lands. As a sovereign, the government is limited by
the rights of the public, both through public trust and public land law. 84
Wilkinson's argument depends upon the acceptance of the notion
79. Id.
80. Wilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law, supra note 6, at 273.
81. During the first era (up to 1888), the federal government had an obligation to the
states to dispose of public lands and make new states. During the second era (1888-1970),
the public lands were a source of federal power to manage natural resources. The third
era (since 1970) is one of public rights derived from public ownership of land. Id. at 278,

280, 284.
82. Federal Land Policy and Management Act, Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2743
(1976).
83. The third era "involves the direct or indirect use of the public trust doctrine to
limit federal power and to justify rights of the public against the federal government."
Wilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law, supra note 6, at 284.
84. "[t]he shift to a conceptualization of the federal role as governmental rather
than proprietary focuses attention on duties to the public. Rulemaking is required, records are open, decision-making is shared, and the courts are available
because public lands business is public business. It is the public to whom public
lands managers are ultimately accountable."
Id. at 304. A parallel effect of this change in conceptualization of the federal role is that
private parties harmed by federal actions are less likely to recover compensation. The
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of public rights as meaningful. His point is not that individuals have
rights rooted in the public trust doctrine, although at least some individuals must have standing to act on behalf of the public. Instead, his point
is that the public, as an entity, has rights. I am skeptical about the concept of public rights, which, like the concept of the public interest, will
forever elude a definition that is acceptable to all individuals and groups
in society. I am even more skeptical about our ability to agree upon
what a public right is, assuming that such things can be said to exist in
any meaningful sense. The problem of defining public rights is similar
to the problem Christopher Stone faced in defining the rights of inanimate objects. 8 5 Indeed, Wilkinson links these two concepts in asserting
'86
that "the [public trust] doctrine protects the resources themselves."
The difficulty with Stone's idea was that individual people had to act on
behalf of the inanimate objects, thus requiring reliance upon some individual's perception of the interests of the inanimate object. The same
problem exists for actions on behalf of the public trust.
In the Mono Lake case, 8 7 for example, it was not an officially designated representative of the public who brought the action, but rather a
self-appointed representative who was suing the official representatives. 8 8 Wilkinson claims that the doctrine will not permit judges to be
"roving ambassadors" 89 on behalf of environmentalists, that it is a
"value-neutral" approach. 90 But I do not think Professor Wilkinson really believes that the Mountain States Legal Foundation, for example,
could successfully rely on the public trust doctrine to get an injunction
against the National Park Service requiring the extermination of Yellowstone's grizzly bears because they threaten public enjoyment of the park.
On the other hand, it is quite conceivable that an injunction might issue
pursuant to the trust doctrine or public land laws requiring the exclusion of humans from some areas to protect the grizzlies' use of the park.
It is not a value-neutral doctrine. It is a doctrine which serves the interests of groups with particular conceptions of the public interest. I am
for the bears, but many of my fellow citizens can do without them.
Unlike Sax, who seeks to obscure the counter-majoritarian diffidistinction is one which runs from government tort liability through takings law, to public
resource management, although not necessarily consistently.

85. Stone constructed a persuasive case for the idea of natural objects having rights,
but failed to explain how those rights would be defined and asserted except by self-interested individuals purporting to act on behalf of the natural object. C. STONE, SHOULD
TREES HAVE STANDING (1974). See Huffman, Trees as a Minority, 5 ENVTL. L. 199 (1974).
86. Wilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law, supra note 6, at 315.
87. National Audubon Soc y, supra note 12.
88. Defendant Department of Water and Power of the City of Los Angeles is the administrative body responsible for implementing the public interest as determined by the
Los Angeles City government. The Department's water rights were granted pursuant to
legislation administered by the California Water Board and enacted by the California Legislature. The plaintiff National Audubon Society has no similar claim to being a democratically certified representative of the public interest or protector of the public rights.
89. Wilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law, supra note 6, at 315.
90. Id. at 316.
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culty, Wilkinson is quite up front in his preference for judicial intervention. Wilkinson argues that the doctrine is rooted
in the precept that some resources are so central to the wellbeing of the community that they must be protected by distinctive, judge-made principles. This is an accepted process in our
law: Anglo-American jurisprudence is rife with judicially developed doctrines
that reflect the deeply held convictions of our
9
society. 1
This argument, however, undercuts Wilkinson's assertion that the doctrine is value-neutral for it is difficult to comprehend how deeply held
convictions can be value-neutral. Moreover, the assertion that the judiciary is the source of most judicially enforced American convictions is
debatable. Most "American convictions" of legal significance trace directly to or are expressed in the Constitution. Few would assert that the
public trust doctrine has constitutional roots. Indeed, the doctrine functions to limit the constitutional role of the legislative and executive
branches of government.
III.

THE PUBLIC TRUST JURISPRUDENCE OF PROFESSOR DUNNING

Professor Dunning has authored two articles on the public trust
doctrine, one in anticipation of the Mono Lake decision 92 and the other
as a follow-up to that case. 9 3 In the first article, Dunning lays out the
California law of public trust easement in a straightforward and understandable manner. 9 4 He addresses the counter-majoritarian difficulty,
arguing that democracy is protected by the fact that public trust uses
may be eliminated if the change is consistent with public trust purposes. 9 5 However, the determination of public trust purposes remains
with the courts, and the legislature will take its chances in altering public
trust uses. It is also difficult to agree with his argument that the public
trust easement is the only way of providing public benefits because, as
he admits, California law provides "[n]o water right may exist simply for
the benefit of the public in general." 9 6 There are significant public benefits, in the sense of benefit to persons other than the rights holder, that
are derived from private rights in water. If California water law prohibits the creation of private rights which deliver only public benefits, the
public trust easement is not the only way, nor the best way, to resolve
that problem. If public sentiment strongly favors providing these public
benefits, then the California legislature could surely be persuaded to
amend this restrictive law.
Dunning argues that "it should not follow that, merely because the
91. Id. at 315.
92. Dunning, The Significance of California's Public Trust Easement for California Water
Rights Law, supra note 8.
93. Dunning, The Public Trust Doctrine and Western 4ater Law: Discordor Harmony?, supra
note 8.
94. Dunning, The Significance of California's Public Trust Easement for California Water
Rights Law, supra note 8, at 363-78.
95. Id. at 370.
96. Id. at 383.
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physical capacity exists and water rights are recognized, a court must
permit a project operator to divert water from the basin to the full extent of the water rights."' 97 However, unless a water right is something
other than a right to divert water, it does follow that such diversion must
be permitted. Under Dunning's interpretation, a water right is a right to
divert water except when a court or some other authority disagrees.
That is not a very meaningful right. It is true that California water users
have had to deal with uncertainties and that, as Dunning has noted, "the
need for adaptation is nothing new to California's water rights system," 9 8 but Californians pay a price for that uncertainty. At present,
California has a private rights system for water allocation. That system,
like any social institution as Sax notes, 99 will benefit from stability. The
Mono Lake decision has introduced significant uncertainties into California water use allocation.
In his article for the 1984 Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Institute,
Dunning discussed the Mono Lake decision and recent developments in
other jurisdictions. To assuage the fears of developers, he states that
"there is no reason to believe [that the public trust doctrine] has greatly
modified the course of ... development [along the water's edge]."' 0 0
This assurance seems a little disingenuous if the doctrine is really perceived as a means for protecting public uses against the ravages of private development. In fact, Dunning admits, unlike Wilkinson, that the
doctrine "serves as an instrument to strengthen the hand of those concerned about maintaining coastal access and preserving some of our
rapidly disappearing wetlands."''1 1 He does not suggest, however, that
it strengthens the hand of real estate developers.
Unlike Sax, who claims that the doctrine is only a means of referring
decisions back to the legislature, Dunning recognizes that "[a]ll existing
water rights which adversely impact public trust values are now subject
to reconsideration and modification by either an agency or a court in the
name of the public trust."' 1 2 Thus, the courts will have to decide the
substantive questions of the extent of land subject to the trust and the
uses protected by the trust. Dunning admits that different judges, Mosk
and Rehnquist in his example, 10 3 will come to different conclusions.
This diversity ofjudicial opinion is not the preservation of democracy in
action, as Sax argues. Rather it is judicial law-making in the name of the
public interest. Although we may agree with a particular judge's determination of the public interest, the judiciary as an institution is not competent to make such determinations.
To his credit, Dunning's analysis of the public trust doctrine as a
97. Id. at 396.
98. Id. at 397.
99. See supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text.
100.

note 8,
101.
102.
103.

Dunning, The Public Trust Doctrine and Western Water Law: Discord or Harmony?, supra

at 17-39.
Id. at 17-40.
Id. at 17-42.
Id. at 17-23 to 17-24.
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close relative of the reserved rights doctrine and of the reasonableness
principle of California water law is logically sound. 10 4 All three doctrines are means of judicial intervention in public policy making, along
with several other doctrines mentioned by Professor Johnson, whose
writings are the final subject of my critique.
IV.

THE PUBLIC TRUST JURISPRUDENCE OF PROFESSOR JOHNSON

Johnson adds to the list of water law doctrines supporting judicial
intervention an expanding navigation servitude, the federal doctrine of
equitable apportionment, public water rights, and regulation pursuant
to the police power. 10 5 According to Johnson, all of these evidence the
rejection of eminent domain as "too costly, too cumbersome, too timeconsuming, and not required by the equities of the water rights holders."1 06 AlthoughJohnson does not seek to justify this rejection of eminent domain as a tool for implementing public water policy, his
approach is extremely attractive to those who would otherwise have to
pay, be inconvenienced, or await the implementation of eminent domain
proceedings. There may be no such thing as a free lunch, but there are
many ways of redistributing the costs of lunch. The public trust doctrine
is one such mechanism, which avoids having to persuade a legislative
body of the wisdom of the wealth transfer.
Of course, the beneficiaries of the public trust will argue that there
is no wealth transfer because the public rights under the doctrine predate any private rights.' 0 7 The same argument is made in support of the
reserved rights doctrine.' 0 8 It is the most attractive aspect of both doctrines, but it is pure mythology. 10 9 By any standard of reasonable legal
expectation, the City of Los Angeles had no reason to doubt its water
rights in the Mono Basin. "l0
Johnson seeks to define a "broader, functionally oriented public
104. Id. at 17-42 to 17-44.
105. Johnson, Public Trust Protectionfor Stream Flows and Lake Levels, supra note 7, at 23436.
106. Id. at 236.
107. The Illinois Central court quoted Chief Justice Taney to date the trust right from
the Revolution when "the people of each State became themselves sovereign, and in that
character hold the absolute right to all their navigable waters, and the soils under them,
for their own common use, subject only to the rights since surrendered by the Constitution to the general government." Illinois Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 456, (quoting Martin v.
Waddell, 41 U.S. 367, 410 (1842)).
108. The reserved rights doctrine assigns a date to Indian and federal water rights
which results in subsequently acquired water rights being junior and therefore less secure.
This is the rule notwithstanding that none of the reservations in question expressly reserve
water rights. See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 595-60 (1963); Winters v.
United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
109. TRELEASE, .4 Fable, in WATER LAw: RESOURCE USE AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 815 (2d ed. 1974).
110. The City made legal purchases of riparian rights on streams tributary to Mono
Lake between 1920 and 1934. In 1934, the City acquired by eminent domain riparian
rights pertaining to Mono Lake. City of Los Angeles v. Aitken, 10 Cal. App. 2d 460, 52
P.2d 585 (1935). In 1940, the California Water Board granted the City permits to appropriate the waters of four Mono Lake tributaries. The City undertook massive water transport projects to supply this water to its residents. Thirty-nine years after the state permit
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trust doctrine" by categorizing traditional public trust cases.' I l He
brings in many cases that are not by name public trust cases and asserts
that in fact they should be so classified." 2 Although I would prefer a
system of legal analysis in which such exercises in classification would be
irrelevant, I recognize that Johnson's objective is to expand the reach of
the doctrine by expanding the historical content upon which future decisions will rely.
Johnson insists that judicial failure to limit water extractions on the
public trust theory would allow the destruction of public rights "with
impunity by persons claiming water rights under the prior appropriation
...system of water law." ' 13 He goes so far as to suggest that express
legislative approval of extraction should be required in some situations, 114 a proposal that makes a mockery of a water rights system,
which in most western states requires the diversion of water for the assertion and maintenance of private rights. According to Johnson, the
115
question is not whether, but how to protect instream water uses.
There has been an increased demand for instream water use over the
past two decades, but the "whether" question will always remain as values and supply and demand change. Certainly, the "how" question is
important, but Johnson and almost everyone else concerned with this
issue have mistakenly presumed that certain resource allocations are inherently preferable and that such allocations will only be achieved
through public action. 1 6 Johnson's argument is based on the premise
that if the legislature fails to act, the courts must act pursuant to the
public trust doctrine.
V.

CONCLUSION

This discussion of the works of four distinguished scholars leads to
a few broad conclusions about the public trust doctrine. First, the doctrine is clearly part of a trend which Sax argues has resulted in "property
rights . . .being fundamentally redefined to the disadvantage of prop-

erty owners." 1 17 1 think this trend is an unfortunate one in terms of the
management and allocation of increasingly scarce natural resources.
Garrett Hardin and other writers have reminded us of the tragedy of the
commons.' 18 The solution to the commons tragedy is not a management committee or dictator, it is private property.' 19 The trend reprewas granted and 45 to 59 years after the riparian rights were acquired, the City's rights
were challenged under the public trust theory.
111. Johnson, Public Trust Protectionfor Stream Flows and Lake Levels, supra note 7, at 241.
112. Id. at 244-55. See supra 83 and accompanying text.
113. Johnson, Public Trust Protectionfor Stream Flow and Lake Levels, supra note 7, at 257.
114. Id. at 258.
115. Id. at 265.
116. For a contrary view, see HUFFMAN, Instream Water Use.- Public and Private Alternatives,
in WATER RIGHTS: SCARCE RESOURCE ALLOCATION, BUREAUCRACY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT
249 (1983).
117. Sax, Decline of Private Property, supra note 5, at 481.
118. See supra note 73.
119. See G. HARDIN &J. BADEN, MANAGING THE COMMONS (1977). In his original article,
Professor Hardin noted that our solution to the tragedy of the commons is private prop-
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sented by the public trust doctrine is simply a return to the commons.
The only difference is that the commons is totally closed to some interests, while the permitted development interests must jump through an
assortment of legislative, administrative, and judicial hoops. Having to
jump through hoops may slow the process of exploitation, thereby postponing the tragedy, but the combination of increasing demand and
diminishing supply will assure that the resources are exhausted, particularly where the effect of governmental action is to redistribute wealth.
Therefore, society should give some consideration to private alternatives to the commons.
Second, assuming that Sax's democracy theory is the central justification for the doctrine, that it is just another form of the hard look doctrine as Rodgers suggests, I am at a loss for why we should be enamored
with the democratic allocation of resources. I do not doubt that democracy is the best form of government, but I do not think that leads to the
conclusion that the best way to make any or every resource allocation
decision is democratically. To the contrary, the fact that the best form
of government is democracy argues for making as few decisions as possible through government. The democratic process, when employed to
allocate resources, is simply a more or less civilized scramble for the
distributional benefits of particular allocations of resources. Because
ours is often a less than civilized society, many members of which value
the roar of motorized transport over the calm of a mountain wilderness
and the comforts of a high-energy life style over the fish runs of the
Columbia River, the public trust doctrine permits the more civilized
members of our society to appeal to the courts to force the democracy to
reconsider its decisions and come to a wiser choice.
Surely we are not deceived by this bit of legal fast shoe. If we believe in democracy, we should certainly live with its consequences. The
public trust doctrine and its relations are tools for political losers or for
those seeking to avoid the costs of becoming political winners. It forces
the proponents of legislative action to justify a particular decision in isolation from the give-and-take of the legislative process. It is frequently
argued that if the legislature does not like what the courts do, they can
change it. Legislative action, however, does not come easily in the modern state legislature. Controversial issues, even where there is a clear
majority position, are easily overlooked in the interests of other legislative agendas. Some will assert that a legislature's failure to act is an act
in and of itself. However, the logic of that proposition is lost in the
legislative context where the potential agenda always consists of more
issues than can be considered meaningfully.
Third, the contention that the public trust doctrine is just another
form of the "hard look" doctrine should not persuade us to be comfortable with the public trust approach. Instead, it should lead us to be
erty which, when combined with inheritance laws, "is unjust - but we put up with it because we are not convinced, at the moment, that anyone has invented a better system."
Hardin, supra note 73, at 1251.
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skeptical of the "hard look" doctrine. Rodgers is right in linking the two
because both are concepts used to justify judicial intervention in legislative and executive actions. The "hard look" doctrine tries hard to appear purely procedural and outcome neutral, but the public trust
version of that doctrine reveals its substance. How hard a court looks
does not depend exclusively upon the adequacy of the legislative and
executive procedure, it also depends upon the substantive action that
was taken. If we have learned nothing else from the legal realists, we
should have come to understand the impact of values on judicial
decisions.
Although, I do not wish to defend democracy as a resource allocator, neither do I wish to defend the resources allocation efforts of legislators and administrators. Thus, the real issue in all of this is what
institutional mechanisms should we employ to allocate resources. The
public trust doctrine is part of a widespread presumption in favor of
public allocation, 12 0 although it is really a remedy for the perceived failure of public allocation. Thus, it parallels our approach to environmental law, which has been to regulate the regulators with at least as much
vigor as they regulate private actions. If public resource allocations are
perceived to be a problem, we should look at the possibility of improving the private rights system before resorting to reliance on an arcane
doctrine that probably never meant what its proponents claim it means
and that ignores the fact that the foundation of our resource allocation
system is private property rights. Thus, state courts should take a "hard
look" at the shortcomings of public trust theory before jumping into
Mono Lake with the California Supreme Court.

120. Professor Sax's article in the Washington Law Review is an excellent statement of
this presumption. See Sax, Decline of Private Proper(y, supra note 5.

THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AS A SOURCE OF STATE
RESERVED WATER RIGHTS*
INTRODUCTION

When Justice Holmes remarked that "[a] river is more than an
amenity, it is a treasure,"' he captured the essence of society's relationship with water. Although water is especially important in the arid and
semiarid lands of the West, 2 water has a special importance wherever it
may be found. Whether found in the Great Ponds of Massachusetts or
the prairie potholes of the northern Great Plains, along the lakefront of
Chicago or amidst the tufa towers of Mono Lake, water is as vital as the
air we breathe, as influential in the development of our national character as the land, and as evanescent asferae naturae.3 Having such singular
and valuable characteristics, water has always been coveted by mankind
and much sought after by men who wished to "own" it, especially when
* This note is exclusively concerned with the application of the public trust
doctrine to inland waters in states lying on or west of the hundredth meridian. In large
measure, the central theme of this note was inspired by Professor Harrison Dunning's
thought-provoking article on the public trust doctrine and the central case in the Mono
Lake litigation, National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 33 Cal. 3d
419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
Mono Lake], in which he noted that the "[ulse of the public trust doctrine to limit water
rights in a situation such as that at Mono Lake is strikingly similar to use of the Winters
Doctrine to limit state-recognized water rights." Dunning, The Public Trust Doctrine and
Western Water Law: Discord or Harmony?, 30 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 17-1, 17-44 (1984).
The author would like to thank Barrett W. McInerney, counsel for California Trout, for his
invaluable assistance and Professors John A. Carver, Jr. and Edward J. Roche, Jr. of the
University of Denver College of Law for their unrelenting critiques of the ideas advanced
in this note. My thanks also to Professor John Rohr of the Center for Public
Administration and Policy at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University for
pointing out the objection discussed in and disposed of in footnote 80. Otherwise, the
thoughts expressed herein as well as any errors, omissions, and inconsistencies are, of
course, solely the responsibility of the author.
During the final stages of preparing this note, the author learned through Professor
Dunning that the Superior Court of Mono County had issued a preliminary injunction in
response to a request by the California-based fishermen's organization (California Trout)
to maintain a minimum instream flow of nineteen cubic feet per second (cfs) in Rush
Creek, a non-navigable tributary of Mono Lake. Telephone conversation with Professor
Harrison Dunning (April 23, 1986). The preliminary injunction, effective since March 7,
1985, operates against the Grant Lake Dam, which is operated by the Department of Water
and Power of the City of Los Angeles. Telephone conversation with Barrett W.
McInerney, counsel for California Trout (May 5, 1986). This judicial order represents, to
the best of my knowledge, the first instance of a judicially-created quantified public trust
water right in a non-navigable stream.
1. New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 342 (1931).
2. "There is no more essential commodity in the western United States than water."
WESTERN GOVERNORS' ASSOCIATION, NEW CHALLENGE, NEW DIRECTION: THE WATER POLicy REPORT OF THE WESTERN GOVERNORS' ASSOCIATION 5 (on file with the author). One

state supreme court has noted, with reference to the waters of its state, that they "are the
very life blood of its existence." Chow v. City of Santa Barbara, 217 Cal. 673, 702, 22 P.2d
5, 16 (1933).
3. See IAJ. GRIMES, THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY 318 (repl. ed. 1980); see also 1 S.
WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES 3 (3d ed. 1911).
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it occurs in those areas that are "water-poor." "Ownership" of water
has been a problematic concept for human societies precisely because of
its unique characteristics. 4 Societal concerns about the ownership of
water are manifestations of society's concerns over the right to use water
resources, for ownership in its fullest sense obviously includes the right
to control the use of that which is owned. 5 Throughout the history of
Western civilization, the water law of every society has reflected the balance struck between proponents of public interests and rights in water
6
and proponents of private interests and rights in water.
This note will review the role that the public trust doctrine has had
in the balances struck and restruck by societies between private ownership interests in water resources and public ownership interests in water
resources. Following a brief historical review, 7 it will be suggested that
the public trust doctrine can serve as the basis for a new species of water
rights-state reserved rights, which would for the most part be analogous to federal reserved rights 8 in their scope and effect. This proposition will be buttressed by discussions about the doctrine of pre-existing
title and state constitutional and statutory provisions on state or public
ownership of state water resources. Finally, this note will argue that just
compensation is not a constitutionally-required prerequisite to the infringement of existing water rights, except in those instances where the
4. "The water of a stream, lake, or pond cannot be dealt with as real property on
account of its mobile and evanescent nature ....
" 1AJ. GRIMES, supra note 3, at 320.
5. See I J. GRIMES, THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY 3 (repl. ed. 1980).
6. See MacGrady, The Navigability Concept in the Civil and Common Law: Historical Development, Current Importance, and Some Doctrines That Don't Hold Water, 3 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 511,
515-87 (1975); Note, The Public Trust in Tidal Areas: A Sometimes Submerged TraditionalDoctrine,
79 YALE L.J. 762, 772-73 (1970).
7. Because of its ancient origins, obscure development, and tremendous potential
impact of private ownership interests in water, the public trust doctrine has been the subject of over 100 scholarly commentaries with the vast majority having appeared in the past
decade. See Lazarus, Changing Conceptionsof Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 643-44 n.75 (1986) (extensive, albeit
partial, listing of the voluminous materials on this subject).
8. The United States Supreme Court has concisely described the basis and scope of
the doctrine as follows:
This Court has long held that when the Federal Government withdraws its land
from the public domain and reserves it for a federal purpose, the Government, by
implication, reserves appurtenant water then unappropriated to the extent
needed to accomplish the purpose of the reservation. In doing so the United
States requires a reserved right in unappropriated water which vests on the date
of the reservation and is superior to the rights of future appropriators. . . . The
doctrine applies to Indian reservations and other federal enclaves, encompassing
water rights in navigable and nonnavigable streams.
Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976) (citations omitted).
To date, the question of whether the public trust doctrine applies to the United States
has yet to be directly addressed by either the Supreme Court or the federal courts of
appeals. District of Columbia v. Air Florida, Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
However, at least two federal district courts have explicitly held that the doctrine applies to
the federal government. In In re Stuart Transportation Co., 495 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Va.
1980), the court held that "[u]nder the public trust doctrine, . . . the United States [has]
the right and duty to protect and preserve the public's interest in natural wildlife resources." Id. at 40. In the other federal case, Congress was held to be the trustee of
public trust values "'in the tideland and the land below the low water mark that relate to
the commerce and other powers delegated to the federal government." United States v.
1.58 Acres of Land, 523 F. Supp. 120, 123 (D. Mass. 1981).
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right affected was perfected prior to statehood, and that the correction
of any inequity resulting from the absence ofjust compensation is a matter most properly addressed by state legislatures. It is the hope of the
author that this note will contribute some new ideas about how the public trust doctrine can be used to advance the state management of inland
water resources in the West and how the consequences of the "collision" 9 between the public trust doctrine and the appropriative water
rights systems can best be managed.' 0

I.
A.

THE ORIGINS

& EVOLUTION

OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE

Civil & Common Law Origins

As a legal concept, the public trust doctrine can be traced to both
Roman law and English common law. In Roman times, any person was
free to use rivers, ports, and the seashore to the high tide level as long as
such use did not interfere with other uses. This concept was first articulated in Justinian's maxim that "[b]y the law of nature ... the air, running water, the sea and consequently the shores of the sea" are common
to man.II This principle eventually found its way into French law and
has also been cited as a source of Louisiana civil law on property.1 2 Similar concepts were carried over into Spanish law, Mexican law, and ultimately California law. For instance, in a recent public trust case, the
California Supreme Court cited a thirteenth century Spanish law, Las
9. See infra note 92.
10. The author is not unaware of the chilly reception that the public trust doctrine has
received in some states, most notably in Colorado. In People v. Emmert, 198 Colo. 137,
141, 597 P. 2d 1025, 1027 (1979), that state's supreme court in an opinion, which has been
criticized as poorly reasoned, Comment, People v. Emmert: A Step Backward for Recreational
Water Use in Colorado, 52 U. COLO. L. REV. 247, 252-53, 270 (1981), and which provoked
two sharp dissents, refused to recognize the public trust doctrine as a basis for permitting
public recreational use of surface waters flowing over privately owned streambeds.
Furthermore, at a recent seminar on water law, one prominent member of Colorado's
water law bar was heard to say that "[w]e don't need a broad public trust doctrine in
Colorado." G. Hobbs, Presentation at a water law seminar, entitled "How the Rivers Run
(Denver,
... Colorado April 19, 1986). Hobbs argued that the Colorado Water Conservation Board's power to appropriate water for public trust purposes, such as fish and
wildlife enhancement and recreation, under existing state water law negated the need for
the exercise of the public trust doctrine in Colorado. Hobbs, however, failed to mention
that "public" water rights acquired by the Colorado Water Conservation Board are usually
so junior in their priority that they would not satisfy the public uses for which they were
appropriated during water-short years and are not adequately enforced. See Wilkinson,
Western Water Law in Transition, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 317, 334 n.73 (1985). Wilkinson also
notes that Colorado "has never made a call to protect its instream appropriations." Id.
(reporting information obtained from an interview with StevenJ. Shupe, Assistant Attorney General, State of Colorado, on December 5, 1984).
1I. Stevens, The Public Trust: A Sovereign's Ancient Prerogative Becomes the People's Environ-

mental Right, 14 U.C.D. L.

REV.

195, 196-97 (1980) (quoting from

THE INSTITuTES oFJUS-

2.1.1 (T. Cooper trans. & ed. 1841)).
12. In Gulf Oil Corp. v. State Mineral Bd., 317 So.2d 576, 581-82 n.2 (La. 1975), the
Louisiana Supreme Court cited several articles of the state civil code providing that such
things as air, running water, and the sea and its shores are not susceptible to ownership,
but are held in common for the use and benefit of all. These articles, according to the
court, arise from various sources, including Justinian's Institutes, Article 538 of the Code
Napoleon, and Toullier, Le droit civil francais, Tome Troisieme, Liv. II, tit. I, chap. III,
n.38-39 at 27 (1839).
TINIAN
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Siete Partidas, that had applied to California while it was a part of Mexico and thereafter under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. 1 3 Las Siete
Partidas states that the sea, seashores, rivers, harbors, and public high14
ways "belong to all persons in common."'
While the civil law public trust doctrine is based upon the concept
that ownership of such public areas is not possible, the common law
public trust doctrine is predicated upon sovereign ownership of such
shores and waterways.1 5 The Crown was considered to own these areas;
however, because the public enjoyed the right to use them, the Crown's
ownership could not be transferred or separated from the sovereign.16
This common law doctrine was expressly adopted in the United States at
the time of independence on the theory that the rights held by the
Crown accrued to the states, including sovereign ownership in trust of
such public areas. 17 Although the precedential weight of these civil and
common law rationales for the application of a public trust doctrine in
the United States has been seriously questioned,' 8 the doctrine's legal
history is largely irrelevant in light of the American courts' acceptance of
the principle that rights to use shores and streams should be held in
trust for the benefit of the public.' 9
13. City of Los Angeles v. Venice Peninsula Properties, 31 Cal. 3d 288, 298 n.8, 644
P.2d 792, 797 n.8, 182 Cal. Rptr. 599, 604 n.8 (1982) (quoting Law III of Title XXVIII of
Las Siete Partidas, CCH (Spain) (1931) pp. 820-21), rev'd sub nom. Summa Corp. v. California ex rel. State Lands Comm'n, 466 U.S. 198 (1984). In Summa, the United States Supreme
Court reversed the California Supreme Court's approval of California's assertion of public
trust rights in privately-held tidelands, which had originally been acquired under Mexican
grants and validated following California statehood by federal patents. It should be noted
that California did not acquire any ownership interests in Mexican and Spanish grant lands
upon its admission to the Union. The Court's reversal was based upon the distinction
between title acquired from the state and the species of title involved in the case, which
was predicated upon federal legislation and federal patent. According to the Court, California should have participated in the patent proceedings, which confirmed the Mexican
grant, if it desired to subject the grant lands to the public trust doctrine. 466 U.S. at 209.
The Supreme Court, however, did not reach the issue as to whether Mexican law gave
California a public trust easement over such lands. 466 U.S. at 201-02 n.l.
14. Venice Peninsula, 31 Cal. 3d 288, 298 n.8, 644 P.2d 792, 797 n.8, 182 Cal. Rptr.
599, 604 n.8. See also Knight v. United States Land Ass'n, 142 U.S. 161 (1891) (Hispanic
rights guaranteed by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo serve as an independent basis for
guaranteeing public rights to navigable waters); San Francisco v. LeRoy, 138 U.S. 656
(1891) (the United States acquired the duty to protect the tideland trust when it acquired
California from Mexico); Comment, California Beach Access: The Mexican Law and the Public
Trust, 2 EcOLOGY L.Q. 571 (1972).
15. See Stevens, supra note 11, at 197-98.
16. Id. (quoting 2 H. BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 39-40 (S.

Thorne trans. 1968)).
17. See infra notes 18-32 and accompanying text.
18. One commentator has asserted that both Justinian's declaration and Bracton's
writings were more likely their own "idealization[s]" in that they did not accurately reflect
the Roman and English practice. Professor Lazarus has argued that the Romans "did not
shy away from conveying private rights in coastal resources" and that English assertions of
public rights held by the Crown were merely means to increase the treasury. Lazarus,
supra note 7, at 634-35 & nn.12, 19. See also Deveney, Title, Jus Publicum, and the Public
Trust: An HistoricalAnalysis, 1 SEA GRANT L.J. 13 (1976); MacGrady, supra note 6, at 599.
19. "[W]hat is important is what was perceived to be the common law and what American courts chose to accept of it." Stevens, supra note 11, at 198; "The correct views on
Roman and English law are of no more than historical interest today." Dunning, The Sig-
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American Developments

Arnold v. Mundy, 20 in 1821, was the first American case to embrace
the public trust doctrine. 2 1 The New Jersey Supreme Court addressed
the issue of whether a conveyance of land that included oyster beds below the high water mark could operate to exclude the public. The court
held that states, as successors to the interests that the Crown possessed,
22
held rights to the beds of navigable waters in trust for their citizens.
Any grant purporting to divest the citizens of these rights was deemed
void. 23 The "navigable waters" requirement arose from the Roman and
common law test for distinguishing private from public waters. 2 4 As the
use of the public trust doctrine increased in the United States, the navigable waters requirement acquired meanings that varied with its application. For example, the requirement differs when determining federal
commerce clause jurisdiction as opposed to determining title to submerged lands.2 5 Today, the navigable waters requirement, as a limitation upon the scope of the public trust doctrine, is becoming less
26
important.
Subsequent to Arnold v. Mundy, the United States Supreme Court
recognized the public trust doctrine on several occasions during the
nineteenth century. In Martin v. Waddell,2 7 the Court held that Waddell's title to submerged lands in Raritan Bay, below the high water
mark, did not give him the exclusive right to take oysters from the bay.
The Court reasoned that if the surrender of lands from the Crown to the
Duke of York, the source of Waddell's title, had been intended to sever
from the sovereign the "right of dominion and ownership in the rivers,
bays, and arms of the sea, and the soils under them," such a conveyance
would have to be express and could not be implied. 2 8 The Court further held that upon the inception of state government in New Jersey,
nificance of California'sPublic Trust Easement For California Water Rights Law, 14 U.C.D. L. REV.

357, 363 (1980).
20.

6 N.J.L. 1 (1821).

21. Several colonies had previously, through ordinances, protected public access to
ponds and lakes for the purpose of fishing and hunting. See Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S.
371, 393 (1891); see also Smith, The Great Pond Ordinance-Collectivism in Northern New England, 30 B.U.L. REV. 178 (1950).

22. 6 N.J.L. at 78.
23. Id.
24. See Lazarus, supra note 7, at 513-15 (quoting Lamprey v. Metcalf, 53 N.W. 1139,
1143 (Minn. 1893)).
25. See Stevens, supra note 11, at 202-09; see, e.g., State v. Bunkowski, 88 Nev. 623, 503
P.2d 1231 (1972) (navigability used to determine title).
26. This is a result of the different nature of the public trust protection. For instance,
the navigability test serves the purpose of determining whether title to land under water or
tideland should be privately owned or owned by the state. This requirement becomes
ineffectual in determining the right to use the water in the stream, whether for public
recreation, irrigation, or environmental habitat maintenance. See Montana Coalition for
Stream Access, Inc. v. Hildreth, 684 P.2d 1088 (Mont. 1984); Montana Coalition for
Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163 (Mont. 1984).
27. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842).
28. Id. at 416. Included in the sphere of such rights was "the right of common fishery
for the common people." Id.
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29
these "prerogatives" of the Crown became vested in the state.
In 1892, the Supreme Court decided a case that has been described
as the American "lodestar" of the public trust doctrine: 30 Illinois Central
Railroad v. Illinois.3 1 The case involved a grant of a 1,000 acre tract of
tidal and submerged land on Chicago's waterfront to the railroad by the
Illinois legislature. The legislature later rescinded the grant, which
prompted a suit to determine the rights of the railroad company, the city
and the state.3 2 The Court upheld the legislative revocation, holding
that the conveyance would have been essentially an "abdication" of state
control over lands under navigable waters, inconsistent with the "trust
which requires the government of the state to preserve such water for
the use of the public." 3 3 The Court further held that such a trust cannot
be affected by a transfer or conveyance and, therefore,3 4the control of the
state for the purposes of the trust can never be lost.

Since Illinois Central, cases in numerous jurisdictions have relied
upon the public trust doctrine in addressing public interests in waters
and water-related lands. 3 5 Nowhere has the reliance upon and expansion of the doctrine been so extensive as in California.
Beginning with People v. California Fish Co. 36 in 1913, the California
Supreme Court has held that certain tidelands, sold to private parties
pursuant to various statutes, were subject to the public right of navigation and that the state reserved the right to make navigational improvements where necessary. 3 7 The court further held that, regardless of the
effect of a conveyance upon title, a transferee cannot "destroy, obstruct,
or injuriously affect the public right of navigation in the waters
thereof.''38 In City of Long Beach v. Mansell,30 the court reaffirmed its
holding in California Fish, noting that only "bare legal title" was conveyed when private ownership in tidal lands was created. 40 However,
the court did note that where the legislature determined that such lands
were no longer useful for the trust purposes, they could be conveyed
29. 41 U.S. at 416. See also Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845) (newly
admitted states had no less power to exert such a trust than the original states).
30. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective JudicialIntervention, 68
MiCH. L. REV. 471, 489 (1970).

31. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
32. Id. at 389-90.
33. Id. at 452-53.
34. Id. See also Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894).
35. See infra note 74.
36. 166 Cal. 576, 138 P. 79 (1913).
37. 166 Cal. at 596, 138 P. at 87. Distinctions have been made in California between
legislation that authorizes the conveyance of tideland for the purpose of furthering navigation or commerce ("special acts") and "general acts" that authorize conveyance of tideland not expressly for the purpose of navigation or commerce. The special acts have been
deemed to convey absolute title, while the general acts convey title subject to the public
trust. City of Berkeley v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 26 Cal. 3d 515, 606 P.2d
362, 162 Cal. Rptr. 327, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 840 (1980).
38. 166 Cal. at 587-88, 138 P. at 84.
39. 3 Cal. 3d 462, 476 P.2d 423, 91 Cal. Rptr. 23 (1970).
40. 3 Cal. 3d at 482, 476 P.2d at 437, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 37.
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into fee simple absolute private ownership. 4 1
The scope of the public trust doctrine in California underwent a
major expansion in Marks v. Whitney, 42 where the court extended the
doctrine's protections to environmental and recreational values. The
original defendant, Marks, had sought to fill and develop his tideland
property. Claiming that such action would cut off his littoral ownership,
Whitney had sought a declaration that Marks' property was subject to
both a public trust easement and certain private easements held by
Whitney. 43 In agreeing with Whitney, the court explained that the public trust right of navigation possessed by the public included the right to
fish, hunt, bathe, swim, and boat. 4 4 Quoting California Fish, the court
stated that the private right of a tideland owner extended only as far "as
the public interests will permit." '45 On this basis and on the finding of a
state interest in maintaining the tideland for the public, the court pre46
vented Marks from filling and developing his tidal property.
C.

The Mono Lake Decision and its Legal Progeny

National Audubon Society v. Superior Court,4 7 the seminal application of
the public trust doctrine in the area of water rights, represents the current high water mark of the California experience with the public trust
doctrine. The case involved a direct conflict between use of water for
maintaining wildlife habitat and appropriations for the City of Los Angeles. In 1940, Los Angeles acquired the right to appropriate waters from
streams tributary to Mono Lake. 4 8 The heaviest diversions occurred between 1970 and 1980 and resulted in a thirty percent reduction in the
lake's surface area and a forty foot decrease in water level. The reduction in the lake's water level had a debilitating effect on its wildlife populations. For instance, a large number of California gulls lost safe habitat
when an island became connected to the main shore, allowing coyotes to
reach the island. The lake's brine shrimp population, a major source of
food for waterfowl at the lake, was also threatened by the increased sa41. Id.
42. 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971).
43. 6 Cal. 3d at 256, 491 P.2d at 377, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 793.
44. 6 Cal. 3d at 259, 491 P.2d at 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 796. As was later noted by the
California Supreme Court, the traditional trust purposes of navigation, commerce and
fisheries did not limit the public trust doctrine. ,Vono Lake, 33 Cal. 3d at 435, 658 P.2d at
719, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
45. 6 Cal. 3d at 260, 491 P.2d at 379, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 795.
46. The court noted in passing that one of the most important public uses of the
tidelands trust
is the preservation of those lands in their natural state, so that they may serve as
ecological units for scientific study, as open space, and as environments which
provide food and habitat for birds and marine life, and which favorably affect the
scenery and climate of the area. It is not necessary to here define precisely all the
public uses which encumber tidelands.
6 Cal. 3d at 260-61, 491 P.2d at 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 796.
47. 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, cerl. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
48. The rights were acquired through California Water Resources Control Board permits. 33 Cal. 3d at 424, 658 P.2d at 711, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 348.
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linity of the lake water due to Los Angeles' depletions. 49
In 1979, several plaintiffs, including the National Audubon Society,
brought suit to enjoin Los Angeles from further diversions from the
lake's tributaries, asserting that the public trust doctrine protected the
lake. 50 In its decision, the California Supreme Court reviewed both the
California public trust doctrine and the California system of water
rights. The court stated that "[t]he objective of the public trust has
evolved in tandem with the changing public perception of the values and
uses of waterways." 5 1 Against this background the court noted that,
although Mono Lake was a navigable waterway, the issue was a new one:
the extent to which the public trust doctrine applies to nonnavigable
tributaries to navigable waterways. After reviewing several California
cases on the issue of navigability, the court concluded that the doctrine
would protect navigable waters from "harm caused by diversion of non'52
navigable tributaries."
After discussing the evolution of the public trust doctrine, the court
stated that the cases demonstrate the power of the state, as trustee, to
revoke rights granted by the state or to apply the trust to lands that had
previously been considered free of the trust.53 The court then noted
that the California dual water rights system, encompassing both appropriative and riparian rights, had existed independent of the public trust
doctrine. 5 4 After rejecting both the Audubon Society's argument that
the public trust doctrine is antecedent to, and thus limits, all appropriative rights, and Los Angeles' argument that the doctrine has been" 'subsumed' into the appropriative" system, the court came to three
conclusions. 55 First, the principle that the state as sovereign retains supervisory control over waters, tidelands, and shores prevents any party
from "acquiring a vested right to appropriate water in a manner harmful
to the interests protected by the public trust."'56 Second, the court
stated that the legislature, in some "necessary" situations, has the power
to allow diversions that may "unavoidably harm" trust uses at the source
of the stream. 57 Finally, the court held that "[t]he state has an affirmative duty to take the public trust into account in the planning and allocation of water resources, and to protect public trust uses whenever
49. 33 Cal. 3d at 430-31, 658 P.2d at 715-16, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 352.
50. The case was transferred to a federal district court, which requested that the state
courts rule on the relationship between the public trust doctrine and the appropriative
water rights system and the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies. The Superior
Court of Alpine County held that the public trust doctrine did not constitute a basis for
challenging the diversions and entered summary judgment for the defendant, the Department of Water and Power of the City of Los Angeles. 33 Cal. 3d at 431-33, 658 P. 2d at
716-18, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 353-54.
51. 33 Cal. 3d at 434, 658 P.2d at 719, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
52. 33 Cal. 3d at 437, 658 P.2d at 721, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 357.
53. 33 Cal. 3d at 440, 658 P.2d at 723, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
54. The court also noted, however, that by statute, beneficial use in California includes the use of water for recreation and preservation and enhancement of fish and wildlife resources. 33 Cal. 3d at 444, 658 P.2d at 726, 189 Cal Rptr. at 363.
55. 33 Cal. 3d at 445-46, 658 P.2d at 727-28, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 363-64.
56. 33 Cal. 3d at 445, 658 P.2d at 727, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 364.
57. 33 Cal. 3d at 446, 658 P.2d at 727, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 364.
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feasible." '5 8 This final conclusion was based on the possibility that, in
the absence of the consideration of public trust values, an appropriative
system could result in unjustified harm to public trust interests. 59 Because neither the legislature, the Water Resources Control Board, nor
the lower courts had determined the "impact of diversion on the Mono
Lake environment" by balancing the water needs of Los Angeles against
the public interest in Mono Lake, the case was reversed and
60
remanded.
The Mono Lake decision has elicited a significant amount of legal
commentary about its potential impact upon the public trust doctrine. 6 '
The California cases, however, are not the only important public trust
decisions in recent years. Several other jurisdictions have applied the
public trust doctrine, some relying not only upon the common law theory of the public trust, but also upon statutory and constitutional provisions. For instance, in United Plainsmen Association v. North Dakota State
Water Conservation Commission,62 the North Dakota Supreme Court held
that, prior to issuing future water permits for coal-fired power plants,
the state engineer would be required to complete long and short term
planning surveys, including weighing the potential effect of such permits
on water supply and future water needs. 63 This holding was based upon
the common law public trust doctrine, a state water policy statute providing that the public health, safety and welfare depends upon the protection and "wise utilization of all the water and related land resources,
and another statutory section declaring that "all waters 'belong to the
public' for the purpose of beneficial use." 64
The Supreme Court of Hawaii, in Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 65 examined
Hawaii's historical use of water in light of recent constitutional provisions in answering public trust questions certified by the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals. According to the Hawaii court, at the time private
58. 33 Cal. 3d at 446, 658 P.2d at 728, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 364-65. The court also stated
that
[o]nce the state has approved an appropriation, the public trust imposes a duty of
continuing supervision over the taking and use of the appropriated water. In exercising its sovereign power to allocate water resources in the public interest, the
state is not confined by past allocation decisions which may be incorrect in light
of current knowledge or inconsistent with current needs.
33 Cal. 3d at 447, 658 P.2d at 728, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 365.
59. 33 Cal. 3d at 447, 658 P.2d at 728, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 365.
60. 33 Cal. 3d at 447, 658 P.2d at 728-29, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 365.
61. Dunning, The Mono Lake Decision. Protecting a Common Heritage Resourcefrom Death by
Diversion, 13 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.)10144 (1983); Note, National Audubon Soci-

ety v. Superior Court: The Expanding Public Trust Doctrine, 14 ENVTL. L. 617 (1984); Note,
National Audubon Society v. Superior Court: A Watershed Case Integrating the Public Trust
Doctrine and California Water Law, 5 J.ENERGY L. & POL'Y 121 (1983); Note, The Shadow of the
Mono Lake Decision in Montana, 6 PuB. LAND L. REV. 203 (1985); Note, Reconciling the Public
Trust Doctrineand Appropriative Water Rights inCalifornia, 24 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 219 (1984);
Comment, Public Trust Doctrine Protects Navigable Waters From Harm Caused by Diversion of Nonnavigable Tributaries: National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, II PEPPERDINE L. REV.
289 (1983).
62. 247 N.W.2d 457 (N.D. 1976).
63. Id. at 461-62.
64. Id. at 459, 461 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 61-01-01, -26 (1960)).
65. 65 Hawaii 641, 658 P.2d 287 (1982).
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ownership was introduced to the islands, the Hawaiian king reserved
66
ownership of all surface waters, holding them in trust for the public.
Further, the court noted that the public trust doctrine was codified in
1978 by a constitutional provision stating that "[a]ll public resources are
'6 7
held in trust by the State for the benefit of the people."
Public trust rights in recreational uses have also been recognized
and upheld. For instance, in Mathews v. Bay Head Improvement Association,6 8 the New Jersey Supreme Court extended the public trust doctrine
to permit the public use of non-public dry sand beach areas for bathing,
swimming, and other shore activities. 6 9 This holding was based, in part,
upon the court's conclusion that the the public's right to swim and bathe
below the high water mark might "depend upon a right to pass across
the upland [privately owned] beach." ' 70 Similarly, the recreational use
by the public of surface waters flowing over privately-owned streambeds
71
has been held to be a protected right under the public trust doctrine.
72
Citing the Montana Constitution,
the Montana Supreme Court has
twice held that "any surface waters that are capable of recreational use
may be so used by the public without regard to streambed ownership or
navigability for nonrecreational purposes."' 73 Furthermore, the court
stated that the issue of navigability was "immatcrial to determining the
question of navigability for recreational purposes under Montana state
74
law."
66. 658 P.2d at 310.
67. 658 P.2d at 311 n.34 (quoting HAWAII CONST. art. XI, § 1 (1978). Butsee Robinson
v. Ariyoshi, 753 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1985) (where parties' water rights had previously been
determined by territorial court, a subsequent state judicial decision adopting common law
of riparian rights to the detriment of the parties' rights would require condemnation proceeding), petition for cert. filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3170 (U.S. Sept. 10, 1985) (No. 85-406).
68. 95 N.J. 306, 471 A.2d 355, cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 93 (1984).
69. 471 A.2d at 363.
70. Id. at 364.
71. Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Hildreth, 684 P.2d 1088, 1093
(1984); Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 171 (1984).
72. MoNr. CONST. art. IX (1972).
73. Hildreth, 684 P.2d at 1093; Curran, 682 P.2d at 171. But see Bott v. Comm'n of
Natural Resources, 415 Mich. 45, 327 N.W.2d 838, 846 (1982) ("The public trust doctrine
applies only to navigable waters and not to all waters of the state;" recreational boating is
not determinative of navigability) (emphasis in original).
74. Id. at 171. For other recent cases upholding or recognizing the public trust doctrine with regard to water or water-related lands, see Kootenai Envtl. Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 105 Idaho 622, 671 P.2d 1085 (1983) (public trust doctrine does
not prohibit private dock from being built in public lake); People ex rel. Scott v. Chicago
Park Dist., 66 Ill.2d 65, 360 N.E.2d 773 (1976) (conveyance of submerged Lake Michigan
property by legislature violated public trust); James v. Inhabitants of Town of West Bath,
437 A.2d 863, 865 (Me. 1981) ("Maine's tidal lands and resources, including marine
worms, are held by the State in public trust for the people of the State."); Opinion of the
Justices, 437 A.2d 597 (Me. 1981) (standard of reasonableness is used in determining
whether legislature's dealings with public trust are valid); Opinion of the Justices, 383
Mass. 895, 424 N.E.2d 1092 (1981) (state's vestigial interest could be eradicated after
hearing); Superior Pub. Rights, Inc. v. State Dep't of Natural Resources, 80 Mich. App. 72,
263 N.W.2d 290 (1977) (Department of Natural Resources not obligated to find that every
possible use of public trust land is in itself beneficial); State v. Forehand, 67 N.C. App.
148, 312 S.E.2d 247 (1984) (grant of submerged land for wharf purposes does not convey
title); Thomas v. Sanders, 65 Ohio App. 2d 5, 413 N.E.2d 1224 (1979) (land reclaimed
from Lake Erie is subject to public trust); Morse v. Oregon Div. of State Lands, 285 Or.
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As the preceding historical review evidences, the public trust doctrine has undergone substantial development between its birthplace
along the Mediterranean and its modern applications in the American
West. The doctrine's pervasive presence in the governmental management of water resources makes it imperative that means for integrating
the doctrine into modem legal systems of water allocation and management be identified, investigated and debated. The following proposal to
convert public trust use requirements for water into a species of reserved rights represents a considered effort to initiate this much-needed
process of resolution and integration.
II.
A.

THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE SHOULD BE VIEWED AS EFFECTING
AN IMPLIED RESERVATION OF WATER FOR PUBLIC TRUST USES

Preface

The use of analogies as aids in legal analysis is an exercise fraught
with peril. Often, they mislead because of the lack of precision with
which they are used and seldom do authors state the limits of their analogies. Yet, for all their pitfalls, analogies can promote the understanding of obscure or complex concepts, especially when those concepts are
unfamiliar or previously unknown, by relating them to well-established
and well-understood concepts. Thus, despite the often questionable
usefulness of analogies in legal analysis, the analogy of public trust doctrine water rights in inland waters to federal reserved water rights in
such waters is offered as a means of reducing the destablizing effect that
the renaissance of the public trust doctrine has had on the security of
existing water rights 7 5 and to explain why states are not constitutionally
required to compensate water rights holders who may be adversely af76
fected by the exercise of public trust rights.
197, 590 P.2d 709 (1979) (Director of Division of State Lands must weigh the public need
for filling in estuary against the public interest in navigation, fishing, and recreation). For
cases dealing with the public trust doctrine as it applies to non-water-related areas, see
State v. Zimring, 58 Hawaii 106, 566 P.2d 725 (1977); Wade v. Kramer, 121 Ill. App. 3d
377, 459 N.E.2d 1025 (1984); Save Ourselves, Inc. v. Louisiana Envtl. Control Comm'n,
452 So.2d 1152 (La. 1984). See also Summa Corp. v. California ex rel. State Lands Comm'n,
466 U.S. 198 (1984) (reversing California's assertion of public trust rights over certain
tidelands; in order for state public trust interests to be recognized in federal confirmation
(through special legislation) of Mexican land grant, state would have had to assert those
rights at the patent confirmation hearing).
75. See Dunning, The Public Trust Doctrineand Western Water Law: Discord or Harmony?. 30
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 17-1, 17-25. (noting the tension between the public trust doctrine and appropriative water rights). Professor Dunning notes that "[aill existing water
rights which adversely impact public trust values are now subject to reconsideration and
modification by either an agency or a court in the name of the public trust." Id. at 17-42.
See also WESTERN WATER 3 (March/April 1983) (wherein the General Counsel of the Association of California Water Agencies is quoted as saying: "You wonder if any of the water
rights in the state are that secure any more.").
76. The literature on the public trust doctrine reflects a vigorous debate on the question of whether compensation ought be paid to water right holders whose rights are infringed by the state's exercise of the public trust doctrine. Compare Smith, The Public Trust
Doctrineand NationalAudubon Society v. Superior Court: A Hard Case Makes Bad Law or the Consistent Evolution of California Water Rights, 6 GLENDALE L. REV. 201, 203 (1984) ("As applied by
the [Mono Lake] court the public trust doctrine does not frustrate expectations of appropri-
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The Public Trust Doctrine is an Integral Element of the Sovereign Powers
of a State

That the public trust doctrine is an incident of sovereignty is evident from its origins and evolution. 7 7 As such, it is always available to
the judiciary of a state as a basis for scrutinizing the effects of administrative and legislative decisions to use or allocate public trust resources.
Although the public trust doctrine has been characterized as merely a
variant of a state's police power, 7 8 the two are only indirectly connected.
While the police power of the state is usually exercised by the state in an
79
affirmative manner to further the public health, safety, and welfare,
the public trust doctrine is essentially a constraint on state actions, 80
even those state actions that arguably further the public health, safety,
and welfare.
While admittedly some affirmative action is necessary to invoke the
doctrine, 8 1 the doctrine is essentially a dormant sovereign power8 2 exercised, as is the dormant commerce clause power,8 3 by the judicial arm of
the sovereign. Moreover, the public trust doctrine and the police power
may be distinguished by the public trust doctrine's dependence upon
the state's retention of an ownership interest in the resource.8 4 No such

dependence exists for the police power as it can regulate public as well
as wholly private resources in furtherance of the public interest.8 5 Thus,
ative water right holders because the power to use an appropriative right has always been
subject to the discretion of the State.") with Comment, The Fifth Amendment as a Limitation on
the Public Trust Doctrine in Water Law, 15 PAc. L.J. 1291, 1319 (1984) ("The preexisting title
theory of the public trust doctrine asserts retroactively that the water rights holder never
possessed the property, therefore, compensation is not required when the state acts to
protect public trust uses that conflict with the water rights. This contravenes the mandate
of the fifth amendment." (footnote omitted)).
77. See supra notes 11-74 and accompanying text.
78. See Sax, supra note 30, at 484-85.
79. State ex rel. Carpenter v. City of St. Louis, 318 Mo. 870, 897, 2 S.W.2d 713, 722
(1928); Exparte Tindall, 102 Okla. 192, 229 P. 125, 130 (1924).
80. Sax, supra note 30, at 473, 474, 477; Comment, The Public Trust Doctrine in Maines
Submerged Lands: Public Rights, State Obligation and the Role of the Courts, 37 MAINE L. REV. 105,
118 (1985). Although it may be objected that the public trust doctrine cannot be both an
incident of sovereignty and a restraint on the state, this objection can be disposed of by the
following clarification in terms: the sovereign in the American political system is the people and the public trust doctrine is an incident of that sovereignty. Thus, the duly constituted representative of the people - the state - may be constrained in its exercise of the
powers that the sovereign has entrusted to it by the sovereign's resort to the public trust
doctrine. Therefore, when I speak of the state as sovereign I do so as shorthand for
describing the state's role as the people's vehicle for their sovereignty.
81. In the past, most public trust actions have been brought by private parties. Mono
Lake, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346 (1983); United Plainsmen Ass'n, 247
N.W.2d 457 (N.D. 1976). However, public bodies occasionally have relied upon the doctrine as a basis for some action. See, e.g., Illinois Central, 146 U.S. 387 (1892) (legislative
repeal of a grant of submerged lands upheld on the basis of the public trust doctrine).
82. Contra Walston, The Public Trust Doctrine in the Water Rights Context: The Wrong Environmental Remedy, 22 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 63, 68 (1982) (noting that "[tihe public trust
[doctrine] . . . is an active common law principle which, without more, protects the public
interest in navigable waters.").
83. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &J. YOUNG, CONSTIUTrIONAL LAW 266-67 (2d ed. 1983).
84. See H. ALTHAUS, PUBLIC TRUST RIGHTS 85 (1978).
85. Id.
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the police power can be used to regulate the use of a public trust resource where the legislature has extinguished its sovereign ownership
interests in that resource and has terminated the application of the public trust doctrine to that resource. Furthermore, where the state has retained a sovereign ownership interest in a particular resource, a
conversion from a wholly private use to a wholly public use effected
through the exercise of the police power would constitute a taking
under the fifth amendment requiring the payment of just compensation.8 6 However, if the conversion was effected under the public trust
doctrine no taking would occur, except in those instances where the private property interest predated statehood, because of the pre-existing
8 7
title of the state in the public trust resource.
The interrelationship between the public trust doctrine and the
state's sovereign ownership of a particular trust resource, such as inland
waters, is of central importance to the analogy that may be drawn between the reserved water rights of the federal government and the public trust water rights of a state. Although it may be objected that federal
reserved water rights are inextricably linked to the federal government's
ownership of land as a proprietor,8 8 this objection is bottomed on a
false premise: that the federal government can divorce itself of its sovereignty and own land in a strictly proprietorial sense. This unsound
proposition has been expressly rejected by the Supreme Court in Kleppe
v. New Mexico, 89 where the Court held that "Congress exercises the powers both of a proprietor and of a legislature over the public domain." 90
Having disposed of the purported sovereign/proprietary distinction
in government land ownership, it is thus clear that the true foundation
for federal reserved water rights is the sovereign ownership interest that
the United States holds to the waters reserved: an ownership interest
86. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
87. Title to state public trust ownership interests, which are a species of public property rights, "springs from the ownership of land conferred on the State of California upon
admission to the United States." Dunning, Public Trust Easement, supra note 19, at 364.
Note, Environmental Law--Expanding the Definition of Public Trust Uses, 51 N.C.L. REV. 316,
324 (1972).
At least one state supreme court has held that a state is not constitutionally required
to provide compensation for the infringement of a private property right by the initiation
of a public trust use on the theory that the state had impliedly reserved the right to use the
property for public trust uses. Sage v. Mayor of New York, 154 N.Y. 61, 79-80, 47 N.E.
1096, 1101 (1897).
88. "The reserved water so withheld is the property of the United States, and the
government, exercising its proprietary powers and rights, can put it to use without compliance with state law." F. TRELFASE, FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS IN WATER LAw-LEGAL
STUDY No. 5, at 114 (1972).
89. 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
90. Id. at 540. The repudiation of the proposition was foreshadowed almost two decades ago by a commentator who asserted "that all activities of the federal government in
the land ownership field are sovereign, and nothing else." Sewell, The Government as a
Proprietor of Land, 35 TENN. L. REV. 287, 288 (1968) (footnote omitted). This view was
echoed in a student note, in which it was argued that "the judicially created dichotomy
between governmental obligations and proprietary rights of the state as landlord or licensor is based on a mistaken premise that government can divorce itself from its sovereign
responsibilities." Note, The Government as Proprietor-The Private Use of Public Property, 55 VA.
L. REV. 1079, 1101 (1969).
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good against all other public and private parties. This sovereign ownership interest is also the basis of state public trust doctrine water rights;
however, a state's sovereign ownership interest is always subordinate to
the federal government's sovereign ownership interest. Although it may
be argued that federal reserved water rights differ from public trust doctrine water rights because the former are integrated into the prior appropriation system by way of stream-wide adjudications that assign to
federal reserved rights a priority date and a quantity, 9 1 whereas public
trust doctrine water rights to date have not been similarly integrated
into state water allocation systems, 92 there is no good reason to believe
that public trust doctrine water rights could not be similarly treated.
Certainly a state could bring claims in a stream-wide adjudication for
that water necessary to protect and preserve public trust uses of the
stream at issue. 93 If successful, such claims would probably result in
public trust uses having the benefit of a relatively senior right because
the claimed priority would reflect the date the public trust obligation
arose in the state, which would be the date of that state's admission into
94
the Union.
C.

Public Trust Interests in State Waters Have Been Recognized in State
Constitutions and Water Codes

To describe the numerous written histories of the origins and development of the public trust doctrine as varied and divergent is, perhaps,
an understatement. Because of the antiquity of the events, circumstances, and documents involved, it is hardly surprising that commentators on the public trust doctrine have widely divergent views on the
degree to which the modern public trust doctrine has a sound grounding in ancient and medieval jurisprudence. Yet, while this academic
jousting can certainly promote caution in the use of historical analogies
relating to the public trust doctrine, there is evidence that the American
variant of the English common law public trust doctrine was accepted,
without trepidation over the exact origins or development of the doctrine, throughout the West as an indispensible and salutary legal principle. The fundamental premise of the doctrine-that water is a common
91.

See United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978).

92. This lack of intergration was expressly noted by the California Supreme Court in
Mono Lake:
This case brings together for the first time two systems of legal thought: the appropriative water rights system ... and the public trust doctrine ....
Ever
since we first recognized that the public trust protects environmental and recreational values, the two systems of legal thought have been on a collision course.
Mono Lake, 33 Cal. 3d at 426, 658 P.2d at 712, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 349 (citations omitted).
93. But see supra note * (where it is suggested that such integration may be nearing).
It would be preferable in the first instance to have state reserved rights claims brought

by the state, rather than by private parties. The reasons supporting such a preference are
the promotion of state-wide water planning by the state water resources agency for public
trust uses and the desirability of having a single entity litigating for state reserved rights,
instead of a variety of private parties, each of which may have sharply disparate private
agendas.
94. Comment, The Public Trust Doctrine and California Water Law: NationalAudubon Society

v. Department of Water and Power, 33

HASTINGS

L.J. 653, 661 (1982).
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resource belonging to the people-is evidenced in the constitutions of
four western states. 9 5 These reservations of a sovereign ownership interest in the waters of the western states reflected a popularly felt need
for governmental safeguards against the socially undesirable consequences that may have followed from the private monopolization of
water supplies. 96 The judiciary of at least one western state has explicitly recognized that the incorporation of the public trust doctrine into
the fundamental law of a state creates an affirmative obligation on the
part of a state to safeguard public trust uses in the management, alloca97
tion, and development of public trust resources.
The importance of public trust uses in western water resources is
also evidenced by the numerous statutory provisions confirming state
ownership interests in water resources. Ten western states have statutory provisions declaring their waters to be the property of the state, 98
the people of the state,9 9 or the public. 10 0 The high courts of some of
these states have recognized the public trust doctrine as a necessary corollary to state ownership. 10 ' Thus, the general rule is that the public
trust doctrine is an inherent and fundamental element of the foundation
10 2
of western water law: the state ownership of water resources.
III.

PRE-EXISTING STATE OWNERSHIP INTERESTS, FEDERAL RESERVED
RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF No COMPENSATION FOR THE
INFRINGEMENT OF JUNIOR WATER RIGHTS

It is undisputed that the public trust doctrine, as an incident of sov95. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5 ("The water of every natural stream ...

is hereby

declared to be the property of the public, and the same is dedicated to the use of the
people of the state, subject to appropriation as hereinafter provided."); MONT. CONST. art.
IX, § 3 ("All surface, underground, flood, and atmospheric waters within the boundaries
of the state are the property of the state for the use of its people ....
"); N.M. CONST. art.
XVI, § 2 ("The unappropriated water of every natural stream . . . is hereby declared to
belong to the public and to be subject to appropriation . . ."); Wvo. CONST. art. 8, § I
("The water of all natural streams, springs, lakes or other collections of still water, within
the boundaries of the state, are hereby declared to be the property of the state.").
96. See, e.g., PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF COLORADO 44

(1907), where a convention delegate proposed that "[i]t shall be the duty of the legislature
from time to time to pass such laws as may be necessary to secure a just and equitable
distribution of the water . . . [and thereby] promote the greatest good to the greatest
number of the citizens ....
"
97. United Plainsmen Ass'n, 247 N.W.2d at 462. Dunning, The Public Trust Doctrine and
Western Water Law: Discord or Harmony?, 30 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 17-1, 17-33 ("The
North Dakota court . . . treated state constitutional and statutory provisions on state and
public ownership of water as expressions of the trust.").
98. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-101

(1977); TEX. WATER CODE ANN.

§ 5.021 (Vernon

1972).
99. CAL. WATER CODE § 102 (West 1971).
100. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-131(A) (Supp. 1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-202
(1984); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 533.025 (1986); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 46-1-3 (1983); OR.
REV. STAT. § 537.110 (1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-1-1 (1980); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.

§ 90.03.010 (Bancroft-Whitney & West 1962).
101. See, e.g., State exrel. Bliss v. Dority, 55 N.M. 12, 225 P.2d 1007, 1010 (1950), appeal
dismissed, 341 U.S. 924 (1951); Motd v. Boyd, 116 Tex. 82, 286 S.W. 458, 468 (1926).
102. Contra Trelease, Government Ownership and Trusteeship of Water, 45 CAL. L. REV. 638,
643-45 (arguing that the real basis of a state's control over its water resources is its police
power).
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ereignty, arises upon the formation of a sovereign government. It follows then that the doctrine becomes binding as of the date of a state's
admission into the Union. Concurrently, a state also obtains the complete ownership of the inland waters within its boundaries, subject to
superior federal ownership interests, l0 3 private ownership interests obtained directly or indirectly from the federal government, 10 4 and other
ownership interests withheld by the federal government pursuant to
treaties.' 0 5 It is from this posture of ownership that the western states
have allocated rights to use water resources to private parties.
That a water right is a usufructuary right is a fundamental legal
maxim in western water law. Since the genesis of the prior appropriation doctrine, it has been universally recognized that the right to take
and use water from a natural stream "is subject to the paramount right
of the public to use or dedicate water for state purposes."' 1 6 The fundamental character of a water right as merely a usufructuary right, rather
than as a possessory right, is perhaps best highlighted by "the fact that
the states, in granting appropriative water rights, issue only 'permits' or
'licenses' rather than 'deeds' or other documents which evidence 'own10 7
ership' of property."'
Although some commentators have pointed to the fifth amendment's prohibition against the taking of private property without the
payment ofjust compensation 10 8 as a potential "limitation on the public
trust doctrine,"' 0 9 these arguments are dependent on the acceptance of
103. This category would include federal and Indian reserved rights as well as potential
federal non-reserved rights.
104. This category would include ownership interests received by private parties directly from Congress or through the auspices of a territorial government, such as was the
case in Aroyoshi, 65 Hawaii 641, 658 P.2d 287 (1982).
105. This category would include the lagoon tidelands involved in Summa, which were
not passed to California by the federal government upon its admission into the Union,
because under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo the federal government did not acquire
any fee interest in those lands. The private owners of those lands, who had acquired them
from the Mexican Government, subsequently had their title confirmed through federal
patent proceedings. City of Los Angeles v. Venice Peninsula Properties, 31 Cal. 3d 288,
291, 644 P.2d 792, 794, 182 Cal. Rptr. 599, 601 (1982), rev'd sub noma.Summa Corp. v.
California ex rel. State Lands Comm'n, 466 U.S. 198 (1984). Due to the complete absence
of any state ownership interests in the lagoon tidelands and the acquisition of those lands
by their original private owners prior to California statehood, the Supreme Court was correct in holding that the public trust doctrine could not be imposed upon the lagoon tidelands in the complete absence of notice to the tideland owners of California's claim.
Summa, 466 U.S. at 209. See also infra notes 111-13 and accompanying text (sufficient notice given to appropriators of state waters of the public character of inland water
resources).
106. Walston, supra note 82, at 83.
107. Id.
108. U.S. CONST. amend V. The takings clause of the fifth amendment has been held to
be applicable to the states under the fourteenth amendment. Chicago B. & Q R. Co. v.
Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897).
109. See, e.g., Comment, The Fifth Amendment as a Limitation on the Public Trust Doctrine in
Water Law, 15 PAc. L.J. 1291 (1984); R. Walston, The Public Trust Doctrine and the Taking Clause: A Collision Course (February 13, 1986) (outline of presentation given to an
ABA Section of Natural Resources water law seminar held in San Diego on February 1314, 1986) (on file with the author).
In the Mono Lake litigation, Los Angeles, however, may be unable to claim that its
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the premise that recipients of water rights from the states had no notice
of the retention of sovereign ownership interests by the states and the
accompanying public trust obligations." 0 That such a premise is untenable is evident when one recalls that the usufructuary principle of western water law is a universally recognized "expression of the state's trust
.responsibilities to its citizens in the water rights context.""' 1 Moreover,
given the constitutional and statutory declarations of state or public
ownership of water resources upon which western water law was
founded,' 12 the "no notice" premise of the takings argument is, at best,
a strained appeal to equity for it also ignores the numerous judicial affirmations of the public nature of state inland water resources"13 and the
common understanding, prevalent throughout the West, that the inland
water resources of a state "belong" to all the people of the state." l 4
Thus, the acquisition of water rights by a state under the public trust
doctrine would, like federal reserved rights acquired by the federal government, not require the payment ofjust compensation for the infringement of privately-held water rights.
CONCLUSION

The proposition that a new species of public water rights ought to
be created at a time when state water law systems in the West are just
now painstakingly incorporating federal reserved rights into the fabric
of the present weave of ownership rights in water 1 15 will undoubtedly
strike many water rights holders, water lawyers, and legal scholars as
undesirable, unwise, or worse. However, the public trust doctrine
seems destined to remain a formidable influence on water law in the
West because it serves the socially desirable function of permitting assessments and reassessments of past, present, and future legislative and
administrative decisions affecting the management, allocation and development of a state's water resources. 1 16 Thus, the security of existing
water rights, which already have been threatened by the potential deproperty has been unconstitutionally taken because the Supreme Court has held that municipalities may not bring such claims against an unwilling state. Trenton v. New Jersey,

262 U.S. 182 (1923).
110. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 108, at 1306-07.
111. Walston, supra note 82, at 85. Walston also asserts that "[tihe usufructuary principle is both an outgrowth and an extension of the public trust doctrine." Id.
112. Supra notes 95, 98-100 and accompanying text.
113. Supra note 101 and accompanying text.
114. "[Wlater in the western states, and particularly in California, is owned by all the
people in the state." Remarks of Ron Robie, Director of the California Department of
Water Resources, in THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN NATURAL RESOURCES LAW AND MANAGEMENT: CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 132 (H. Dunning ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS]. It has also been argued that "[t]he usufructuary principle
provides a warning to holders of water rights that their rights are subject to modification as
necessary to achieve more important social goals." Walston, supra note 82, at 88.
115. See, e.g., United States v. City and County of Denver, 656 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1982).

116. See Alono Lake, 33 Cal. 3d at 445-47, 658 P.2d at 728, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 364-65; see
also CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 114, at 134, where Ron Robie argues that "[w]e

need the flexibility [provided by the public trust doctrine] to change things we have done
wrong in the past."
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mand for water necessary to satisfy federal and Indian reserved
rights,1 7 will probably be further undermined. This uncertainty could,
however, be diminished if claims for the water necessary to preserve and
protect public trust uses were pressed by the states in stream-wide adjudications. 1 18 By quantifying the water requirements of public trust uses
in such a manner, water rights holders would gain important information about the relative security of their water rights. Thus, they could
plan for and effect whatever measures, such as the acquisition of higher
priority rights or the augmentation of supply through water conservation, were necessary to make available enough water to satisfy the requirements of public trust uses, while maintaining their current uses.
There is no doubt that such changes in water allocation will cause some
measure of hardship during this renaissance of public ownership interests in water resources. Yet, if a state reserved rights theory is chosen as
the means for incorporating society's requirements for water necessary
for public trust uses into the prevailing system of water allocation, the

security of existing water rights can be enhanced with a modicum of
time and expense by treating public trust doctrine water rights as a state
version of federal reserved water rights.1 19
While the doctrine of federal reserved water rights offers a model,
albeit a less than perfect one, for incorporating the water requirements
of public trust uses into existing water rights systems, it must be
remembered that state reserved rights for public trust uses should be
subject to reassessment and contraction or expansion in light of changing circumstances, such as changes in environmental conditions or society's demand for a particular public trust use. This malleability, which
principally distinguishes the suggested state reserved water right from
its federal counterpart, derives from its basis in the American variant of
the common law public trust doctrine.120 That being the case, state re117. A recently issued report of the Western Governors' Association concludes that
Indian water rights in the West may be as high as forty-five million acre-feet a year, an
amount that is more than three times the Colorado River's annual flow. WESTERN GOVERNORS' ASSOCIATION, INDIAN WATER RIGHTS IN THE WEST 93 (1984).
118. The state's role in applying for public trust water rights in stream-wide adjudications would be analogous to the efforts of the federal government to obtain water rights
for federal reservations in such adjudication. A major distinguishing feature, however,
between the obligations of these two sovereigns is that while it seems probable that a state
could be ordered to adjudicate claims for public trust water rights, Mono Lake, 33 Cal. 3d at
446, 658 P.2d at 728, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 364; see Sax, supra note 30, at 482-89, it appears that
the federal government cannot be ordered to press potential claims to federal reserved
water rights, at least not on a public trust doctrine theory. Sierra Club v. Block, 622 F.
Supp. 842, 866 (D. Colo. 1985). However, such a duty may exist under various environmental protection statutes. See id. at 865.
Of course, in some instances such claims would already be present in the form of
agency applications for water necessary to comply with statutory and administrative directives on minimum instream flows, fish and wildlife enhancement and water-related recreational uses.
119. There undoubtedly would be litigation over precise character of public trust uses
and the amount of water sufficient to facilitate them. In this respect, the past and present
litigation over the same issues under the doctrine of federal reserved rights can be viewed
as having blazed a path and set out some meaningful guidelines.
120. Note, Lyon and Fogerty: Unprecedented Extensions of the Public Trust, 70 CAL. L. REV.
1138, 1141 (1982) (noting that "[e]arly cases brought the public trust doctrine to this
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served rights should thus reflect the growth or diminution of the doctrine, which as a common law doctrine has as "its true glory, that it is
flexible, and constantly expanding with the exigencies of society."'21
Peter A. Fahmny*

country, but it has been adapted to American circumstances"); Note, The Public Trust Doctine: , ,Vew Approach to Environmental Protection, 81 W. VA. L. REV. 455, 458 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Note, 4 New Approach! (noting that "Iwihile the American courts recognized
the basic premises of the trust concept, certain modifications were made to reflect the
social, economic and geographical conditions which existed at the time.").
121. THE MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS oFJosEPH STORY 526 (W. Story ed. Boston 1852);
Accord District of Columbia v. Air Florida, Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (noting that the public trust doctrine contains "a dynamic common-law principle flexible
enough to meet diverse modern needs."); Neptune City v. Avon-By-The-Sea, 61 N.J. 296,
309. 294 A.2d 47, 54 (1972) (holding that "Ithe public trust doctrine, like all common law
principles, should not be considered fixed or static, but should be molded and extended to
meet changing conditions and needs of the public it was created to benefit."); Note,.4 New
Approach, supra note 120, at 459 (noting that "[als a common law theory, the public trust
doctrine has the inherent qualities of flexibilty and adaptability.").
** The author gratefully acknowledges the invaluable assistance ofJames R. Ghiselli
in researching and writing section 1 of this note.

CHEMICAL MANUFACTURERS

ASSOCIA TION." THE

FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT FACTOR VARIANCE-A
NECESSARY EVIL

INTRODUCTION

In Chemical Manufacturers Association v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., I the Supreme Court held that fundamentally different factor variances may be granted for toxic pollutants. This decision allows the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to continue to grant variances
from categorical regulations for dischargers of toxic pollutants who
demonstrate that they are fundamentally different from the other dischargers in their category.
This comment will outline the development of these variance provisions as well as the development of the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act (hereinafter referred to as the FWPCA), which governs those provisions. Previous judicial interpretations of the variance provisions will be
analyzed and the policy issues raised by the decision will be discussed.
This comment takes the position that the variance provisions are necessary for effective enforcement of the FWPCA.
I. BACKGROUND

A.

Legislative Background

In October 1972, the FWPCA was amended by Congress to set a
national goal of eliminating the discharge of pollutants into navigable
waters by 1985.2 Prior to 1972, regulations were aimed at aiding the
3
states to provide for enforcement of specific water quality standards.
Taking a new approach, the 1972 amendments emphasized regulations
based on discharges instead of regulations based solely on water quality.
The nature and extent of the administrative problems that the
FWPCA would provoke were not fully recognized in 1972. To provide
guidance on the character and scope of corrections that might be necessary during the first years of implementation, Congress created a National Commission on Water Quality. 4 Based on the final report of the
Commission and testimony from industry representatives, the EPA, environmental groups, scientists, and federal, state. and local officials,
Congress amended the FWPCA in the Clean Water Act of 1977. 5 The
1. 105 S. Ct. 1102 (1985).

2. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1976).
3. I F. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 3-80 (1973).
4. 33 U.S.C. § 1325 (1976).
5. The House passed H.R. 3199 on April 5, 1977, and shortly thereafter the EPA
submitted to both Houses a package of amendments approved by the Carter Administration. After further hearings in both Houses, the Senate passed S. 1952 on August 4, 1977.
At the same time, it passed H.R. 3199, completely rewritten to reflect the substance of S.
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purpose of most of the 1977 amendments 6 was to correct specific implementation problems, especially those that were raised by the provisions
dealing with toxic pollutants, 7 in order to better regulate pollution at
the point of discharge.
Congressman Ray Roberts described the amendments to Title III of
the FWPCA and its provisions dealing with toxic pollutants as "the most
important and far-reaching amendments." Indeed, to Congress, the
public and the many industries involved, these amendments were of
great concern. The principal mechanism designated for regulating the
discharge of toxic pollutants, § 307 of the FWPCA, 9 had been more difficult for the EPA to implement than Congress had expected in 1972.
Congress was unaware of the lack of information on toxicity, persistence, and bioaccumulation of pollutants. Moreover, the period of time
within which the EPA was to publish a list of toxic pollutants and promulgate regulations was unrealistically short. The promulgated standards could not be met within the time allowed for compliance and thus
posed a threat of severe economic hardship on individual plants. The
pollutant-by-pollutant regulatory approach made long-range planning
impossible for industry because standards were to be issued for pollutants that would likely require different control technologies. Faced
with these problems and concerns, the EPA was slow to implement
§ 307.10 This delay, however, upset environmental action groups, who
brought four lawsuits to compel the EPA to regulate toxics promptly
and to issue pretreatment regulations. I ' In 1975 and 1976, the EPA
developed a strategy designed both to reduce the burden on industry
and to regulate the discharge of toxic pollutants. This strategy, which
provided the basis for the settlement of the four lawsuits, was approved
in a consent decree issued by Judge Flannery of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in 1976.12
The consent decree strategy was essentially adopted by Congress in
the 1977 amendments to correct the numerous problems of § 307 im1952. The bill agreed upon after further hearings, H.R. 3199, was printed on December 6,
accompanied by the Conference Report, H.R. REP. No. 830, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
Both Houses passed the bill by substantial majorities on December 15. Hall, The Clean
lWater Act of 1977, 11 NAT. RESOURCEs LAw. 343-72 (1978).
6. Although the amendments themselves are entitled the "Clean Water Act of
1977," § 2 of the Clean Water Act amends FWPCA § 518 to read: "This Act may be cited
as the 'Federal Water Pollution Control Act' (commonly referred to as the Clean Water
Act)." Throughout this comment, references to the "amendments" refer to the 1977
amendments and references to the FWPCA refer to the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act. The corresponding U.S.C. cite will be given in the footnote the first time a section of
the FWPCA is cited.
7. Toxic pollutants are defined in § 502 of the FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. § 1512 (1982).
8. 123 CONG. REC. H12926 (1977).
9. 33 U.S.C. § 1317 (1976), amended by 33 U.S.C. § 1317 (1982).
10. 41 Fed. Reg. 23576-23578 (1976) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 129 (1985)). A history
of the specific problems faced by the EPA is provided by Hall, supra note 5.
11. NRDC v.Train, 8 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2120 (D.D.C. 1976), modified sub nom.
NRDC v. Costle, 12 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1833 (D.D.C. 1979), modified sub nom. NRDC v.
Gorsuch, 17 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2013 (D.D.C. 1982), modified sub nom. NRDC v. Ruckelshaus, Consol. No. 2153-73 et. al. (Jan. 6, 1984).
12. NRDC v. Train, 8 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2120 (D.D.C. 1976).
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plementation.13 The EPA was to develop and issue effluent guidelines,
pretreatment standards, and new source performance standards for
twenty-one major industries covering sixty-five groups of pollutants by
December 31, 1979.14 These guidelines were to be implemented in accordance with §§ 301, 304, 306, and 307.15 No point source 16 was to
discharge without a permit issued by the EPA or by a state with an approved permit program under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimina17
tion System (NPDES), which is set forth in § 402 of the Act.
Pretreatment standards are set forth in § 307(b) of the FWPCA. 18
Under this section, the EPA is required to designate the category or categories of dischargers to which these standards apply. Pursuant to the
consent decree and legislative intent, effluent limitations for dischargers
that expel pollutants not susceptible to treatment by sewage systems or
that interfere with the operation of those systems are regulated under
the two-phase approach applied to direct dischargers in § 301(b) 19 of
the FWPCA. 20 This approach requires that dischargers comply with the
best practicable control technology currently available (BPT) by July 1,
197721 and subsequently meet more stringent effluent standards consistent with the best available technology economically achievable (BAT).
For toxic pollutants, the BAT standard must be met by July 1, 1984. As
control technology, processes, operating methods, or other alternatives
change, the EPA is required by § 307(b)(2) to revise the pretreatment
standards following the procedure established by § 307(b).
The special provision for revising pretreatment standards is one of
the few provisions in the FWPCA allowing for the revision or modification of standards. Prior to 1972, only § 301(c), 2 2 which permits the
plant-by-plant modification of BAT standards on the grounds of eco13.

Congress sanctioned the consent decree approach to establishing pretreatment

standards for indirect dischargers. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Costle, 636
F.2d 1229, 1244 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
14. All of the pollutants listed are carcinogens, suspect carcinogens, or seriously toxic
at low concentrations and are discharged by one or more of the industries. These 21
industries discharge substantial quantities of at least some of the listed pollutants.
15. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1314, 1317 (1982) and §§ 1311, 1316 (1982 & Supp. 1 1983).
16. "The term 'point source' means any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete
fissure, container, rolling stack, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other
floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14)
(1982).
17. 33 U.S.C. § 1412 (1982).
18. 33 U.S.C. § 1317(b) (1982).
19. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (1982).
20. See NRDC v. Train, 8 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2120 (D.D.C. 1976); H.R. REP. No.
830, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 87, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4326, 4462.
21. BPT is defined as "the establishment of a range of best practicable levels, to be
based on: the average of the best existing performance by plants of various sizes, ages, and
unit processes within each industrial category."
CONG.,

IST SESS.,

A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

AMENDMENTS OF 1972 at 169 (1973).

SENATE COMM. ON PUB. WORKS, 93D

OF THE WATER

POLLUTION

CONTROL ACT

Although the deadline for BPT passed in 1977, the

EPA is required to issue BPT level standards as an interim measure pending development
of more stringent standards. The electroplating BPT-level pretreatment standards are
such standards.
22. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(c) (1976).
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nomic hardship, existed as an express statutory authority for relaxing a
limitation. The 1977 amendments, however, added § 301(g) 2 3 which allows modification of BAT standards if a discharger can show that the
modification will not degrade water quality, nor result in the discharge
of pollutants that may endanger humans or the environment. The section, however, expressly provides that these modifications do not apply
24
to toxic pollutants.
Central to the controversy surrounding Chemical ManufacturersAssociation is another provision prohibiting modifications of provisions dealing
with toxic pollutants. Section 1311(1),25 added by the 1977 amendments, provides that the EPA may not modify any requirement of § 1311
as it applies to any toxic pollutant. The EPA's treatment of this provision will be examined in the next section.
B.

Administrative Background

The EPA has developed BPT, BAT, and pretreatment regulations, 26 which cover twenty-one major industry categories and sixty-five
toxic pollutants or groups of pollutants, through a series of extensive
rulemaking proceedings set out in § 307 of the FWPCA. In developing
these regulations, the EPA must take into account certain factors in
§ 304(b), such as age of equipment, age and type of facilities, and the
process employed. 2 7 The EPA compiles extensive data, including scientific information on the pollutants discharged by an industry, and establishes subcategories within the industry to reflect any differences
identified by the data among segments of the industry.
The EPA realized early in the rulemaking process that data for each
statutory factor for every discharger in an industry category could not be
obtained. Thus, establishment of accurate subcategories was not always
possible. The EPA also recognized that, if the § 304(b) factors were to
be considered in the establishment of limitations and standards applicable to a plant, a procedure for considering those factors in an individual
proceeding for plants that demonstrated that they were fundamentally
different from the plants that the EPA examined in developing the regulations was needed. With this scheme in mind, the EPA developed "fundamentally different factor" variance provisions (hereinafter referred to
28
as the "FDF variance provision").
Section 403.13 of the General Pretreatment Regulations for Existing and New Sources of Pollution, 2 9 challenged in Chemical Manufac23. 33 U.S.C. § 1 3 1 1(g) (1982) (amending 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1976)).
24. Noticeably absent from the statutory scheme of the FWPCA is a BPT variance
provision. See infra notes 32 & 33 and accompanying text.
25. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(l) (1982) (amending 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1976)).
26. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
27. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b) (1982).
28. 40 C.F.R. § 403.13 (1983) is the FDF variance provision that applies to indirect
dischargers who discharge wastes into publicly owned treatment works. 40 C.F.R.
§ 125.30 (1985) is the FDF variance provision that applies to direct dischargers who discharge wastes directly into navigable waters.
29. 40 C.F.R. § 403.13 (1985).
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turers Association, applies to indirect dischargers. The section provides, in
relevant part, that a request for the establishment of pretreatment standards less stringent than those required by the statute shall only be approved if the requester3 0 can demonstrate that it is fundamentally
different in ways corresponding to § 304 factors. 3 ' In addition, the discharger must show that compliance with the regulations promulgated
for its category would result in costs out of proportion to the costs considered by the EPA or, in the alternative, that compliance results in a
non-water quality environmental impact more adverse than the impact
considered during development of the pretreatment standards. Section
403.13 also provides for public notice of the FDF application and a pub-

lic hearing.
Noticeably absent from the statutory scheme of the FWPCA is a
BPT variance provision. 32 Section 403.13 makes no distinction between
BPT and BAT in its variance provisions. Thus, the EPA has provided
BPT variance provisions for every category and subcategory of industrial point sources for which it has promulgated regulations. All BPT
variance provisions are similar in form, allowing for a variance from BPT
standards upon a showing that factors in existence at the individual
point source are fundamentally different from those considered by the
EPA in promulgating regulations for the point source's category. The
EPA has stated that, because § 301 (c) of the FWPCA expressly provides
for modifications of only BAT standards based on economic factors,
only non-economic technological and engineering factors will be considered in granting a BPT variance to avoid violations of § 301(c). 33 The
courts have struggled with FDF variances for BPT standards and toxic
pollutants. Pursuant to the decision of the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit in National Association of Metal Finishers v. EPA,34 the EPA
30. A "requester" is defined as an industrial user or other interested person seeking a
variance from the limits specified in a categorical pretreatment standard. 40 C.F.R.
§ 403.13(a) (1985).
31. Factors considered fundamentally different include the nature, quality, and volume of pollutants contained in the raw waste load of the user's process wastewater; the
energy requirements of the application of control and treatment technology; the age, size,
and land configuration as they relate to the user's facilities; and the cost of compliance
with required control technology. 40 C.F.R. § 403.13(d) (1985). Factors not considered
fundamentally different include the feasibility of installing the required equipment within
the statutory deadline and the user's ability to pay for the required equipment. 40 C.F.R.
§ 403.13(e) (1985).
32. This absence may be explained by the fact that BPT standards. designed to require the best practicable technology to be used, are not strict standards. If the technology is not practicable, then the technology is not required for compliance. BAT standards,
designed to require the best available technology to be used, are more strict. If the technology is not practicable under the BAT standards, the discharger has no alternative but
to apply for a variance stating that compliance is not practicable. Also missing from the
statutory scheme is any reference to "categories and classes of point sources" for BPT
standards. See 33 U.S.C. § 131 l(b)(l) (1982). This omission has resulted in litigation as to
whether EPA has authority to issue regulations for BPT or whether BPT must be decided
on a plant-by-plant basis. See American Iron and Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027 (3d Cir.
1975).
33. 30 Fed. Reg. 30,073 (1974) (memorandum of Assistant Administrator for Enforcement and General Counsel).
34. See infra note 59.
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amended § 403.13 to prohibit variances for toxic pollutants. 3 5 The following section examines that decision and prior decisions interpreting
the FDF variance provisions and the FWPCA.
C. JudicialBackground
The contours of the "fundamentally different factor" variance provisions will be an active subject for future litigation over BPT.3 6 The
few district courts that have reviewed the variance provisions have rendered ambiguous and vague decisions. Consequently, appellate courts
have struggled with the precedential value and meaning of these
decisions.
The first challenge to the BPT variance provisions was in NRDC v.
EPA, 3 7 in which the NRDC argued that variance provisions violate the
congressional goal of uniformity and the goal that subcategories be the
only means of dealing with variations among dischargers. The court disagreed and held that Congress intended uniform treatment only for similar plants. The court based its decision on the fear that, in formulating
requirements for thousands of plants, the EPA would overlook the distinguishing characteristics of individual plants. Emphasizing this rationale, the majority stated that "without variance flexibility, the program
'38
might well founder on the rocks of illegality."
In 1976, the Fourth Circuit struck down the EPA's interpretation of
the BPT variances. In Appalachian Power Co. v. Train,3 9 the court held
that the BPT variance provision for steam-electric generating plants
should have included the consideration of the economic effects on individual point sources. The court held that a discharger's "economic capability" should be considered in deciding whether to grant a BPT
variance because it must be considered under § 301(c), the variance provision for BAT. 40 The court reasoned that because BPT standards were
not meant to be more stringent than BAT standards and because BAT
variances were permitted for economic reasons, variances should also be
41
allowed from BPT standards for economic reasons.
In 1976, the Fourth Circuit also decided E. I. DuPont de Nemours &
Co. v. Train,4 2 criticizing just as it did in Appalachian Power, the EPA's
failure to consider economic factors in granting BPT variances. In E. I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train,4 3 the Supreme Court granted certiorari
to consider the issue of BPT variances. DuPont had challenged the
EPA's authority under § 301 of the FWPCA to issue industry-wide regu35. 49 Fed. Reg. 5131, 5132 (1984) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 403).
36. Note, Annual Water Quality Committee Review of Significant Legislative, Judicial,and Administrative Developments in 1979: Clean Water Act, 13 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 231, 238 (1980).
37. 537 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1976).
38. Id. at 647.
39. 545 F.2d 1351 (4th Cir. 1976).
40. The EPA has stated that consideration of economic factors in granting BPT variances violates § 301(c) of the FWPCA. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
41. Appalachian Power, 545 F.2d at 1359.
42. 541 F.2d 1018 (4th Cir. 1976).

43. 430 U.S. 112 (1977).
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lations limiting discharges by existing plants. The Court held that "the
FWPCA authorizes the 1977 limitations (BPT) as well as the 1983 limitations (BAT) to be set by regulation [instead of on a plant-by-plant basis
at the permit-issuing stage], so long as some allowance is made for variations in individual plants, as the EPA has done by including a variance
clause in its 1977 limitations. ' 4 4 The Court, however, also held that the
plants that are unable to
EPA may withhold variances from individual
45
comply with the new source standards.
The rationale of DuPont is particularly difficult to understand. First,
the Court concluded that the FWPCA authorizes BPT limitations to be
set by regulation so long as some allowance is made for variations in
individual plants. The Court does not cite to any portion of the FWPCA
that expressly or impliedly makes such a statement. Thus, it appears
that the Court's reasoning is the sole basis for its conclusion. Second,
by upholding the EPA's decision to prohibit variances for plants unable
to comply with the new source standards, the Court seems to contradict
itself.4 6 Finally, the Court's discussion of Congress' intent to set limita-

tions by regulation in order to promote uniformity within a class and
category of point sources 4 7 is not reconciled with the Court's strong
statement for the allowance of variances.
The vagueness of DuPont leaves much room for differing interpretations of the Court's holding. Subsequent decisions have interpreted DuPont as holding that variances are allowable and necessary, although
DuPont easily may be read as holding just the opposite. For instance, in
Weyerhauser v. Costle,4 8 pulp and paper makers challenged the 1977 regu-

lations promulgated by the EPA. The Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia disagreed with the implication in Appalachian Power that
those permits that impose requirements beyond a source's economic capability are unacceptable. The court held that the fact that a discharger
could not afford to comply need not control the BPT variance decision. 49

In both Weyerhauser and Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 5 0 chal-

lenged regulations

were

upheld because

the "crucial"

variance

mechanism provided the necessary flexibility. 5 1 The Fourth Circuit

again considered BPT variances in Consolidation Coal Co. v. Costle5 2 and,
44. Id. at 128.
45. Id. at 138.
46. There is contradiction by allowing variances from BPT requirements to account
for differences in plants but not allowing variances unless there is statutory authority for
them. There is no statutory authority allowing BPT variances (§ 301 (e) and § 301 (g) only
apply to modifications of the § 301(b)(2) BAT limitations). Perhaps the contradiction can
be resolved by reasoning that new sources are more flexible than existing sources and that
existing sources vary greatly and are not easily changed to fit rigid classifications. Thus,
the Court would rather force flexible new sources into compliance with standards that may
be impossible for misclassified existing plants to attain.
47. DuPont, 541 F.2d at 128-33.
48. 590 F.2d 1011, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
49. Id. at 1035-36.
50. 612 F.2d 1232 (10th Cir. 1979).
51. Weyerhauser, 590 F.2d at 1040-41; Kennecott, 612 F.2d at 1243-44.
52. 604 F.2d 239 (4th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 449 U.S. 64 (1980).
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consistent with its decision in Appalachian Power, held that a discharger
must show both that BPT is beyond its economic capability and that the
proposed lesser reductions represented "reasonable further progress"
towards the goal of eliminating pollutant discharges. 5 3 The judicial
confusion in interpreting these provisions of the FWPCA is evidenced
by the reversal of the decision the following year.
In 1980, NRDC petitioned the Fourth Circuit for review of EPA's
compliance with the 1976 Appalachian Power decision. In a case also entitled Appalachian Power Co. v. Train5 4 (Appalachian Power II), NRDC argued that Congress' enactment in 1977 of § 301(l) barred FDF
variances for toxic pollutants. The EPA argued that § 301 (1) of the Act
applied only to the § 301(c) and § 3 01(g) modifications. The Fourth
Circuit agreed and held that an FDF variance is not a modification of
applicable limitations, but instead an individual determination of the appropriate limitations. 55 Thus, the court held that § 301 (l) did not apply
to BPT variances and thereby, reflected a change in thinking after DuPont. It is evident that courts have encountered great difficulty in making consistent decisions in the face of changing statutory regulations.
In a case resembling the 1976 Appalachian Power decision, the BPT
variance question once again reached the Supreme Court from the
Fourth Circuit. In EPA v. National Crushed Stone Association,5 6 the Court
held that the EPA may withhold variances from individual polluters who
are economically unable to comply with the BPT limitations. 5 7 The
Court reasoned that Congress intended to force polluters to comply
with minimal standards or shut down. 58 Implicit in the holding was an
acknowledgment that variances from the BPT limitations for those economically able to comply are permitted.
In 1983, the Third Circuit considered the BPT variance provision.
In National Association of Metal Finishers v. EPA, 5 9 NRDC argued that
§ 301 (1) prohibits BPT variances for toxic pollutants. Reminiscent of its
argument in Appalachian Power H, the EPA argued that § 301 (1) applies
only to § 301(c) and § 301(g) modifications. The Third Circuit agreed
with NRDC and held that § 301(1) applies to BPT variances. The court
disagreed with the Appalachian Power H decision and distinguished the
DuPont decision as applying only to BPT variances and not to BAT or
60
pretreatment standards.
In 1984, the Supreme Court addressed the validity of EPA regulations promulgated pursuant to the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1977.61 In Chevron, U.S.A. v. NRDC,6 2 environmental groups filed a pe53. Id. at 244.
54. 620 F.2d 1040 (4th Cir. 1980).
55. Id. at 1047.
56. 449 U.S. 64 (1980).
57. The 1976 Appalachian Power decision was not overruled on the specific point that
National Crushed Stone addressed-withholding variances for economic reasons.
58. National Crushed Stone, 449 U.S. at 77-78.
59. 719 F.2d 624 (3d Cir. 1983).
60. Id. at 644-46.
61. 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(6) (1982).
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tition to review EPA regulations 63 that allowed states to treat all of the
pollution-emitting devices within the same industrial grouping as
though they were encased within a single "bubble." 64 The regulations
were promulgated to implement § 172(b)(6) of the Clean Air Act. The
amendments, much like sections of the Clean Water Act Amendments,
require states that have not achieved the national air quality standards to
establish a permit program regulating new or modified major stationary
sources of air pollution. Under these regulations, an existing plant that
contained several pollution-emitting devices could install or modify one
piece of equipment without meeting the permit conditions if the alteration would not increase the total emissions from the plant. Justice Stevens, expressing the unanimous view of the Court, held that the EPA
regulations allowing states to treat all of the pollution-emitting devices
within the same industrial grouping as though they were encased within
a single "bubble" were based on a reasonable construction of the term
"stationary source" in § 172(b)(6). The Court stated that Congress did
not have a specific intent as to the applicability of the "bubble concept"
and that the EPA's use of that concept was a reasonable policychoice for
the agency to make.
In 1985, the Supreme Court again granted certiorari to address the
variance issue and the EPA's interpretation of congressional intent. In
Chemical Manufacturers Association, the Court addressed many of the unresolved problems and ambiguities spawned by the complex legislative
65
and judicial history of the BPT variance provisions.
II.

FACTS OF CHEMICAL MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION V. NATURAL
RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC.

In NationalAssociation of Metal Finishers,66 the National Association of
Metal Finishers, the Institute for Interconnecting and Packaging Electronic Circuits and Ford Motor Company filed petitions in the Court of
67
Appeals for the Third Circuit for review of the BPT-level pretreatment
standards for the electroplating point source category. 68 In the same
action, NRDC and other petitioners sought review of the electroplating
standards and of the general pretreatment regulations promulgated and
69
amended by the EPA.
62. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
63. 40 C.F.R. § 51.180)(10) (1985).
64. Hence, this method of categorization is often referred to as "the bubble concept."
65. The Supreme Court has previously upheld regulations because the provision for
exception or variance helped assure the parties of due process. See United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742, 755 (1972); FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 377 U.S. 33,
40-41 (1964); United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192, 205 (1956). Chemical
Mfrs. Ass'n, 105 S. Ct. at 1112 n.25.
66. 791 F.2d 624 (3d Cir. 1983).
67. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
68. Promulgated on September 7, 1979 in 44 Fed. Reg. 52,590 (1979) and amended
in 46 Fed. Reg. 9462 (1981) (codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 413.01-84 (1985)).
69. Promulgated in 43 Fed. Reg. 27,736 (1978) and amended in 46 Fed. Reg. 9404
(1981) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 403 (1985)).
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Among the disputed provisions of the pretreatment regulations was
the FDF variance provision set forth in § 403.13 of the General Pretreatment Regulations for New and Existing Sources of Pollution. 70 NRDC
and other petitioners sought a declaration that § 301(1)71 of the FWPCA
prohibited the EPA from issuing FDF variances for pollutants, listed as
toxic under the FWPCA, including those from electroplating operations. 72 The EPA and the Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA)
argued otherwise. The Third Circuit invalidated the FDF variance provision and remanded the provision to the EPA. Subsequently, the EPA
amended § 403.13 to clarify that "the pretreatment FDF variance provision is not available for toxic pollutants." ' 73 The CMA and other respondents appealed to the Supreme Court, contending that the EPA
may issue an FDF variance from toxic pollutant effluent limitations
promulgated under the FWPCA.
III.

CHEMICAL MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION V. NATURAL RESOURCES
DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC.

In a five-to-four decision, 74 the United States Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit and held that neither legislative intent, nor the
objectives of the FWPCA precluded EPA's statutory interpretation. The
majority and dissent addressed three questions central to the FDF variance provision controversy. First, the Court considered whether the
Third Circuit was correct in ruling that § 301(1) precludes the granting
of variances for toxic pollutants to plants that can show the existence of
a factor not considered by the EPA in establishing national regulations.
Second, the Court considered whether the Third Circuit's decision was
contrary to the Court's holding in DuPont. Finally, the Court asked if the
decision below improperly removed the EPA's discretion to deal with
atypical regulatory situations and to interpret the statute governing its
regulations.
The majority based its discussion of § 301(l) on the plain meaning
of the section and the legislative history of the FWPCA. Although the
minority also relied on a plain meaning interpretation and the legislative
history, its interpretation contrasts sharply with the majority's
interpretation.
In examining the meaning of § 301(1), the majority and minority
reached two different interpretations of the phrase "may not modify any
requirement of this section." '7 5 The majority refused to read the word
70. 40 C.F.R. § 403 (1985).
71. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(1) (1982).
72. The facts of the case do not actually state that a particular variance was applied to
a point source in the electroplating category. However, the challenged variance provision,
§ 403.13 provides for FDF variance from pretreatment standards such as those for the
Electroplating Point Source Category.
73. 49 Fed. Reg. 5131, 5132 (1984) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 403.13(a)(2)(1985)).
74. Justice White wrote the opinion of the Court. Justice Marshall filed the dissenting
opinion, joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens. Justice O'Connor joined in part of the
dissent.
75. Section 301(1) provides that "the Administrator may not modify any requirement
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"modify" broadly to encompass any change or alteration in standards.
The Court reasoned that it makes no sense to construe the statute to
forbid the EPA from amending its own standards, correcting errors, and
imposing stricter limitations. 7 6 The dissent, on the other hand, determined that the phrase proscribes all modifications of the toxic pollutant
standards. 7 7 Both opinions used congressional silence on the issue to
support their interpretations. The majority determined that congressional silence clearly proved that the § 301(l) prohibition applied only
to § 301 (c) and § 301 (g) modifications because any express intent to ap78
ply the section to FDF variances is not found in the legislative history.
The minority found that absence of such expressed intent signaled a
general, unqualified prohibition of modifications to the toxic pollutant
79
standards, including the prohibition of variances for toxic pollutants.
The majority found that § 301(l) applied only to § 301(c) and
§ 3 01(g) modifications for a number of reasons. Turning to legislative
history, the Court traced the evolution of § 301(l) to its beginnings in
the Conference Committee and determined that § 301(1) was meant to
be a clarification of the statutory language of § 301(c) and § 301(g).
The Court reasoned that because § 301(c) was in force prior to the 1977
amendments and contains no language expressly prohibiting modifications for toxic pollutants, Congress intended § 301(1), added by the
amendments, to apply to § 301(c). 80 The Court further reasoned that
because the § 301 (1)ban on waivers for toxics and the § 301 (g) ban are
similarly worded, there is little support for the argument that § 301(l)
forbids anything more than modifications for toxic pollutants. 8 1 The
dissent found this reasoning dubious and unsupported and argued that
there was no reason to believe that Congress singled out the § 301(c)
and § 301(g) modifications as more pernicious from the standpoint of
an effective toxic control program. The dissent found the converse to
be true because Congress specifically provided for exemptions in these
areas, but not in other areas. According to the dissent, those areas Congress thought most critical to the toxic control program should not con82
tain variance or modification allowances.
The dissent's strongest argument centered on the importance of the
toxic control program. Using numerous citations from legislative history, including statements from Senator Muskie (the main proponent of
the 1977 amendments), the dissent reasoned that the control of toxic
pollutants was of such importance to Congress that it did not intend to
allow any modifications of the toxic pollutant provisions. 83 Thus, the
of this section as it applies to any specific pollutant which is on the toxic pollutant list
under § 1317(a)(1) of this title." 33 U.S.C. 1311(1) (1982).
76. Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n, 105 S. Ct. at 1108.
77. Id. at 1115 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 1109.
79. Id. at 1115 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 1108-09.
81. Id. at 1109 n.16.
82. Id. at 1116 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 1115 (Marshall, J.,dissenting).
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dissent concluded that § 301(l) was drafted and included in the 1977
84
amendments to expand the scope of prohibition against modifications.
NRDC argued that allowing FDF variances would render meaningless the § 301(1) prohibition against modification on the basis of economic and water quality factors. The majority answered this argument
by explaining that FDF variances are specifically unavailable for the
grounds that would satisfy § 301(c) and § 301(g).85 The dissent, however, did not address this issue, which had already been resolved by the
86
Court in National Crushed Stone.
In its final argument for allowance of variances, the EPA contended
that § 307(b)(2) expressly provides for revision of pretreatment standards, such as the electroplating standards, 8 7 and that an FDF variance
is more like a revision permitted by § 307 than like a § 301(c) or
§ 301(g) modification. Thus, if § 301(1) applies only to § 301(c) and
§ 301(g), the EPA argued, then § 301(1) does not apply to variances.
The majority agreed with the EPA 88 and added that § 307 also permits
the EPA to make a subcategory for a source fundamentally different
from other sources. Thus, the majority reasoned that issuing FDF variances is simply a different means of reaching the same end. 89 The dissent credited the majority with a strong argument on the § 307 issue,
but used extensive legislative history to argue that Congress intended
standards to be set and therefore revised on a categorical basis instead
of on an individual basis. 90 The dissent argued that variances are not at
all like the subcategories in § 307 because variances are granted on an
individual plant-by-plant basis. As the dissent observed, there is no
mechanism built into the variance provisions for the EPA to identify similarly situated dischargers. 9 1 Thus, the variance provisions run contrary
to the congressional objective of revision on a categorical basis.
The second major question considered in Chemical ManufacturersAssociation was whether the decision below contradicted the holding in DuPont. The majority simply stated that prohibiting FDF variances for
toxic pollutants would overrule the Court's decision in DuPont because
the regulations upheld in DuPont contained a variance clause that applied to toxic pollutants. The Court stated that Congress was obviously
aware of the DuPont decision and that, in the absence of express congressional intent, the Court should not infer that Congress meant to
84. Id. at 1117 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
85. Id.at 1111.
86. National Crushed Stone, 449 U.S. at 78.
87. Supra note 18 and accompanying text.
88. Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n, 105 S. Ct. at 1108.
89. Id. at 1111.
90. Id. at 1122-23. Senator Muskie stated that "[t]he Conferees intend that factors
described in § 304(b) be considered only within categories and classes of point sources
and that such factors not be considered at the time of the application of an effluent limitation to an individual point source within such a category or class." 118 CONG. REC. 33697
(1972). Senator Muskie did not distinguish between BAT and BPT factors, which are to be
promulgated for point sources and not for categories of point sources.
91. Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n, 105 S. Ct. at 1123 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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amend the FWPCA to overrule DuPont.9 2 The minority disagreed with
the majority's treatment of DuPont and stated that the case did not authorize the issuance of variances in any context relevant to Chemical Manufacturers Association. 9 3 The minority reasoned that the holding in DuPont
was limited to granting variances only when BPT standards were set by
regulation. 94 Thus, the dissent stated that Congress would not have
considered DuPont or necessarily have been aware of the decision in determining whether § 301(1) applied to FDF variances.
Finally, the Court considered whether the EPA's interpretation of
the FWPCA was entitled to deference. The majority stated that the
agency charged with administration of the statute is entitled to considerable deference and that the Court need only determine that the interpretation is a rational one. The Court held that only where Congress
has clearly expressed an intent contrary to the agency's interpretation of
the statute will the Court not defer to the agency's interpretation.
Where provisions of the statute have no plain meaning, as in § 301(1),
the majority determined that such provisions are a proper subject for
agency interpretation. 95 The dissent disagreed with the majority, arguing that only when congressional intent cannot be discerned is defer96
ence required.
The dissent strongly criticized the majority for incorporating policy
considerations into its opinion. In policy matters, the dissent asserted,
the courts should defer to Congress in the first instance and then to the
97
administrative agency in the absence of a clear congressional mandate.
IV.

ANALYSIS

Courts have struggled with the issue of BPT variances and no doubt
will continue to struggle with the issue after Chemical ManufacturersAssociation. Although the Supreme Court firmly stated that BPT variances will
be allowed for toxic pollutants, the split within the Court indicates differences on many points of the issue. Moreover, neither the legislative
history, nor prior case law are of much help in resolving those
differences .98
92. Id. at 1109.
93. Id. at 1118 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Interestingly, Justice Stevens authored the
majority opinion in DuPont, but joined the dissent in Chemical Mfrs. Ass 'n. Although the
majority and minority opinions in ChemicalMfrs. Ass n are sharply divided over DuPont, the
dissent may be the better indication of how the majority in DuPont wished the case to be
interpreted.
94. Id. at 1119 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
95.

Id. at 1108.

96. Id. at 1121 (Marshall,J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 1114 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
98. Indeed, perhaps the strongest indicator of the outcome was the fact that Justice
White authored the majority opinion. In the last Supreme Court decision on this issue,
National Crushed Stone, Justice White, also writing for the majority, deferred to the EPA's
interpretation of the statute. In DuPont,Justice White sided with the majority in allowing
the EPA to issue industry-wide regulations. Moreover, in a recent case, Immigration and
Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983),Justice White devoted a large portion
of his dissent to the present-day trend of deferring to administrative agency interpreta-
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Both the majority and minority in Chemical Manufacturers Association
agreed that the Administrator is entitled to deference when congressional intent cannot be discerned. 99 Both opinions made various attempts to point to legislative history to prove that § 301(l) was or was
not intended to apply to FDF variances. Neither the majority nor minority, however, could find specific history to support their views. For instance, the majority's determination that § 301(l) applies only to
§ 301(c) and § 301(g) is unsupported by the legislative history. The dissent argued that Congress would have no reason to draft § 301(l) to
apply to § 301(c) and § 301(g) when Congress could have instead
amended § 301(c) and § 301(g) in 1977. Moreover, there was no reason
expressed or implied by Congress for adding § 301 (1)only a few subsections after § 301(c) and § 301(g) to merely restate § 301(g).10 0 The minority may have gotten closer to discerning the true congressional intent
by arguing that toxic pollutants were a major concern in the debates and
concluding that § 301(1) was meant to expand the prohibition of modifications for toxic pollutants. Yet, the minority could not find any evidence of an express congressional intent to apply § 301(1) to FDF
variances, which are, as the Court had decided in National Crushed Stone,
different from § 301(c) and § 301(g) modifications. If the decision in
DuPont had been clearer, Congress may have addressed this specific issue. The confusion over DuPont in Chemical Manufacturers Association
reveals the differences in the Court about the precise holding of the
case; differences that, not surprisingly, are reflective of those in Congress. In view of the lack of conclusive legislative history, the majority
made the correct decision because, as both the majority and dissent recognized, where no clear congressional intent can be discerned, the
Court must defer to the administrative agency.
The Court's decision to defer to the agency's interpretation was
consistent with the Court's earlier unanimous decision to defer to the
EPA's use of the "bubble concept" in Chevron one year earlier. Justice
Stevens expressed the Court's inclination towards deference by noting
that
[w]hen a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute
which it administers . . .[and] if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court
is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.l 0 l
The Court's difficulties in finding a precise indication of congressional
intent in Chevron is not unlike the difficulties it later faced in Chemical
ManufacturersAssociation. The Chevron Court could find no specific refertions. Justice White stated that "[w]hen agencies are authorized to prescribe law through
substantive rulemaking, the administrator's regulation is not only due deference, but is
accorded 'legislative effect.' " Chadha, 462 U.S. at 986.
99. Supra notes 95 & 96 and accompanying text.
30
1(g), not § 30 1(c), states that modifications will not be allowed for tox100. Section
ics. However, there was no reason for Congress to draft § 30 1(1) to cover the inadequacy
in § 301(c) when Congress could simply have amended § 301(c).
101. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
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ence to the controversial "bubble concept," nor a specific definition of
the term "stationary source" in the legislative history.' 0 2 Yet, the Court
concluded that the absence of any express congressional language on
the issue did not foreclose the EPA from basing its implementation of
the Act's proscriptions on a reasonable interpretation of the "stationary
source" designation.' 0 3 Similarly, the Court in Chemical Manufacturers
Association could find no specific reference to variance provisions in the
legislative history. Congress had no specific knowledge of FDF variances and, therefore, never specifically addressed the issue. The majority, finding no precise language about variances, deferred to the EPA.
The minority, however, reasoned that the general intent of Congress
was to regulate and almost fully curtail the discharge of toxic pollutants
into the environment. Thus, the minority concluded that this general
intent was so precise as to obviate the possibility of deference and cast
reasonable doubts upon the correctness of the EPA's interpretation.
The controversy between the majority and minority in Chemical
Manufacturers Association stems from differing interpretations of the holding in Chevron. Stated simply, the disagreement between the sides revolves around the question of "How precise is 'precise'?" In Chevron,
Justice Stevens set the standard for deference, "whether Congress has
directly spoken to the precise question at issue,"' 0 4 but failed to define
"precise." However, after considering the general intent expressed in
the statements of Senator Muskie, 10 5 Justice Stevens concluded that the
intent was not sufficiently clear and deferred to the agency's interpretation. Although Justice Stevens joined the minority in Chemical Manufacturers Association, the minority failed to reconcile its opinion with Justice
Stevens' conclusion in Chevron. Thus, the question of precise intent is
still somewhat unclear. The majority, on the other hand, followed Chevron by deferring to the agency.
The minority criticized the majority for including policy issues in its
decision. Indeed, the majority was concerned with the EPA's inability to
adequately classify dischargers given the number of dischargers subject
to classification and the time constraints imposed upon the EPA. The
minority stated that such policy issues should be deferred to Congress in
the first instance and to the administrative agency in the absence of congressional mandate. 10 6 However, both opinions conceded that there
was no congressional mandate.
The EPA has promulgated its regulations relying on the variance
provisions to provide a feasible way for fundamentally different dis102. Id. at 851.
103. Id. at 861-62. The Court explained that it was not persuaded that parsing of general terms in the text of the statute will reveal an actual intent of Congress. "We know full
well that this language is not dispositive; the terms are overlapping and the language is not
precisely directed to the question of the applicability of a given term in the context of a
larger operation."

Id.
104. Id. at 842.
105. Id. at 853.
106. Chemical Afrs. Ass'n, 105 S. Ct. at 1114 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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chargers to comply. The variance provisions not only allow the fundamentally different discharger to stay in business, but more importantly
reduce the chances of such a discharger turning to "midnight dumpers"
for disposal of wastes or polluting waterways by simply not complying
with the regulations. The variances are not an exemption from the regulations, but instead simply provide a feasible means of compliance for
fundamentally different dischargers.107
CONCLUSION

The legislative history of the FWPCA and its amendments do not
specifically discuss variances for toxic pollutants. In the absence of discernible congressional intent, both the majority and minority in Chemical
ManufacturersAssociation agreed that deference is owed to the administrative agency. By deferring to the EPA's interpretation of the FWPCA, the
Court placed the difficult decision of granting variances for toxic effluent
limitations in the bailiwick of the most competent interested party. The
variance policy provides a feasible way for misclassified plants to comply
with regulations and reduces the chances of misclassified plants being
forced into "midnight dumping," non-compliance, or bankruptcy. It
would be both unreasonable and unjust to force the closure of a misclassified plant where it can be demonstrated that the plant is economically
incapable of achieving compliance. Furthermore, if the EPA's program
of water pollution control is "[w]ithout variance flexibility, the program
might well founder on the rocks of illegality."'")
Alison L. Taylor

107. For instance, the example of Freeport Chemical Co. is evidence of the necessity of
variances. The EPA found that the Freeport plant design differed so fundamentally from
the other phosphoric acid plants in its category that the regulations when applied to Freeport allowed no discharge whatsoever. Freeport would have had to have spent $27 million
to retrofit their plant to comply with the regulations, as compared to the $500,000 spent
by the other plants in its category. Other than Freeport, only one variance has been
granted. Thus, the EPA is not granting variances indiscriminately or with any regularity.
Petitioner's Brief at 8, Chemical .1fs. .-Iss'n v. .VRDC. 105 S. Ct. 1102 (1985).
108. NRDC v. EPA, 537 F.2d at 647.

